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This paper aims to raise awareness of the potential misuse of Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) within the financial services industry and outline the potential negative impact this may have on society in certain developing countries.

This piece of research adopted a mix-method approach across three strands; an online line anonymous survey, consisting of 24 questions, face to face interviews with 10 anti-bribery and corruption compliance officers and three focus group, one in Hong Kong, India and Mexico.

The results of the research have evidenced that there is a lack of understanding of the methodology used to compile the CPI within the financial services industry and there is a potential adverse impact if misused.

A potential limitation was the fact that the survey was written in English yet was distributed to some countries where English was not the respondents’ first language. As such, it was accepted that there may have been context challenges or a misunderstanding of what the question asked.

By raising awareness of the methodology of the CPI and the advantages and disadvantages of its use, it will enable the financial service industry to better understand the implications of using such an index and the impacts of its misuse.

This research highlights that through the potential misuse and lack of understanding of the CPI by the financial services industry this may have an adverse financial, growth and development impact on societies in low ranked countries.

This paper draws on a sub-set of results from a wider piece of research that was undertaken for a Professional Doctorate. This research combined academic knowledge with practitioner research skills, providing an original contribution to knowledge surrounding corruption from a more targeted focal point, particularly with input from anti-bribery and corruption compliance officers in the financial service industry.

The paper aims to reveal some uncertain correlations and presumptions about corruption.

The paper defines corruption as a social phenomenon. It presents two basic components of that phenomenon: unreasonable preferential treatment and abuse of power. The paper addresses the moral issue that is implied in any phenomenon of corruption. The author will use the Corruption Perception Index and the Bribe Payers Index of Transparency International as well as the International Country Risk Guide, in order to check to what extent some correlations or presumptions about corruption could be reliable, at least as hypotheses.

Uncertain correlations and presumptions about corruption actually create an effect of distorted interpretation. They could cause ideological biases that distort our perception of corruption in developing and developed countries.

The paper does not take into account the multiple expressions of gift‐giving practices around the world and the way such practices could be confused with corruption.

Being aware of our “presumptions” about corruption will help us to choose relevant strategies to combat corrupt practices. This study has implications for business corporations, governments and IFIs. It reveals how the awareness of such uncertainties and presumptions about corruption is related to the CSR discourse.

The originality of the paper is to unveil some presumptions about corruption that have not been compared with the results obtained from the Corruption Perception Index, the Bribe Payers Index and the International Country Risk Guide.

This study aims to investigate the impact of the adoption of international accounting and auditing standards on corruption perception. In addition, this study examines the strength of auditing and reporting standards (SARS) that mediate the relationship.

Agency theory and bonding theory were applied in this paper to investigate the impact of the adoption of international accounting and auditing standards on corruption perception. Data from 130 countries during three years were collected from Transparency International, Worldwide Governance Indicators, International Federation of Accountants, World Economic Forum, World Bank, Freedom House and World Justice Project. Hypotheses were tested using partial least squares structural equation modeling.

The results show a positive impact of the adoption of international accounting and auditing standards on corruption perception, directly and indirectly, through the SARS.

The results provide an insight into corruption eradication strategy through the adoption of international accounting and auditing standards and strengthen the auditing and reporting standards.

This study is distinctive, as no study has yet examined the impact of the adoption of international accounting standards construct, which contains International Financial Reporting Standards and International Standards on Auditing, on the corruption perception. The corruption perception construct is developed by combining the corruption perception index and the control of corruption indicators.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of corruption on trade.

The authors estimate gravity equations with the last econometric advances on a wide sample of countries and years using three different measures of corruption. Two of them belong to the so-called perception-based indexes and the third is derived from a structural model that takes into account the causes and indicators of corruption across countries.

A negative effect of corruption on trade appears with perceptions, but it is not widespread. However, the authors find sensible evidence of the “grease the wheels” view with the structural index if low and middle income countries are implicated. Additionally, when using this measure, differences in corruption levels negatively impact trade. Both results are in line with expectations.

