Search results

The purpose of this study is to investigate the federal sentencing of organizational probation for environmental offenders using the focal concerns. Those organizations that are more blameworthy should be sentenced to longer probation terms. However, little research has been conducted to examine whether probation is being sentenced accordingly. This is especially true for organizations convicted of environmental offenses, which are often thought of as deserving of increased penalties compared to non-environmental offenses.

This study used quantitative federal sentencing data from 2011 to 2020 (n = 1,436) and eight potential measures of blameworthiness grounded in the focal concerns.

The results showed that those organizations convicted of environmental crimes received 30% longer probation sentences than those not convicted of environmental crimes. However, additional measurements of blameworthiness derived from the existing literature of focal concerns were not relevant to probation sentencing decisions.

This study extends the application of the focal concerns and increases the body of knowledge regarding the sentencing of federal environmental offenders.

The purpose of this paper is to assess if federal judges have sentenced criminal corporations to fines that are consistent with the seriousness of the offense and the blameworthiness of the organization, which would be in line with the directives from the US Sentencing Guidelines. This paper will also use the focal concerns framework to measure organizational blameworthiness.

This paper uses secondary data from federal sentencing documents, collected by the US Sentencing Commission, for cases that were adjudicated between October 1, 2010 and September 30, 2017.

Results showed that the focal concerns framework can be used to define potential constructs for blameworthiness and that an organization’s culpability score was a significant predictor in whether the company received a higher fine.

The data are unable to examine two of the three measures of focal concerns. Cross-sectional data limits the ability to draw conclusions regarding cause and effect between blameworthiness and monetary fines.

Results imply that judges are sentencing corporations that have higher culpability scores to more severe fines, in accordance with both the federal Sentencing Guidelines and focal concerns framework.

This study is one of the first to apply the focal concerns framework, usually used to examine the sentencing of individuals, to the sentencing of corporations. It is also one of the first to attempt to empirically define blameworthiness.

Solicitors Paul Verrico and Philip Crosbie consider how attempts to inflate the penalties imposed in fatal cases have failed when compared to the sanctions imposed on defendants convicted of other corporate crimes, such as those in the competition and data protection spheres. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

Consideration of legislation, guidance and recent case law.

There is a significant divide between fines imposed for health and safety fatalities and those for competition/fraud offences. It is a sad fact that it is “cheaper” to cause the death of an employee than to engage in price‐fixing. It is difficult to see how this balance will be redressed without resorting to artificially inflating health and safety fines to a level on par with those offences previously mentioned.

The paper takes a close look at health and safety legislation.

This paper intends to explore how corporate bodies could be held criminally responsible for abuse and neglect that takes place in hospitals and care homes if by their actions they facilitate this abuse or neglect to take place. It explores current domestic and international law and seeks to find precedents and guidance that would allow the Government to create a new criminal sanction for “corporate neglect”.

The paper provides a review of existing legislation and regulation on corporate neglect in hospitals and care homes.

The paper proposes that the Health and Social Care Act 2008 be amended to include a new section which would make corporate neglect a criminal offence. Furthermore, to ensure that the punishments for these offences act both as appropriate sanction and a suitable deterrent for corporations, the author proposes that new offences should be implemented to include unlimited fines, remedial orders and publicity orders.

Following a number of recent scandals in care homes and hospitals, including Winterbourne View and Mid Staffordshire, it is clear that there is a legislative and regulatory gap in the ability to hold corporate bodies to account for neglect or abuse that occurs in their institutions. This must now be urgently addressed.

Can personality traits of chief executive officers (CEOs) be detected at a distance? Following newspaper speculation that the banking crisis of 2008 was partly caused by CEO hubris, this paper seeks to analyse the CEO letters to shareholders of a single bank over ten years for evidence of CEO personality traits, including narcissism (a contributor to hubris), hubris, overconfidence and CEO‐attribution. Following predictions that hubris increases the longer individuals occupy positions of power, the research aims to examine whether hubristic characteristics intensify over time.

