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The purpose of the paper is to explore an emerging challenge for large public‐sector bureaucracies: developing information and performance measurement systems that support anti‐corruption efforts.

The paper is an analytical framework linking functions and contexts of performance measurement to anti‐corruption requirements. The framework is used to explore a case study of the World Bank's ongoing efforts to strengthen anti‐corruption information systems in Indonesia.

The paper finds that a range of organizations are increasingly turning to performance measurement systems to fulfill several functions related to organizational integrity: to hold organizations accountable for reaching publicly stated standards of fiduciary responsibility and corruption control; to identify vulnerable operational points in multi‐faceted public enterprises; and to facilitate organizational learning regarding “what works”. Yet corruption is difficult to measure, and corruption vulnerabilities often arise from informal practices, insufficient incentives for enforcement or adherence to standards, and managerial blindspots. Enhanced information systems need to be coupled with effective and multi‐directional accountability arrangements in order for performance measurement to contribute effectively to corruption control.

The paper shows that improved information systems and a reassessment of managerial incentives and attitudes are both essential in order to reduce organizational vulnerability to corruption and to the public backlash that follows in the wake of corruption scandals.

The paper focusses on an emerging area of performance management likely to gain increasing visibility as large bureaucracies attempt to institutionalize public commitments to high anti‐corruption standards

The paper aims to examine how the measurement of African “corruption” has been manipulated to serve western economic interests.

In depth secondary source analysis within a post‐colonial framework.

The most popular measure of corruption, Transparency International's corruption perception index (CPI), is a flawed instrument. Capable only of calculating proxies of corruption, the measure is oblivious to cultural variance and is business‐centric in style. The CPI is embraced in good faith by African governments and donor organisations oblivious to its deeper purpose of serving western economic and geo‐political interests under the guise of weeding out something falsely portrayed as a universal negative.

The paper will assist efforts to ground the anti‐corruption effort in the realities of Africa.

The paper is part of a minority scholarship that seeks to provide space for the consideration of alternatives to the dominant conceptions of corruption and its measurement.

The purpose of this paper is to provide space for the consideration of alternatives to the dominant conceptions of corruption and its measurement.

The paper provides an in‐depth secondary source analysis within a post‐colonial framework.

The paper demonstrates how public administration can be subverted to the agenda of business by the way the measurement and management of African “corruption” is manipulated to serve Western economic interests. The conclusion reached is that the most popular measure of corruption, Transparency International's (TIs) corruption perception index (CPI), is a flawed instrument, capable only of calculating vague proxies of corruption. The index is oblivious to cultural variance and is business‐centric in style and philosophy.

The paper represents one of the first attempts to expose the business serving purpose of TI's CPI. A fresh approach to corruption is advocated around two principles; corruption cannot be comprehended outside the experience, nor can it submit to empirical investigation. A new corruption‐fighting role for the African Union is envisaged.

Citizens are demanding better performance from governments and they are increasingly aware of the costs of poor management and corruption. In view of scarce resources and the major transformations already underway in the global economy, identification and awareness of good governance and preventing corrupt practices have become key to ensuring structural reforms and critical investments necessary for encouraging, sustaining, and enhancing economic growth and competitiveness. Political corruption severely undermines government legitimacy and weakens the development of political, economic, social, and environmental structures.

This article aims to report on the development and validation of a bribery measurement index for the business sector, which, based on institutional theory, seeks to overcome the limitations of traditional measurements, recognizing the dynamics that originate the phenomenon and identifying process components.

To construct the index, correlational and principal component analysis techniques were used, as well as rigorous statistical tests, validating the instrument in a sample of 2,963 companies in Latin America, including Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru.

The result was an instrument composed of two dimensions: (1) anti-bribery game rules, composed of regulations knowledge and anti-bribery efforts, and (2) bribery as a perceived habit, allowing an objective representation of reality due to its internal consistency, concurrent and discriminant validity.

This instrument is one of the few that focuses on measuring bribery in the business sector in terms of corrupt practices, applicable for both public and private institutions to promote game rules against bribery. Additionally, the proposed theoretical model can be used to measure other phenomena with similar characteristics.

This article empirically highlights different variables that make bribery possible. The results can be helpful in the design of strategies to prevent this type of behavior. It also highlights the importance of designing mechanisms to record information related to bribery and the different expressions of corruption in order to explain its different nuances.

Este artículo informa sobre el desarrollo y validación de un índice de medición de soborno para el sector empresarial, que, basado en la teoría institucional, busca superar las limitaciones de las mediciones tradicionales, reconociendo las dinámicas que originan el fenómeno e identificando los componentes del proceso.

Para la construcción del índice se utilizaron técnicas de análisis correlacional y de componentes principales, así como rigurosas pruebas estadísticas, validando el instrumento en una muestra de 2.963 empresas de América Latina, entre ellas Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, México y Perú.

El resultado fue un instrumento compuesto por dos dimensiones: (1) reglas de juego antisoborno, compuestas por conocimiento normativo y esfuerzo antisoborno (2) soborno como hábito percibido, permitiendo una representación objetiva de la realidad debido a su consistencia interna, validez concurrente y discriminante.

Este artículo pone en evidencia empírica diferentes variables que hacen posible el soborno. Los resultados pueden ser útiles en el diseño de estrategias para prevenir este tipo comportamiento, también destaca la importancia de diseñar mecanismos para registrar la información relacionada con la lucha contra el soborno.

