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The purpose of this paper is to make recommendations to address the four limitations of Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB).

The paper begins by attributing Singapore’s reputation as the least corrupt Asian country to the CPIB’s four strengths: its independence from the police; its adequate staffing and funding; its adoption of the total approach to enforcement; and its impartial enforcement of the anti-corruption laws. It then proceeds to identify the CPIB’s limitations and provides four suggestions to address these limitations.

The sentencing of Edwin Yeo, a senior CPIB officer, to ten years’ imprisonment on 20 February 2014 for misappropriating US$1.76 million for nearly four years reveals that there were weaknesses in the CPIB’s internal controls and procurement procedures in spite of its effectiveness in curbing corruption. This paper recommends that the CPIB addresses its four limitations by strengthening its internal controls and procurement procedures; enhancing public trust and confidence by further improving its outreach to the population; improving the external oversight of its activities; and developing its in-house research capabilities.

This paper will be useful for those scholars, policy-makers, and anti-corruption practitioners who are interested in how the CPIB can further enhance its effectiveness even though Singapore is perceived as the least corrupt Asian country.

The purpose of this paper is to explain why Singapore has succeeded in curbing the problem of police corruption and to identify the six lessons which other Asian countries can learn from Singapore's experience.

The paper analyzes the causes of police corruption in Singapore during the British colonial period and describes the measures adopted by the People's Action Party government after assuming office in June 1959 to curb police corruption. The effectiveness of these measures is assessed by referring to Singapore's perceived extent of corruption according to three international indicators and the reported cases of police corruption from 1965 to 2011.

The Singapore Police Force has succeeded in minimizing police corruption by improving salaries and working conditions, cooperating with the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, enhancing its recruitment and selection procedures, providing training and values education for its members, and adopting administrative measures to reduce the opportunities for corruption. Other Asian countries afflicted with rampant police corruption can learn six lessons from Singapore's success.

This paper will be of interest to those policy makers, scholars, and anti-corruption practitioners, who are interested in learning how Singapore has succeeded in curbing police corruption.

Corruption was a serious problem in Singapore during the British colonial period and especially after the Japanese Occupation (February 1942–August 1945) mainly because of the lack of political will to curb it by the incumbent governments. In contrast, the People’s Action Party (PAP) government, which assumed office in June 1959 after winning the May 1959 general election, demonstrated its political will with the enactment of the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) in June 1960, which strengthened the capacity of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) to combat corruption effectively. Indeed, Singapore’s success in curbing corruption is reflected in its consistently high scores on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from 1995 to 2012 as the least corrupt country in Asia. Singapore was ranked first with Denmark and New Zealand in the 2010 CPI with a score of 9.30. Similarly, Singapore has been ranked first in the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC) annual surveys on corruption from 1995 to 2013. Why has Singapore succeeded in minimizing the problem of corruption when many other Asian countries have failed to do so? What lessons can these countries learn from Singapore’s experience in combating corruption? This chapter addresses these two questions by first describing Singapore’s favorable policy context, followed by an identification of the major causes of corruption during the British colonial period and Japanese Occupation, and an evaluation of the PAP government’s anti-corruption strategy.

The purpose of this paper is threefold: first, to ascertain the levels of effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) in China, Japan, Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan; second, to explain why some of these ACAs are more effective than others; and third, to suggest some policy recommendations for addressing their limitations.

This paper relies on three well-known international indicators to assess the perceived extent of corruption in the five countries. Similarly, their quality of governance is assessed by their total percentile rank on the World Bank’s six governance indicators in 2013.

Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau is effective because of its government’s political will and favorable policy context. The Philippines and Taiwan rely on ineffective multiple ACAs, which are inadequately staffed and funded, and compete with each other for limited resources. China’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection is ineffective because corrupt party members are disciplined and not prosecuted, and the political leaders use corruption as a weapon against their opponents. Japan’s weak political will is reflected in its reluctance to address its structural corruption. This paper concludes with policy recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of the ACAs in the five countries.

The comparative analysis of the effectiveness of the ACAs in the five Asian countries and the policy recommendations for addressing their limitations will be of interest to policy makers, scholars and anti-corruption practitioners.

The purpose of this paper is to explain why Singapore has succeeded in curbing corruption and to recommend three measures for enhancing South Korea’s anti-corruption strategy.

