Search results

The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate the act of shadow reporting by a social movement organisation as a form of shadow accounting within a sustained campaign against a target corporation. Situated within a consideration of power relations, the rationales underlying the production of the shadow report, and the shadow reports perceived value and limits as a shadow accounting mechanism, are investigated.

A Foucauldian approach to power/knowledge and truth is drawn upon in the analysis of a single case study. Alongside a consideration of the shadow report itself, interviews with both the preparers of the report and senior management of the corporation targeted comprise the main data.

The paper provides an empirical investigation into shadow reporting as a form of shadow accounting. While a range of insights are garnered into the preparation, dissemination and impact of the shadow report, key findings relate to a consideration of power relations. The perceived “truth” status of corporate accounts compared to accounts prepared by shadow accountants is problematised through a consideration of technologies of power and power/knowledge formations. Power relations are subsequently recognised as fundamental to the emancipatory potential of shadow reporting.

Results from a single case study are presented. Furthermore, given the production of the shadow report occurred several years prior to the collection of data, participants were asked to reflect on past events. Findings are therefore based on those reflections.

While previous studies have considered the preparation of shadow reports and their transformative potential, this study is, the author believes, the first to empirically analyse the preparation, dissemination and perceived impacts of shadow reporting from the perspectives of both the shadow report producers and the target corporation.

Social institutions are experiencing change in their patterns of power as they are re‐aligned to an increasingly complex world and the onset of the new information economy. Attention has been drawn particularly to the need to improve corporate governance as a means to enhance corporate accountability and improve corporate performance. This paper consequently explores the distribution of corporate power and the processes that can foster higher quality decision making and actions by boards. The paper investigates the fundamental difference between the exercise of leadership, management and political power within an organization and, particularly, the responsibility and power relationships between an organization and its board. The authors assert that if the patterns of power are well understood then some things can be said about the patterns that are likely to emerge and what structures might be more effective than others. The paper concludes by arguing that the manner and style of corporate governance could benefit from some further refinement.

This study aims to investigate the impact of managerial power distance on the corporate sustainability performance of Chinese firms and to explore the regulatory role of corporate digitalization in the Chinese capital market.

The study collects data from 2,632 A-share Chinese non-financial firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges during the period from 2010 to 2020. The authors apply different panel data regression techniques (fixed effects, GMM-System) to investigate the impact of managerial power distance on corporate sustainability performance and to explore the regulatory role of corporate digitalization in the Chinese capital market.

The results of the study show a positive relationship between high managerial power distance and the sustainability performance of Chinese non-financial firms. This positive relationship is particularly pronounced in Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The results also show that corporate digitalization increases the sustainability performance of Chinese firms. Further, corporate digitalization weakens the positive relationship between high-power distance and the sustainability performance of Chinese firms. These results are robust to alternate sustainability performance measures and various regression techniques.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the regulating impact of corporate digitalization on the relationship between managerial power distance and corporate sustainability performance in China.

This paper relies on a “trinity of menetypes” of group knowing which captures the essential decision‐making dynamics of board membership. Formal, corporate decision‐making processes require higher commitments of time and cognitive energy of directors – certainly, the requirement is of non‐executive directors to make more formal contributions to the “political” process that determines corporate commitment to appropriate courses of action. There is a fundamental shift from “managerialism” to “politicism” in the corporate dynamics of organization – a shift in “menetype” driving governance dynamics. This wholesale shift in orientation has accentuated personal and group values as key determinants of corporate efficacy. The paper proposes structural reforms to corporate/agency governance conventions, including a greater focus on performance and strategy, greater independence of more effective and extensive audit processes and a greater transparency in the nomination and remuneration of top‐executive appointments.

This paper analyzes and explains the dynamics of corporate evolution in the context of anthropologist conception of culture. The multinational corporate characterizing the Galbraithian world, as The New Industrial State, dominates the current economic landscape. The conception of corporate culture and its dynamics lays bare the locus of corporate power which resides in the control of corporate technology. Granting this dynamic, the question then arises concerning the agency which controls the application and use of this cumulated corporate power. Corporate power and policy in the USA are currently directed by a social institution in the form of profits without social responsibility. This policy is manifest in a “low road” of cost reduction. Such a policy direction exacerbates rather than ameliorates the current economic malaise now characterizing the US economy.