Este instrumento es uno de los pocos que se enfoca en medir el soborno en el sector empresarial en términos de prácticas de corrupción, útil para instituciones tanto públicas como privadas para promover mejores reglas de juego en contra del soborno. Adicionalmente el modelo teórico propuesto puede ser utilizado para medir otros fenómenos con características similares.

This paper aims to examine whether the level of corruption affects profitability and soundness of Islamic banking.

This paper uses a dynamic panel of 61 Islamic banks from 12 Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) countries covering the period between 2016 and 2018.

This paper finds that the empirical evidence examined shows that corruption does affect the profitability and soundness of Islamic banks.

The value of this paper is to emphasize further understanding of corruption behaviour on Islamic banking in Islamic countries. This paper contributes to filling the gaps in the current literature on corruption and Islamic banking. Existing literature has only focussed on either profitability or soundness of Islamic banking, whereas this paper analyses the impact of corruption levels for both performance measurements simultaneously.

The purpose of this paper is to argue that corruption is inherently unmeasurable. Measures of corruption produced by different sources are highly unsatisfactory. Useful measures may be possible for specific purposes in limited contexts. Reasons why highly unsatisfactory measures are in use have to do with politics and power, rather than utility of these measures.

The paper shows that different dimensions of corruption cannot be reduced to a single number without serious loss of information. For example the number and size of bribes cannot be reduced to a single index. The difference between perceptions of corruption and the reality also makes most popular indices useless.

The paper shows that commonly used measures of corruption are useless for their ostensible purposes. Evidence is presented that they are calculated and used for political purposes. In particular, they provide convenient excuses for the widespread failure of the structural adjustment programs of IMF and World Bank.

The paper's findings cast doubt on the vast amount of research which takes the corruption measures as objective and factual, and attempts to find causal factors for corruption, as well as effects of corruption on growth and other variables.

This study investigates the effects of fiscal decentralization on global competitiveness through the level of corruption. This study aims to clarify the causal impacts of fiscal decentralization policy on the achievement of competitiveness rank considering the degree of corruption in a country.

The paper uses an empirical study using both cross-country arithmetic mean and panel data, covering ten-year period (2005-2014). The analysis uses both linear and non-linear specification in search of actual intermediating effects of corruption with controlling the possible endogeneity.

The paper provides empirical insights about corruption effects of fiscal decentralization on global competitiveness. It suggests that increasing level of fiscal decentralization has a positive contribution to competitiveness for the less-corrupt countries. The adverse effects appear for corrupt countries where the delegation of fiscal authority should endanger the country competitiveness.

This research exploits the well-known measurement of fiscal decentralization, the degree of corruption and competitiveness. Therefore, this measurement might be challenged for representing the real concept of decentralization, corruption and competitiveness, furthermore its relationship. Despite the limitation, this research explores the entanglement of fiscal decentralization, corruption and competitiveness.

The paper provides the implications for the national policymakers about decentralizing the fiscal authority to achieve higher competitiveness level, through assessing their state of corruption.

The research provides additional comments for Oates’ (1972) decentralization theorem in connection to competitiveness, by adding corruption level as pre-requisite condition.

The purpose of this paper is to measure and investigate the determinants of corruption across Indian states.

This research begins by developing a corruption index (CI) based on official data on corruption cases. Second, the authors also create an adjusted corruption index (ACI) using the stochastic frontier modelling approach to address corruption case under-reporting. Third, they use a panel feasible generalised least square (FGLS) technique to discover corruption determinants.

The results show that approximately 77% of corruption cases in India go under-reported, which is a major concern. The results also show that per capita income, government spending, law and order and urbanisation are the important factors affecting corruption at the regional level.

The findings of the study emphasise the need to address the huge under-reporting of corruption data. From a policy perspective, the governments need to emphasise factors like per capita income, government spending, law and order and urbanisation to tackle corruption in India.

Corruption is a complex global phenomenon, and several studies have conducted detailed research on the causes of corruption at all levels (regional and cross national), but this study differs from previous studies in the following ways. First, the authors used a more objective measure of corruption by developing a CI at the state level. Second, the study uses stochastic frontier analysis, which is novel in the literature on corruption analysis, to address the most critical component of under-reporting in corruption data. Finally, the study attempts to examine the factors of corruption at the regional level, which is again innovative in nature.

The purpose of this paper is to develop an overview of the phenomenon of corruption in Latin America and to propose a synthetic aggregate indicator to compress most of the statistical information available on corruption for Latin American countries.

The indicator of corruption has been obtained through factor analysis by applying the principal component methodology.

The authors have managed to obtain a single component that reproduces and synthesizes 86 per cent of all the information about corruption in Latin America gathered by prestigious institutions.

The authors are aware that their study is not free from limitations. The first limitation is associated with the impossibility of incorporating information related to the phenomenon of corruption from the indicator called Latinobarómetro, as the economies of Cuba and Haiti (included in this research) are not part of the sample analyzed by that indicator. Second, this study reproduces and synthesizes 86 per cent of all available information by prestigious institutions about corruption in Latin America, and although this percentage is significant, it does not constitute 100 per cent.

This study has created a new indicator that gathers methodologies to measure corruption in Latin American countries.