Moreover, membership in regional trade agreements does not seem to significantly alter these results.

This study aims to examine how corruption influences the voluntary disclosure of corporate governance (CG)-related information by developed country multinationals (DC-MNEs) and emerging market multinationals (EM-MNEs) investing in six Latin American countries.

The study uses information from 300 MNEs included in the 2018 ranking of the 500 Largest Latin American companies (America Economía, 2018). Each MNE’s final annual report for the financial year ending 2018 was examined and coded to obtain the corporate governance disclosure index. Fractional probit regression was applied to test the hypotheses of the research.

DC-MNEs disclose more CG-related information in corrupt environments than EM-MNEs. This differentiated behavior occurs because DC-MNEs face higher legitimacy pressures in corrupt environments than EM-MNEs and because EM-MNEs are more experienced than DC-MNEs in dealing with such corrupt environments.

While both EM-MNEs and DC-MNEs need to continue investing in corrupt countries to grow, they need to disclose CG-related information as a strategic tool to manage the legitimacy issues triggered by corruption in the markets they operate.

Despite corruption being pervasive in emerging markets, its implications for firms’ strategic behaviors are still under-researched. This paper extends the scope of corporate governance and international business fields by studying how MNEs respond to relevant dimensions of the macro environment. This research shows that voluntary disclosure of CG-related information is a strategic response of the MNEs to gain legitimacy in corrupt environments.

The research aims to include good governance as a facet in the measurement of human development.

A modified Human Development Index (MHDI) was computed by including a governance dimension computed using the six governance indicators published by the World Bank. The rankings using the new index were obtained and compared to the rankings of the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP's) HDI.

The rank correlation of the original and modified indices was very high, but there were many big rank changes for individual countries in each HDI group. These rank changes could be largely reconciled in the light of the rankings of these countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index and the Democracy Index.

The research considers the measurement of human development at a point in time alone and incorporates 2010 governance indicators into the 2011 HDI, which could lead to a discrepancy in time periods considered. Furthermore, the governance indicators are measures of perceptions which can be subjective. The Practical implications paper does not delve into the country-specific factors that may have caused big rank changes.

The paper builds a case for incorporating, or at least providing the option of including a governance dimension in the HDI.

The paper is a novel attempt to incorporate good governance as a dimension in the HDI. It reasserts the need for policy-makers and governments to realize that peoples' capabilities cannot be realized in the absence of good governance, and that whilst improving other facets of human development, much attention needs to be paid towards establishing good governance.

This article aims to report on the development and validation of a bribery measurement index for the business sector, which, based on institutional theory, seeks to overcome the limitations of traditional measurements, recognizing the dynamics that originate the phenomenon and identifying process components.

To construct the index, correlational and principal component analysis techniques were used, as well as rigorous statistical tests, validating the instrument in a sample of 2,963 companies in Latin America, including Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru.

The result was an instrument composed of two dimensions: (1) anti-bribery game rules, composed of regulations knowledge and anti-bribery efforts, and (2) bribery as a perceived habit, allowing an objective representation of reality due to its internal consistency, concurrent and discriminant validity.

This instrument is one of the few that focuses on measuring bribery in the business sector in terms of corrupt practices, applicable for both public and private institutions to promote game rules against bribery. Additionally, the proposed theoretical model can be used to measure other phenomena with similar characteristics.

This article empirically highlights different variables that make bribery possible. The results can be helpful in the design of strategies to prevent this type of behavior. It also highlights the importance of designing mechanisms to record information related to bribery and the different expressions of corruption in order to explain its different nuances.

Este artículo informa sobre el desarrollo y validación de un índice de medición de soborno para el sector empresarial, que, basado en la teoría institucional, busca superar las limitaciones de las mediciones tradicionales, reconociendo las dinámicas que originan el fenómeno e identificando los componentes del proceso.

