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Most research on sustainable tourism has been devoted to understanding the determinants of tourists' sustainable behavior on a unidimensional construct, overlooking the importance of behavioral costs in sustainable travel behavior. To shed light on this issue, this study aims to quantitatively differentiate sustainable travel behaviors based on behavioral costs and to examine the impact of psychological factors on both low-cost and high-cost sustainable travel behaviors.

A survey of 470 tourists used Rasch analysis to measure the behavioral costs associated with sustainable travel behavior and partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) to test hypotheses.

The results indicate that the value-identity-personal norm model explains more variance in low-cost sustainable travel behaviors than in high-cost sustainable travel behaviors. This supports the central tenet of the low-cost hypothesis and also suggests that values and self-identity factors have a stronger influence on low-cost sustainable travel behavior. However, personal norms have a stronger influence on high-cost behaviors.

This research highlights the importance for tourism and destination managers to distinguish between different categories of sustainable travel behavior and to analyze their determinants separately. This allows for the development of tailored messages for specific groups of tourists based on the psychological drivers of sustainable travel behavior.

This study provides insights into the determinants of sustainable travel behaviors with different behavioral costs and highlights the importance of analyzing different categories of behaviors separately.

A prime objective of the Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (SBA; Clean India Mission) is to motivate people to segregate their household waste. The purpose of this study is to assess the ground reality of waste management behaviour of Delhi residents with the help of a modified Value–Belief–Norm (VBN) model. Past researches point the need to include cost as a variable in the VBN model. This study fulfils this need and tests cost as one of the variables on the gathered data.

The research data were gathered by interacting with the people and the civic staff in the jurisdiction of the three Delhi municipalities through a stratified sampling technique (N = 250). The structural equation modelling was used to analyse the collected data.

The modified VBN model explains the waste management behaviour, but the variables do not follow the exact causal chain. Values, awareness of consequences, ascription of responsibility and personal norms all explain the resident's waste management behaviour. However, cost limits the resident's waste management behaviour.

The study could only achieve a moderate model fit; its sample size was small; and data were collected through self-reported questionnaire.

Three main practical implications of the study are: (1) While designing waste management solutions, due importance must be given to the cost to be borne by people for adopting these solutions. (2) Design such interventions that target residents' values to convince them to make the desired behavioural change. (3) People need be educated about the ways to sort waste and made aware of the importance of waste segregation in eradicating the urban waste mess.

The paper is an original contribution to testing a modified VBN model in predicting waste management behaviour. The modified model includes cost as a variable missing in the previous research. This research is useful in the backdrop of the SBA and provides suggestions for policymakers and pro-environment researchers.

A country’s institutional environment influences every facet of its business. This paper aims to identify institutional factors (state ownership, government attention on employment and employees’ educational background) that affect the asymmetric cost behavior in China.

Using 2,570 listed firms’ data between 2002 and 2015, we use empirical models to explore the effects of state ownership, government attention on employment and employees’ educational background on the asymmetric cost behavior in China.

This study found that the asymmetric cost behavior of central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs) is greater than local state-owned enterprises (LSOEs). Meanwhile, the empirical results show that government attention on employment is reflected in five-year government plans, and employees’ educational backgrounds are positively associated with asymmetric cost behavior.

This study contributes to the economic theory of sticky costs, institutional theory and asymmetric cost behavior literature by providing evidence that shows how government intervention and employee educational background limit the flexibility of corporate cost adjustments. Additionally, this study provides guidance to policymakers by showing how government long-term plans affect firm-level resource adjustment decisions.

On the basis of labor economics theories, this study examines how adjustment in human capital accounts for labor cost stickiness.

This study makes use of employee education level as a measure of the quality of human capital and relies on data from Chinese public firms to conduct the empirical test. This study focuses on two important components of labor cost changes: one corresponding to the adjustment in the number of employees (capacity adjustment) and another corresponding to the adjustment in the mix of employee education levels (quality adjustment).

This study reveals that labor cost changes driven by the adjustment of employee education level are sticky. This stickiness cannot be explained by the standard adjustment cost theory. This further shows that firms that actively adjust their employee quality during downturns experience improved future performance. The findings are robust to alternative measures and specifications.

This study provides new evidence for and insights into the cost behavior literature. Previous studies treat input resources in a homogenous way and focus on the effect of capacity adjustment. This study considers the heterogeneity of resources and examines three dimensions of salary cost adjustment: capacity, structure, and unit cost. In line with the economic theory of sticky costs proposed by Banker et al. (2013a), the study’s evidence sheds light on the additional underlying economic mechanisms driving cost stickiness behavior. Specifically, managers asymmetrically adjust both employee structure and average salaries, in addition to employee number. This study also adds to the existing knowledge of the consequences of managers' actions regarding cost behavior.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between CEOs' inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and the operating leverage of the firms they manage, with the aim to examine whether CEO incentives play a role in corporate risk-taking.

