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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to understand the roles of corporate governance reforms in Malaysia following the 1997/1998 Asian crisis from the perspectives of corporate managers.

Design/methodology/approach – The primary evidence used is drawn from a series of in-depth semi-structured interviews with Malaysian corporate managers involved in the overseeing of the governance structures within their companies.

Findings – This study shows that most interviewees believed that an appropriate corporate governance system could play a role in resolving the problems associated with the interlocking and concentrated corporate ownership structure in Malaysia. However, the effectiveness of the corporate governance reforms in dealing with this issue is questionable. It also reveals that Malaysian companies ‘changed’ their corporate governance practices predominantly to recover (foreign) investor confidence lost during the crisis and to fulfil the legal requirements enforced by the government, where the latter was under pressure from the international community (especially, the World Bank and IMF) to ‘improve’ the Malaysian corporate governance practices after the crisis.

Originality/value of paper – This paper adds to the literature on corporate governance, especially in the context of developing countries. Prior research investigating corporate governance issues in developing countries has been limited, particularly the lack of in-depth examination of corporate governance practices from the perspectives of corporate managers. This paper will be of great value to researchers and practitioners seeking to gain a better understanding of the roles of corporate governance in Malaysia.

This chapter examines China’s corporate governance and accounting environment that shapes the adoption of internationally acceptable principles and standards. Specifically, it examines international influences, including supranational organizations; foreign investors and international accounting firms; domestic institutional influences, including the political system, economic system, legal system, and cultural system; and accounting infrastructure. China’s convergence is driven by desired efficiency of the corporate sector and legitimacy of participating in the global market. Influenced heavily by international forces in the context of globalization, corporate governance and accounting practices are increasingly becoming in line with internationally acceptable standards and codes. While convergence assists China in obtaining legitimacy, improving efficiency is likely to be adversely affected given that corporate governance and accounting in China operate in an environment that differs considerably from those of Anglo-American countries. An examination of the corporate governance and accounting environment in China suggests heavy government involvement within underdeveloped institutions. While the Chinese government has made impressive progress in developing the corporate governance and accounting environment for the market economy, China’s unique institutional setting is likely to affect how the imported concepts are interpreted and implemented.

This paper empirically examines the impact of corporate governance reforms on the financial performance of Indian state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for the period 2003–2011.

The findings indicate that the various corporate governance reforms collectively exhibited a statistically significant positive impact on performance when a difference in difference estimation process is used. However, the performance of SOEs is less than that of publicly listed companies, which is consistent with prior research. When the SOEs are compared with a matched pairing of publicly listed companies of similar size and same industry, their performance was comparable and in many instances superior. This is indicative of the regulatory constraints on competitors and preferential access to resources and markets given to the SOEs. As SOEs move towards a more mixed ownership model with more of them listed on the stock exchange and greater public ownership of shares the corporate governance issues will increase in importance.

The controlled sell down of shares in SOEs presents a need for continuing governance reforms and ongoing research to track progress.

The most striking observation from the study is that changes that were introduced as a corporate governance reform, such greater professionalism in boards, did not gain traction and enhance performance, rather the process of director selection and the concentrated bureaucratic and political interference stymied what was asserted to be conceptually sound reforms.

Purpose of paper – This paper sets out to introduce the special issue on corporate governance in less developed and emerging economies. It summarises and reflects on themes and findings raised in the papers in the volume.

Design/methodology/approach – The findings reported in the paper are based on desk research and review of the papers contained in the volume.

Findings – The paper finds that the adoption of appropriate corporate governance systems is becoming a central issue in less developed and emerging economies. Factors such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the adoption of international donor led reforms, and the globalisation of capital markets are among the factors that are driving corporate governance reforms in less developed and emerging economies.

Research limitations/implications – The pressure from international donors has compelled some less developed and emerging economies to adopt corporate governance models developed in the West with no modification. The paper argues that while it is imperative for less developed and emerging economies to reform their corporate governance systems, it is important that these systems are adapted to suite the specific needs of individual countries.

Originality/value of paper – The paper is a summary of studies exploring various corporate governance issues in less developed and emerging economies. The issues addressed in these studies are important to understand corporate governance issues in both the private and public sectors in less developed and emerging economies.

China has achieved continuous economic growth and become more integrated with the global economy since the start of the current financial crisis in late 2008. As the second largest economy in the world, China's political policies, economic and social development have influence on global economy. Attention has been paid worldwide to the current Chinese legal system, political policies and the development of economic reform since China entered the World Trade Organisation in November 2001. The corporate governance reform is the centre of the enterprise reform. In September 1999, The Fourth Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party's 15th central Committee identified that corporate governance is the core of the modern enterprise system. In recent years China has made significant progress in developing the foundations of a modern corporate system. There are more than 1,200 companies which have successfully diversified their ownership through public listing and 80% of small and medium size companies have been transformed into non-state-owned enterprises. More and more state-owned enterprises are on the way to transforming into corporations. China has formed a legal framework for corporate governance.