Para la construcción del índice se utilizaron técnicas de análisis correlacional y de componentes principales, así como rigurosas pruebas estadísticas, validando el instrumento en una muestra de 2.963 empresas de América Latina, entre ellas Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, México y Perú.

El resultado fue un instrumento compuesto por dos dimensiones: (1) reglas de juego antisoborno, compuestas por conocimiento normativo y esfuerzo antisoborno (2) soborno como hábito percibido, permitiendo una representación objetiva de la realidad debido a su consistencia interna, validez concurrente y discriminante.

Este artículo pone en evidencia empírica diferentes variables que hacen posible el soborno. Los resultados pueden ser útiles en el diseño de estrategias para prevenir este tipo comportamiento, también destaca la importancia de diseñar mecanismos para registrar la información relacionada con la lucha contra el soborno.

Este instrumento es uno de los pocos que se enfoca en medir el soborno en el sector empresarial en términos de prácticas de corrupción, útil para instituciones tanto públicas como privadas para promover mejores reglas de juego en contra del soborno. Adicionalmente el modelo teórico propuesto puede ser utilizado para medir otros fenómenos con características similares.

This study aims to examine the relationship between cultural distances between countries and their scores in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which is the most commonly used measure of corruption in international business (IB) research.

The authors applied fixed-effect (generalized least squares) statistical modeling technique to analyze 1,580 year-country observations.

The authors found that the CPI score is determined to a large extent by cultural distances between countries, specifically the distance to the USA and to Denmark.

CPI is often used as a sole measure of state-level corruption in IB research. The results show that the measure is significantly influenced by cultural differences and hence it should be applied with great caution, preferably augmented with other measures.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to look at cultural distances as determinants of CPI score. The authors empirically test whether the CPI is culturally biased.

The paper aims to examine how the measurement of African “corruption” has been manipulated to serve western economic interests.

In depth secondary source analysis within a post‐colonial framework.

The most popular measure of corruption, Transparency International's corruption perception index (CPI), is a flawed instrument. Capable only of calculating proxies of corruption, the measure is oblivious to cultural variance and is business‐centric in style. The CPI is embraced in good faith by African governments and donor organisations oblivious to its deeper purpose of serving western economic and geo‐political interests under the guise of weeding out something falsely portrayed as a universal negative.

The paper will assist efforts to ground the anti‐corruption effort in the realities of Africa.

The paper is part of a minority scholarship that seeks to provide space for the consideration of alternatives to the dominant conceptions of corruption and its measurement.

The purpose of this paper is to develop and test theory-driven hypotheses on the influence of corruption and gender inequality on logistics performance.

This paper develops hypotheses based on a review of the literature and theory linking corruption, gender inequality and logistics performance. Testing the hypotheses draws on the following secondary data sources: the World Bank Logistics Performance Index, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index and the United Nations Development Programme Gender Inequality Index. Regression analysis is used to test the hypotheses.

A significant direct effect is evident between corruption perceptions and perceived logistics performance. Corruption is detrimental to logistics. Further, there is evidence of an indirect effect, via gender inequality. Gender inequality is also linked directly to lower logistics performance. Gross domestic product/capita enters the analysis as a control variable.

While the analysis uses secondary data, sources are credible and their methods – while not perfect – are logical and appear to be reasonable. It is possible that excluded variables could further explain the relationships under study. This implies future research opportunities, perhaps involving case studies of specific nations.

The results should inspire businesses, non-governmental organizations and governments to invest in, aid, advocate for and legislate toward greater gender equality – and against corruption. Logistics educators have an important role in disseminating this message.

Gender inequality and corruption are current, global social issues. Moving forward toward equality and away from corruption are the right moves. Such moves appear to also yield better logistics.

This paper is among the first linking corruption and gender inequality to logistics performance. It shows how social issues impact logistics performance at a national level.