The paper aims to use a neoliberal ideology to frame an analysis of how the power of ideas can be used to maintain a failed corporate governance model based on stockholder primacy.

The paper employs the concept of corporate hegemony to provide an understanding of the conditioning environment in the USA in the 1990s. It examines the tactics that neoliberals used to gain consensus for their ideology and to skillfully deflect criticism in the face of significant policy failures that have had a global impact.

The paper highlights the power of ideology to create a desired outcome. It finds that Sarbanes‐Oxley represented a neoliberal victory in that it legitimated shareholder primacy and continued use of a failed corporate governance model.

Sarbanes‐Oxley did not address the systemic problems associated with deregulation; it will not resolve the basic problem of how to prevent corporate malfeasance in an economic environment that rewards arbitrage capitalism, high risk and a focus on short‐term profits.

If shareholder primacy weakens accountability, as the paper suggests, then accounting researchers need to develop models that focus on deregulation rather than on regulatory capture and the use of state power to promote private interests. Accounting academics need to assume the role of public intellectuals and to reject Milton Friedman's focus on negative freedom as the sole objective of economic activity and examine economic well being in terms of positive freedom.

We argue that the United States has experienced a decline of economic, political, and military power since the 1970s, and that this decline can be attributed in part to the fragmentation of the American corporate elite. In the mid-twentieth century, this elite – constrained by a highly legitimate state, a relatively powerful labor movement, and an active financial community – adopted a moderate and pragmatic strategy for dealing with the political issues of the day. The “enlightened self-interest” of corporate leaders contributed to a strong economy with a relatively low level of inequality and an expanding middle class. This arrangement broke down in the 1970s, however, as increasing foreign competition and two energy crises led to spiraling inflation and lower profits. In response, the corporate elite waged an aggressive (and ultimately successful) assault on government regulation and organized labor. This success had the paradoxical effect of undermining the elite’s own sources of cohesion, however. Having won the war against government and labor, the group no longer needed to be organized. The marginalization of the commercial banks and the acquisition wave of the 1980s exacerbated the fragmentation of the corporate elite. No longer able to act collectively by the 1990s, the corporate elite was now incapable of addressing issues of business and societal-wide concern. Although increasingly able to gain individual favors from the state, the elite’s collective weakness has contributed to the political gridlock and social decay that plague American society in the twenty-first century.

The Berle and Means thesis focuses on a managerial revolution in which corporate control came to be transferred from owners to managers. Currently, it is arguable that control of corporate policy has shifted back to owners in what has come to be called “investor capitalism.” Stock market manipulators, as owners, have currently come to assert increased levels of control over CEO autonomy. This empirical reality appears in a vicious circle culminating in excessive CEO profits. The result has been to give support to a basic Veblenian assertion that imbecile business institutions hold sway to direct and dominate the economic process. In this process, the making of money rather than the production of goods serviceable for basic human needs have increasingly come to prevail over the US economy and culture.

This article attacks, in a novel way, the continued gulf between the theory and practice of maketing. By adopting the tools of organisational behaviour, drawn particularly from information processing theories of organisation and models of organisational power and political behaviour, the writer proposes an information‐structure‐power theory of corporate marketing. This theory has been developed through the writer's work on marketing information systems, marketing organisation, marketing budgeting and the impact on management of new information technology, but is now aimed more widely at analysing and, ultimately, controlling and managing those processes which determine strategic marketing decision‐making outcomes in organisations.

The purpose of this paper is to uncover the essence of insider trading, explain why insider trading law is ineffective and provide implications of the effectiveness of the law.

This conceptual paper offers three propositions. The first two are based on a literature review of 62 articles in empirical research to develop an understanding of the essence of insider trading and identify the areas in which insider trading is ineffective. This analysis is used in the third proposition to provide a direction in suggesting effective measures to improve insider trading law.

The essence of insider trading is that corporate insiders exercise informational monopoly power over their trades. This understanding explains why insider trading law is ineffective because it has not taken away the monopoly power that corporate insiders possess and exercise. This understanding also leads to three antitrust suggestions aimed at improving insider trading law.

The findings may provide assistance to the lawmakers and regulators to make insider trading law more effective and enforcement more simplified.

This paper is of value to other researchers attempting to understand the essence of insider trading and to policymakers concerned about the existence of monopolistic behavior in the equity market and income inequality due to corporate insiders’ trading profit.