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This chapter examines the way corruption in the public procurement of goods, services, and public works has been commonplace in Southeast Asian states over many years (with the exception of Singapore), and considers the measures taken to combat such practices. It also examines why so often those efforts have not been fully effective. Three reasons are given to explain these failings. These are the following: (a) elite capture of the procurement process by influential politicians, business leaders and senior bureaucrats; (b) the informal bureaucracy in the procuring agencies which allowed corrupt practices to be followed; and (c) lack of political will to enforce measures to combat corruption

The purpose of this paper is to provide an adequate account of anti-corruption agency (ACA) ineffectiveness and propose the kind of ACA that would hold the promise of success. The paper draws on legitimacy theory, legal process and the notion of integrity of purpose.

This paper contextualizes the establishment and proliferation of ACAs; explores different ways of conceptualizing them; examines the broad range of factors that have underpinned ACA ineffectiveness and utilizes both legitimacy theory and the notion of the integrity of purpose.

The one-ACA-model-fits-all approach in corruption-control has been an abysmal failure. Disentangling the reasons for ACA ineffectiveness reveals various endogenous and exogenous factors. It also emphasizes the crucial importance of integrating both legitimacy theory and integrity of purpose in a revamped ACA concept that meets the corruption-control challenge.

It is possible to design and implement an effective ACA by avoiding various factors that have been shown to seriously undermine corruption control efforts by also drawing on legitimacy theory, legal process and integrity of purpose.

Corruption in both the public and private sectors cannot be controlled in isolation from other socio-economic problems. An effective ACA is one that fosters integrity and is considered legitimate by its stakeholders.

While there have been some articles the past two decades discussing the effectiveness of ACAs in particular countries, this is the first paper to account for the overall ACA ineffectiveness also using legitimacy theory, legal process and integrity of purpose to revamp the ACA concept.

This paper analyses the role of Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s first prime minister from June 1959 to November 1990, in minimising corruption by implementing a zero-tolerance policy toward corruption in Singapore.

This paper is based on the analysis of Lee’s beliefs and the policies he introduced to curb corruption in Singapore.

Lee’s disdain for corruption and his beliefs in meritocracy and the importance of good leadership shaped his commitment to a zero-tolerance policy against corruption, which was enforced impartially and sustained in Singapore for the past 62 years.

This analysis of how Lee transformed Singapore into one of the least corrupt countries in the world would be of interest to policy-makers, practitioners and scholars concerned with minimising corruption in their own countries.

Despite all the anti-corruption measures and anti-corruption initiatives, people offer or accept bribes without any hesitation. As anywhere in the world, the negative consequences of corruption lead to a reduction in direct investment, increase inequality and poverty, distort and use public investment and reduce public revenues. The purpose of this article is to study the criminological measures to counteract corruption offences in the field of illegal gambling.

The methodological basis of the study is the provisions of the theory of knowledge: the laws of dialectical materialism, philosophical categories and scientific principles of cognition of social and legal reality.

Although many components of foreign state anti-corruption programmes are quite problematic to apply in modern realities in the Republic of Kazakhstan, according to legal scholars, through gradual implementation into the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan because of the systematic improvement by the state of the content of regulations and responsible implementation of anti-corruption strategies. In this regard, one of the conditions in the fight against corruption is actions aimed at using the best practices of countries that are similar to each other in terms of religion, habits, traditions, ethics and morality.

Anti-corruption initiatives using information and communication technologies, such as digital public services and e-government, crowdsourcing platforms, tools for exposing, transparency portals, blockchain and artificial intelligence technologies can provide significant assistance in combating manifestations of corruption in the field of illegal gambling on the internet in the Republic of Kazakhstan.

This paper analyses the importance of leadership and culture in combating corruption in Hong Kong SAR, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Taiwan.

This paper is based on the comparative analysis of the effectiveness of the anti-corruption measures in the studies of six selected countries/regions in this special issue of Public Administration and Policy. The contributors in this special issue were invited because of their publications on combating corruption in the six countries/regions.

The critical variable ensuring the effectiveness of combating corruption is the strong political will of the leadership in changing the culture of corruption in the country/region by implementing a zero-tolerance policy toward corruption, as shown in Singapore and Hong Kong. In New Zealand’s case, leadership plays a less important role because of the population’s emphasis on equality and egalitarianism and its reliance on the Ombudsman and Serious Fraud Office to curb corruption. However, the corrupt leadership of Tanaka Kakuei in Japan, Najib Rajak in Malaysia, and Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan, demonstrates clearly their insidious impact of consolidating their kleptocratic rule in these countries/regions.

As the role of leadership and culture in combating corruption has not been given sufficient attention in the literature, this paper attempts to rectify this neglect by demonstrating that the political leaders in Singapore and Hong Kong, and to a lesser extent, New Zealand, have succeeded in minimising corruption while their counterparts in Japan, Taiwan and Malaysia, have failed to do so.

Stephanie McPhail's description above of the difficult living conditions of the judges in Mongolia in 1995 underscores their vulnerability to corrupt practices and their negative perception by the public. Judicial salaries during that year were comparable to those of civil servants but lower than those of lawyers in private practice and ranged from US$33 to US$51 per month (Quah, 2003a, p. 43). More importantly, the living conditions of judges were difficult, especially in the countryside, where one-third of the judges did not own an apartment, and were forced to live in their offices. Consequently, McPhail (1995, p. 45) concluded that the “relatively low salaries and mediocre working conditions” of the judges were “an impediment to attracting highly qualified candidates to the profession.”