This paper takes concepts of hubris from the clinical psychology literature and applies them to discourses in CEO letters to shareholders in annual reports. The research comprises a longitudinal study of the discretionary narrative disclosures in the CEO letters to shareholders in eight annual reports, benchmarked against disclosures in the CEO letters to shareholders of the previous and subsequent CEOs of the same organisation.

The results point to evidence of narcissism and hubris in the personality of the bank CEO. Over half the sentences analysed were found to contain narcissistic‐speak. In 45 per cent of narcissistic‐speak sentences, there were three of more symptoms of hubris – what Owen and Davison describe as extreme hubristic behaviour. In relation to CEO overconfidence, only seven sentences (2 per cent) contained bad news. More than half of the good news was attributed to the CEO and all the bad news was attributed externally. The research thus finds evidence of hubris in the CEO letters to shareholders, which became more pronounced the longer the CEO served.

The analysis of CEO discourse is highly subjective, and difficult to replicate.

The primary contribution of this research is the adaptation of the 14 clinical symptoms of hubris from clinical psychology to the analysis of narratives in CEO letters to shareholders in annual reports to reveal signs of CEO hubris.

The aim of this article is to examine those philosophical and structural factors which have been responsible for shaping sentencing policy for economic crime in the UK and to analyse some key decisions of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in this area.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

This study aims to identify the differences between local and foreign companies’ social and environmental disclosures (SEDs) practices operating in the Nigerian oil sector. It aims at distinguishing SED levels by comparing local and foreign companies operating in the oil sector.

The paper analyses annual reports through content analysis. SED extent and type are measured by the number of sentences. SEDs are further classified into three subcategories according to whether they are negative, neutral or positive disclosures and then their proportions are compared through descriptive analysis. To better understand SED differences, the Kruskal–Wallis and Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon tests are used.

Local companies are found to provide more content and a wider variety of SED than foreign companies. The majority of the total SEDs in both local and foreign companies are positive with very little evidence of negative news.

The measurement of SEDs focuses on only annual reports, without consideration of other disclosure media such as standalone reports and corporate websites. SEDs are assumed to be voluntary for the companies and they may choose not to disclose any information in annual reports, as there are no regulations or disclosure guidelines in Nigeria to be followed.

The main contribution of this study lies in identifying the factors that have led to diversity and uniqueness in SED between local and foreign oil companies. As such, this study seeks to contribute to the development of understanding multiple factors that could give rise to changing patterns of SED.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze annual reports through content analysis. Corporate social responsibility reporting (CSRR) extent and type are measured by the number of sentences. CSRR are further classified into three subcategories according to whether they are negative, neutral or positive reports and then their proportions compared through descriptive analysis.

This paper seeks to examine and identify factors influencing CSRR practices of local oil companies (LOCs) in Nigeria. It aims at distinguishing CSRR levels by examining both the quantity and quality of reporting.

For the extent of CSRR, employee-related information was the most reported category with community reports being of greater quality in the LOCs. The majority of the total CSRR in the LOCs was positive with very little evidence of negative news.

The measurement of CSRR focuses only on annual reports, without consideration of other reporting media, such as standalone reports. CSRR are assumed to be voluntary for the companies, and they may choose not to report any information in annual reports, as there are no regulations or reporting guidelines in Nigeria to be followed.

The main contribution of this study lies in identifying the factors that have led to diversity and uniqueness in CSRR in LOCs. As such, this study seeks to contribute to the development of understanding multiple factors that could give rise to changing patterns of CSRR.

This article aims to place recent corporate governance reforms in the historical context of the good corporate citizenship movement that began in the US in the mid‐1990s and came to an abrupt end in 2002 when the most recent spate of corporate scandals emerged. It explores what the apparent failure of this movement portends for the recently‐enacted governance reforms.

The paper engages in a policy analysis of regulatory reform.

After offering the tale of corporate governance, a critical take on current reforms, the paper finds the skeptic's and pessimist's account of corporate good citizenship movement to be most helpful in explaining the illusory nature of corporate reforms and the resilience of the regulatory status quo.

The paper is a critical analysis of corporate governance reforms.