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The above quotations highlight the adverse consequences of corruption in many countries around the world today. Indeed, the research taboo on corruption, which Gunnar Myrdal identified in 1968, no longer exists, and the silence on the “C” word (corruption) in the World Bank was broken by James Wolfensohn in his famous October 1996 speech, which focused on the negative consequences of the “cancer of corruption” on the World Bank's aid programs.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of corruption on the size of the shadow economy in countries that differ with respect to income level or geographical location. The underlying idea is that the primary manifestation of corruption might be associated with country characteristics and that different types of corruption might have different consequences.

IV regressions and bootstrapping are applied to a cross‐section of countries to show that geographical location of a country impacts on the relationship between corruption and the shadow economy. An interaction term of the level of corruption and geography is used to capture the differences in the types and consequences of corruption between countries.

Corruption does not seem to affect the size of the shadow economy outside the tropics. Instead, the higher the tropical area fraction of a country, the more a certain level of corruption enlarges the unofficial economy. Moreover, corruption and the shadow economy seem to be substitutes in the tropics.

Different types of corruption may have different consequences.

Unlike most of the previous literature, the paper accounts for the fact that some corrupt practices tend to be commonplace in some parts of the world, while other countries may be plagued by other types of corruption. Therefore, the consequences of corruption might also differ.

This chapter explores the evolution of the media framings of a corporate corruption scandal over time. Our analysis focuses on the evolution of media frames used by the English and French Press in the coverage of the corruption scandal involving SNC-Lavalin, a Quebec-based multinational engineering firm. We reveal how media coverage shifted from balanced and nuanced coverage of a complex phenomenon that facilitated debates on the appropriate consequences of corruption to a selective (re)construction of events to serve partisan agendas when the company’s legal plight was politicized. Our study contributes to the literature on media framings of corporate corruption by highlighting how the politicization of a corporate corruption scandal led to a dual climate of opinion across the English and French Press.

This study aims to develop a model of corruption that measures the impact of sports corruption on organizational outcomes (i.e. win difference and attendance) and the mediating role of institutional reputation. How the form and extent of the corruption impacted these organizational outcomes was also examined.

Archival data were collected and then structural equation modeling (i.e. path analysis) was used to analyze the model and estimate the parameters.

The model was a good fit. The extent of the violation served as an antecedent to sanctions and institutional reputation mediated the relationship between the extent of the violation and organizational outcomes. A weak but negative correlation between sanctions and institutional reputation was also found.

Rather than seeking to prevent specific forms of corruption carried out by individuals, managers should consider developing and implementing reform interventions that concentrate on eliminating corrupt networks (e.g. a group of interrelated individuals that abuse their power for private or public gain) who facilitate systematic malfeasance acts.

The study is the first to operationalize the extent and form of corrupt acts and measure their impact on organizational outcomes. The results demonstrate how different variables interact to determine the effects on organizational outcomes.

This study aims to investigate the impact of country-level corruption and firms’ anti-bribery policies on analyst coverage. Analyst coverage has been identified as a powerful tool to detect fraud and should equally act as a possible tool to reduce corruption.

This study used a negative binomial count regression method on a longitudinal data set of a sample of S&P Global 1200 companies for the years 2010-2015. To control for potential endogeneity bias and improve the reliability of the estimation, both country-level corruption and firms’ anti-bribery policies variables were instrumented.

After controlling potential endogeneity bias, the results show that the adoption of anti-bribery policies at firm level attracts more analysts to follow a firm. The results for corruption at country level show that analyst coverage increases in less corrupted countries indicating that the costs of corruption exceed its potential benefits. When the variables corruption at country level and anti-bribery policies are interacted, the relationship is positive and highly significant.

Given the potential important role played by anti-corruption measures, firms are encouraged to adopt them to reduce the incidence of corruption and to increase analyst coverage, which will reinforce the benign effect of monitoring.

Although the literature on corruption at the country level is rich, it is geared towards the determinants of corruption in contrast to its consequences, and fewer studies have focused on the impact of corruption at firm level because of data limitations. This paper addresses this gap and contributes to the literature on the consequences of corruption at firm level.

Citizens are demanding better performance from governments and they are increasingly aware of the costs of poor management and corruption. In view of scarce resources and the major transformations already underway in the global economy, identification and awareness of good governance and preventing corrupt practices have become key to ensuring structural reforms and critical investments necessary for encouraging, sustaining, and enhancing economic growth and competitiveness. Political corruption severely undermines government legitimacy and weakens the development of political, economic, social, and environmental structures.

Corruption is a wicked issue affecting public sector organizations across the world. Even though research in this field is blooming, little is known about the strategies that could be implemented to prevent and/or fight the occurrence of public corruption. The purpose of this paper is to fill the extant gaps in the scientific knowledge, providing insights into the strategies that can be use to fight public corruption.

Using a longitudinal approach, the paper points out some evidence on the perceived effectiveness of different public governance initiatives in reducing the risks of public corruption in Europe. More specifically, 31 Western European countries were involved in this analysis. The research covered a seven years’ time-span, ranging from January 2010 to December 2016.

Rule of law (RL) was found to be an important ingredient of the recipe for successful anti-corruption policies. Conversely, political stability (PS) turned out to entail greater incentives to public corruption. Whilst voice and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and control of corruption were correlates of perceived anti-corruption performance, they were not found to act as relevant regressors in the panel model.

The generalizability of the research results is limited by the geographical boundaries of this study; besides, there is the risk that the study findings were affected by the consequences of the recent financial turbulences concerning Western European countries.

RL is momentous to realize the full potential of anti-corruption policies: in fact, it contributes in reducing the incentives to improperly use public assets, enhancing the proper functioning of public sector organizations. Alternatively, PS may induce public officials and citizens to collude in order to capture public resources.

The paper contributes in shedding light on the perceived effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives, paving the way for further conceptual and practical developments.

Most Americans are keenly aware of the costs political corruption extracts on system support, fiscal policies and economic development, and ultimately, government effectiveness. Among a list of 10 challenges facing the nation, the public ranks political corruption as the nation's biggest crisis Samussen (2019). Importantly, this issue cuts across partisan and demographic lines. Members of both political parties and independents consistently cite political corruption as a serious problem facing the country.

However, there is a specific kind of political corruption that is disturbing for the health of American democracy – the corruption of Congress. Most Americans appear to have little faith in lawmakers to do the right thing. Majorities believe that Congress is out of touch with average Americans, focused on the needs of special interests, and is corrupt. To be sure, political corruption severely undermines government legitimacy and weakens the development of political, economic, and social structures. This chapter considers the problem of congressional corruption including what forms it takes, where it arises, what anti-corruption reforms are needed, and what these findings mean for the future of American democracy. More specifically, this chapter will permit us to examine if and how perceptions of congressional corruption influence citizens' interactions with government and provide a better understanding of citizens' policy preferences for regulating political corruption.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the reflection of corruption in Brazilian companies listed on Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão (B3). The methodological design comprised a qualitative and descriptive approach in which documentary research was used to gather data. Content analysis was employed to treat data retrieved from Standard Financial Statements, Explanatory Notes, and Sustainability Reports, from 2013 to 2017. The findings reveal a low level of disclosure of the companies listed on B3 concerning the reflections of corruption. The disclosed reflections include the increase in the company's operating costs and the impact on the company's future cash flow which can be direct, such as through the reduction of revenues from canceled negotiations, or indirect, through transaction costs due to the misconduct of the company.