The paper compares the contextual differences between Singapore and South Korea before analysing Singapore’s effective anti-corruption strategy and identifying the weaknesses of South Korea’s anti-corruption strategy.

Singapore’s success in minimising corruption is the result of its government’s strong political will and the adequate budget, personnel and operational autonomy given to the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau to enable it to enforce the anti-corruption laws impartially. To improve South Korea’s anti-corruption strategy, the Korea Anti-Corruption Agency should be established and adequately staffed and funded to investigate corruption cases. Those found guilty of corruption offences should be punished according to the law, without suspending their jail sentences or being pardoned by the president. Finally, the existing public outreach anti-corruption programmes should be evaluated to identify their weaknesses and improve their effectiveness.

This paper recommends three measures for South Korean policy-makers to improve their anti-corruption strategy by learning from Singapore’s success.

Corruption is a serious problem in many Asian countries, judging from their ranking and scores on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). To combat corruption these countries have relied on three patterns of corruption control. The first pattern relies on the enactment of anti-corruption laws without a specific agency to enforce these laws. For example in Mongolia, the Law on Anti-Corruption that was introduced in April 1996 is jointly implemented by the police, the General Prosecutor's Office, and the courts (Quah, 2003a, p. 44)¹. The second pattern involves the implementation of anti-corruption laws by several anti-corruption agencies. In India, the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) is implemented by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), and the anti-corruption bureaus and vigilance commissions at the state level (Quah, 2003a, p. 66). Similarly, the Philippines has relied on 18 anti-corruption agencies to enforce the many anti-corruption laws since the Integrity Board was formed by President Quirino in May 1950 (Batalla, 2001, p. 47; Oyamada, 2005, pp. 99–101).

The above quotations highlight the adverse consequences of corruption in many countries around the world today. Indeed, the research taboo on corruption, which Gunnar Myrdal identified in 1968, no longer exists, and the silence on the “C” word (corruption) in the World Bank was broken by James Wolfensohn in his famous October 1996 speech, which focused on the negative consequences of the “cancer of corruption” on the World Bank's aid programs.

The purpose of this paper is to compare two corruption scandals in Singapore to illustrate how its government has dealt with these scandals and to discuss the implications for its anti-corruption strategy.

This paper analyses the Teh Cheang Wan and Edwin Yeo scandals by relying on published official and press reports.

Both scandals resulted in adverse consequences for the offenders. Teh committed suicide on 14 December 1986 before he could be prosecuted for his bribery offences. Yeo was found guilty of criminal breach of trust and forgery and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. The Commission of Inquiry found that the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) was thorough in its investigations which confirmed that only Teh and no other minister or public official were implicated in the bribery offences. The Independent Review Panel appointed by the Prime Minister's Office to review the CPIB's internal controls following Yeo's offences recommended improvements to strengthen the CPIB's financial procedures and audit system. Singapore has succeeded in minimising corruption because its government did not cover-up the scandals but punished the guilty offenders and introduced measures to prevent their recurrence.

This paper will be useful for scholars, policymakers and anti-corruption practitioners interested in Singapore's anti-corruption strategy and how its government handles corruption scandals.

The purpose of this paper is to explain Singapore’s success in combating corruption and to identify the lessons for policy makers concerned with enhancing the anti-corruption measures in their countries.

The paper provides a brief literature review and analysis of Singapore’s policy context before explaining Singapore’s success in combating corruption and identifying the lessons for policy makers to enhance the effectiveness of the anti-corruption measures in their countries.

Singapore’s success in combating corruption can be attributed to the political will of the People’s Action Party government and the effectiveness of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau in investigating all corruption cases and enforcing the anti-corruption laws impartially, without fear or favour. Extrapolating from Singapore’s success, policy makers in other countries can learn these lessons: the critical importance of political will; addressing the causes of corruption and learning from past mistakes; establishing and supporting an independent anti-corruption agency with adequate resources; enforcing the anti-corruption laws impartially but not selectively against the government’s political opponents; and combating corruption is a marathon requiring perseverance and sustained effort.

Scholars, policy makers and anti-corruption practitioners will be interested in learning how Singapore has succeeded in combating corruption as well as the relevant lessons for policy makers.