The authors investigate the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (CIDH) (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and the operating leverage (DOL) of the firms they manage. Using a sample of 11,145 US firm-year observations over the period 2006–2017, the authors find a strong negative association between CIDH and DOL. Additional analyses reveal that the relationship between CIDH and DOL is more pronounced in firms with heightened agency issues, powerful CEOs and for CEOs with stronger professional networks. The results are robust to various sensitivity and endogeneity tests.

The authors find strong evidence confirming the expected negative association between CEO inside debt and DOL suggesting that firms with higher inside debt tend to maintain lower levels of operating leverage. These findings continue to hold with the alternative measure for the inside debt and operating leverage, and across a range of tests designed to rule out the possibility that the primary findings are in any way driven by potential endogeneity. In addition, the findings demonstrate that the presence of manager-shareholder agency conflicts can strengthen the inside debt–DOL relationship suggesting the strong role of inside debt in reducing firm risk.

Findings in this paper have implications for design of compensation structures so that corporate boards can establish incentives as a tool for risk management. A limitation of this study is that it is focused on one market, i.e. US listed companies, so the findings may not be applicable on a global scale.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that links firm-level management of operating leverage through design of CEO inside debt incentives (two obvious choices for risk-reduction at the CEOs’ disposal include reducing financial risk through reduction of firm leverage and reducing operating risk through reduction of operating leverage). While use of firm leverage as an instrument of choice has been explored in the past, use of operating leverage to achieve risk reduction when CEO possess high inside holding, has received very little attention.

The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to amplify the imperativeness for a re-oriented regulatory approach that prioritizes constructive engagement with the regulated communities, harnessing the existing pool of savings and retention of market participation.

The paper adopts a doctrinal legal research design with data drawn from primary and secondary sources of law. The primary sources include case laws and statutes, and the secondary sources include book chapters, journal articles and other internet-sourced materials.

The paper finds that the status quo in Nigeria if left to continue would spell severe economic disaster for Nigeria’s securities administration, but a well-structured realignment of the regulations would boost the country’s securities market effectiveness.

The research’s conclusions and suggestions might only be applicable to Nigeria’s particular situation with regard to capital market development and securities regulation. Other nations or locations with distinct regulatory systems, market structures and economic situations may not be able to immediately adapt it. When extending the research results outside of the Nigerian environment, caution should be exercised. For regulatory agencies and policymakers, the research offers insightful suggestions. The analysis may pinpoint certain areas where policy changes are required to address reoccurring problems and improve the chances for a healthy capital market.

For Nigeria’s regulatory frameworks controlling securities to be strengthened, this paper would be crucial. To make sure they are in line with global best practices, this entails examining and revising current laws, rules and standards. A stronger regulatory environment may also result from the implementation of harsher enforcement procedures and consequences for noncompliance. It is also required for creating market infrastructure, fostering market integration and cooperation, facilitating access to capital, monitoring and evaluation. It would also benefit investor education and protection.

Addressing these persistent issues and potential remedies in Nigeria’s capital market development and securities regulation would have various advantageous social effects. These include improved market infrastructure, more financial inclusion, improved investment protection for investors and improved market openness and integrity. Such results will help Nigerian society as a whole by fostering economic expansion, job creation, wealth distribution and general social progress.

This paper is the original work of the authors and has not been published anywhere nor submitted to another journal for publication.

The study aims to address a critical gap in existing healthcare payment schemes and care service pricing by recognizing the influential role of patients' decisions on self-management efforts. These decisions not only impact health outcomes but also shape the demand for care, subsequently influencing care costs. Despite the significance of this interplay, current payment schemes often overlook these dynamics. The research focuses on investigating the implications of a novel behavior-based payment scheme, designed to align incentives and establish a direct connection between patients' decisions and care costs. The primary objective is to comprehensively understand whether and how this innovative payment scheme structure influences key stakeholders, including patients, care providers, insurers and overall social welfare.

In this paper, we propose a game-theoretical model to incorporate the performance of self-management with the demand for healthcare service, compare the patient's effort decision for self-management and provider's price decision for healthcare service under a behavior-based scheme with that under two implemented widely payment schemes, that is, co-payment scheme and co-insurance scheme.

Our findings confirm that the behavior-based scheme incentives patient self-management more than current schemes while reducing their possibility of seeking healthcare service, which indirectly induces the provider to lower the price of the service. The stakeholders' utility under various payment schemes is sensitive to the cost of treatment and the perceived health utility of patients. Especially, patient health awareness is not always benefited provider profit, as it motivates patient self-management while diminishing the demand for care.

We provide a novel framework for characterizing behavior-based payment schemes. Our results confirm the need for modification of the current payment scheme to incentivize patient self-management.

Switching behavior is predominantly seen in the consumer buying behavior of the mobile industry. This research aims to identify the factors influencing consumers to switch from their present mobile service provider. The consumer of the mobile industry operates in a dynamic and ever-changing environment that is difficult to predict, so this paper aims to focus on these issues.