The purpose of this paper, which is based on the author’s study, is to explore the potential use of behavioral analysis in predicting corruption among public officials in Indonesia as part of the corruption prevention measures.

This study examines major corruption cases in Indonesia in the past three years through reports from various institutions regarding fraud-related issues to gain a better understanding of corrupt leaders in Indonesia and how to predict their occurrence by means of observing and analyzing visible behavioral red flags.

The author establishes that in addition to the financial perspective, corruption can be detected and thus prevented by means of behavioral observation and analysis. The discussions in this paper suggest that bad leadership is a major cause of corruption in the Indonesian Government. However, a main reason corrupt leaders are elected into office is because the people failed to recognize them in the first place and accidentally voted for them. Among the signs of bad leadership visible enough for the people to see is the so-called “narcissism” which has four core dimensions: authority, self-admiration, superiority and entitlement. The four core dimensions are often visible in leader candidates in Indonesia which should have been early warning signs of bad leadership which may lead into, among others, corruption. Furthermore, the need for excessive compensation, exposure and power has been a common trait in many corruption offenders in Indonesia and each can be associated with the four core dimensions of narcissism. It is because of such a need that pressure/motivation to commit fraud among Indonesian public officials occurred. Society’s awareness of the signs of narcissism will help them decide who will become their future leaders and diminish the risk of corruption in the country.

This study is self-funded. Therefore, due to the limited resources available, the discussions and analysis on visible behavioral red flags of corruption in this study are built upon secondary data from agencies such as the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the Constitutional Court (MK), the Supreme Audit Board (BPK) and the election Supervisory Committee (Bawaslu). For future studies, primary data from the public regarding their opinions toward the past, present and future leadership in Indonesia will offer a more accurate view into visible behavioral red flags of corruption.

This paper contributes to the development of corruption prevention strategy in Indonesia by empowering the society to monitor potentially corrupt leaders so as to prevent them from controlling the country.

This paper demonstrates how the seemingly small and insignificant behavioral clues may become effective tools to predict and prevent the occurrence of corruption in the future.

This chapter discusses reforms to increase customer-centredness, public consultation (including professional, business and community associations), whole-of-government approaches (a case of trafficking in persons), increased budget, personnel and procurement delegation to departments and increased role of statutory boards (autonomous agencies). According to the author the driving force behind public sector reforms emanates from the inner core of ministers, most particularly the prime minister and deputy prime minister, working in close conjunction with senior permanent secretaries, directors of boards and government-linked companies. In Singapore, power is concentrated in the hands of political executives and senior levels of civil service. Ministers set the policy agenda and make final policy decisions on important issues. The administrative service is the elite service (of about 250 persons) within the civil service that shapes policy, especially permanent secretaries and deputy secretaries. Objections to reforms are often avoided through inputs to the reform process by key stakeholders and experts of relevant fields from inter-ministerial and inter-agency committees and through public consultations. Singapore has achieved an exceptional level of prosperity, and according to the author civil service is guided by practices of meritocracy (e.g., in promotion) and strict accountability through audits and anti-corruption steps.

The global perception of Nigeria as the ‘black hole of corruption’ should be seen in its proper historical context, where corruption is the vestige of a colonial legacy. Moreover, within the international trade which is dominated by the North, corruption is the norm in Nigeria. With the introduction of corruption into the Nigerian ethos, its tentacles permeate from the highest echelons of government to the lowest level of the Civil Service, both national and local. Any transaction involving a public official must involve a bribe from the corrupter to the corruptee. The proceeds of crime are handled by fences — the financial institutions. The perpetrators of corruption are deemed to have personality defects which are responsible for their deviant behaviour. The victims are the Nigerian public who have been adversely affected by the deprivation which has resulted in underdevelopment and perpetual economic slavery. The myriad corruption control measures adopted have failed essentially because of the protection of vested interests compounded with corruption in the judiciary, quangos and law enforcement agencies.

The purpose of this paper is to provide insights into the multiple anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) in Taiwan and their conflict resolution. The birth of the Agency Against Corruption (AAC) in 2011 created the unintended consequence of sibling rivalry with the elder Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MJIB).

A historical background of these agencies is discussed and followed by an analysis of the diversified conflicts among the prosecutor’s office, the AAC and the MJIB. The empirical sources of this study include 17 in-depth interviews with government officials both at ministerial level and field level, scholars and NGO representatives.

The redundancy of ACAs in Taiwan is a fact, which is extremely difficult to change in the foreseeable future in the light of current political and fiscal constraints. This paper concludes that the conflicts among multiple ACAs and their operational weaknesses will not fade away after a mere directive from their superior, the Ministry of Justice, unless genuine cooperation is put into place in various individual cases.

This paper provides a road-map for decision makers to improve collective anti-corruption performance. Taiwan’s AAC serves as the latest example testing the efficacy of the multiple specialized ACAs.

This pioneering study provides insights into Taiwan’s anti-corruption policy and practices. More investigative studies should be conducted on the effectiveness of multiple ACAs in other countries.