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to empirically evaluate the effectiveness of China's 2005 shareholding reform and investigate the relationship of the changes of state-owned shareholdings and the largest shareholdings with corporate performance.

Methodology/approach – This study uses a sample of 470 listed firms that were subject to China's 2005 shareholding reform with data from 2004 and 2006. First, we examine whether the reform has reduced state-owned shareholdings measured by ownership concentration and the largest shareholdings through comparing shareholder structures of the reformed listed companies prior to and after the reform. Second, regression analysis was used to explore the relationship between the change of ownership concentration and largest shareholdings and corporate performance of Chinese listed firms.

Findings – This study reveals the effectiveness of the shareholding reform as both ownership concentration and largest shareholdings decrease. This study presents evidence suggesting a positive impact of China's 2005 shareholding reform on corporate performance and endorsing the notion that state-owned shareholdings are detrimental to corporate performance.

Research limitations – ROE is used as a measure of corporate performance, which is influenced by the rules of accounting standards and corporate behavior.

Originality/value – This study provides empirical evidence on the effectiveness of China's shareholding reform and shows a positive relation between the reduction of ownership concentration and corporate performance. This is the first study to examine this relation using the cases of Chinese listed companies. The findings have implications to regulatory bodies, public listed firms and investors in China in terms of corporate governance and shareholding configuration.

Purpose – The paper explains how internal reporting systems, as embedded practices informing organizational actions and “know-how”, contributed to the inertia in implementing a corporate form of governance in a transitional public organization in a developing country – Egypt.

Design/methodology/approach – The paper synthesizes an institutional theory framework in order to capture the case study mixed results. Drawing on DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) notions of isomorphic mechanisms, Ocasio (1999) and Burns and Scapens’ (2000) notions of organizations’ memory, history, cumulative actions and routines, Brunsson's (1994) notion of organizational institutional confusion as well as Carruthers's (1995) notion of “symbolic window-dressing” adoption of new practices, the paper explores the dynamic of a public hospital corporatization processes. Data collection methods include semi-structured interviews, documentary evidence and direct observation.

Findings – The case study evidence shows that the interplay between the new form of “corporate” governance and the intra-organizational power, routines and “know-how” created internal organizational confusion and changed organizational members’ narrative of risk and uncertainties.

Research limitations/implications – The paper does not reveal the role of reformers involved in the public sector “governance” reform in developing countries. Exploring such a role goes beyond the scope of this paper and represents an area of future research.

Originality/value – The paper provides a comprehensive account of public sector “governance” reform in a developing nation, while exploring the role of management accounting and costing systems in facilitating or otherwise that reform processes.

Reforms in corporate governance in selected Asian countries were introduced after the financial crisis of 1997–1998. After the financial collapse, several crisis-affected economies overhauled their corporate governance, strengthening market forces, implementing tougher regulations and focusing on transparency in decision-making and accountability. Since then, a commitment to improving corporate governance has grown as governments recognised the need to protect investors’ interests, reduce systemic market risks, maintain financial stability and enhance investors’ confidence to encourage the return of capital to the region through better accountability and transparency. The incentive for corporations to follow best practice is to boost their corporate performance and attract investment. Effective corporate governance is also recognised as essential for economic growth. Governments are realising that good governance of corporations is a source of competitive advantage and critical to economic and social progress.

Since the financial crisis, corporate governance has become a key policy issue in most of Asia. Progress in reforming corporate governance, however, has been uneven across Asia. This paper documents that progress.

Recent spectacular collapses globally have sparked renewed public interest in corporate governance and the pursuit of a new global model. The prevailing dominance of an American model has overshadowed constructive attempts to derive a model that is more appropriate for ‘non-western’ and developing countries. In this paper, I examine the discourse of corporate governance in China. I argue that rather than being a mere captive of the American model, it could have crafted and developed an alternate and more appropriate model that takes into account the economic and social needs of China instead of a corporate governance model developed for other countries.

Spectacular corporate failures including One Tel, Ansett, HIH, Enron and Worldcom and the recent fiasco with National Australia Bank are evidence of a legitimacy crisis in current corporate governance practices. This paper analyses the organisational impact of recent “best practice” guidelines and the recommendations for reform. We conclude that substantive concerns still exist and it is likely that companies will utilise a “tick the box” approach emphasising form over substance governance changes. We argue for a two-fold approach to embed effective ongoing reform. The first involves cultural change(s) at the boardroom level to develop a “real” team approach. This would embrace the use of constructive conflict in the decision-making process and also incorporate elements of trust and openness. Constructive conflict, we argue, leads to real and effective boardroom behavioural changes.

The second strand of reform proposes that such changes should be extended into the internal decision-making (enterprise governance) arena. Such a move towards organisational pluralism devolves decision-making and allows greater employee involvement in the “running” of organisations. It also entails a significant re-framing of organisational values, culture and followership. The leadership role becomes one of facilitation and support not the current dominant “command and control” mindset.