The selection of factors was made with the help of qualitative study and quantitative research methods for further findings; with the help of a structured questionnaire, a total of 514 valuable responses were collected to get the results. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA), confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and structural equation modeling (SEM) were used to analyze the data.

The finding shows that technology and edge-on-competition (TEC) and pricing have a negative influence on customer switching behavior. The switching cost (SC) is the most significant factor and has a positive impact, while service encounter failure (SEF) also positively impacts switching behavior.

The findings provide important implications for consumers switching brands if they are finding alternative offers that are cost-effective and SEF from service providers

The study of one of the largest mobile markets is learning lessons for other markets around the world. This study will be helpful for mobile service provider companies in their branding and marketing strategies. This study will also be helpful to practitioners, educators and researchers in understanding the consumer behavior of mobile users.

The learning of the largest mobile market will be a great learning lesson for other mobile markets around the world. Consumer behavior will help marketers follow ethical practices and make their strategy so a consumer does not switch brands and remain satisfied with the existing brand.

The study provides unique learning for practitioners, educators and researchers to understand the consumer behavior of mobile users. This will help marketers create factors that stop consumers from switching brands and develop strategies to retain customers.

The operation of water environment treatment Public-Private Partnership projects (WETP-PPP) is crucial to the project effectiveness. However, there are often problems in projects that attach importance to construction and neglect operation management, which seriously affect the project operation effect. To ensure the good operation effect of the WETP-PPP, an evolutionary game model of the regulation strategy during the operation period of WETP-PPP is constructed.

An evolutionary game model of regulation is established which considers the government, the project company and the public in water environment treatment Public-Private Partnership projects (WETP-PPP). Five scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. Finally, through the simulation, the influence of different factors on the choice of the three-party strategy is analyzed.

First, the key factors that affect the evolution game are the regulation costs and performance rewards of the government, the project company's operation costs and penalties for opportunism and the public supervision costs and rewards. Second, in order to ensure the operation effect, the government needs the performance incentive from the superior government. Third, the public's supervision enthusiasm needs to be mobilized by the government. Last, the penalty strength of speculative operation should be strong enough to play a deterrent role.

The theoretical research in this paper has some limitations. Initially, due to the large number of participants in WETP-PPP, in addition to the government department, the project company and the public studied in this paper, it also involves the consulting industry and financial institutions. In the future, more participants can be added to form four-party interest relationships and conduct four-party evolutionary game research. Second, the operation environment of WETP-PPP is complex and changeable, and various influencing factors are intertwined, the number of parameters involved in this paper is limited, and further detailed research is needed in the future.

Based on the evolutionary game theory, this article discusses the evolution law of the tripartite game behavior of the government department, the project company and the public, which is helpful to clarify the strategy evolution path of the tripartite in the WETP-PPP, and the generation condition and evolution mechanism of the equilibrium strategy of the tripartite game. The key parameters affecting the tripartite strategy selection are analyzed through simulation, which can provide reference for the government department to formulate relevant measures. At the same time, it broadens the application field of evolutionary games and supplements the research on the management mechanism of WETP-PPP during the operation period.

Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper introduces the supervision behavior of the public, which can provide a new perspective for researchers to conduct relevant research. Secondly, for the regulation during the operation of WETP-PPP, this paper can provide reference for the government department to establish a scientific public supervision system, improve the government supervision mechanism and other relevant measures, which can help promote the public supervision willingness, improve the regulation efficiency of the government and guide the project company to reduce speculation, so as to ensure the effect of water environment management.

This paper focuses on the regulation of WETP-PPP during the operation period to research interactions among the government, the project company and the public. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, some suggestions are put forward, such as perfecting the government regulation mechanism, optimizing the reward and punishment system for the project company and broadening the channels of public supervision. The research results of this paper can provide support for the government's regulation of WETP-PPP and ensure the project operation effect.

Transaction cost economics sees a broad spectrum of governance structures spanned by two types of economic adaptation: autonomous and cooperative. Stakeholder theorists have drawn much inspiration from transaction cost economics but have not paid explicit attention to the centrality of the idea of adaptation in this literature. This study aims to address this gap.

The authors develop a novel conceptual framework applying the distinction between the two types of economic adaptation to stakeholder theory.

The authors argue that the idea of cooperative adaptation is particularly useful for describing the firm’s collaboration with primary stakeholders in the joint value creation process. In contrast, autonomous adaptation is more relevant for firms interacting with secondary stakeholders who are not directly engaged in joint value creation and may not have formal contractual relationships with the firm. Accordingly, cooperative adaptation can be seen as vital for resolving team production problems affecting joint value creation, whereas autonomous adaptation addresses how the firm maintains legitimacy within the larger stakeholder environment.

Similar to its significance for transaction cost economics, the distinction between the two types of adaptation equips stakeholder theory with a new systematic understanding of a potentially broad spectrum of firm–stakeholder collaboration forms.