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This paper aims to investigate the determinants of good governance in the US firms.

The data are taken from a sample of 624 US listed and non‐financial firms for the period of 1994‐2003. Four indices were constructed that summarize the governance quality: one indice for the board of directors, another one for the board committees, a third one for the audit committee, and a fourth representing an overall or total index. Multiple regressions analyses are used in the study to find the determinants of strong governance.

The empirical results show statistically significant and positive associations between each governance index (exception to board index) and firm size, investment opportunities, intangible assets and directors and officers ownership. Furthermore, institutional ownership and external financing needs are positively related to each governance index considered. However, growth opportunities and performance have no significant effect on governance quality.

Other corporate governance mechanisms could be considered (transparency and disclosure, anti‐takeover provisions and shareholder's rights).

This paper adds evidence to the important debate about corporate governance ratings. It gives a most comprehensive analysis to date in term of sample size and breath coverage. This paper also offers a new contribution to the debate on the determinants of good governance by isolating the effects of firm characteristics on the board of directors from the effect on compensation and nominating committees and from the effect on audit committee.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact corporate governance, measured by a governance index, on the performance of listed firms in a developing economy, Ghana. It also evaluates the effect of the introduction of a code of corporate governance on compliance rates across Ghanaian firms as well as assessing the impact of the code’s introduction on firm performance for the study period 2000-2009.

The paper develops a Ghanaian corporate governance index (GCGI) containing 33 provisions to measure corporate governance quality during the pre-code and the post-code sub-periods. The authors use a panel data analytical framework and fixed effects regressions to analyse the governance-performance relationships.

After controlling for endogeneity, the authors find a statistically significant and positive relationship between the GCGI and firm performance. The analysis shows evidence of a statistically significant increase in the degree of compliance with the Ghanaian Code from the pre-2003 sub-period to the post-2003 sub-period. The authors also find that the introduction of the code has led to improved firm performance. However, not all elements of corporate governance appear to have a significant effect on firm performance.

One limitation of this study is the development of a corporate governance index. The binary coding used to construct the GCGI may not reflect the relative importance of the different corporate governance provisions. This means that all elements included in the index are given equal weighting. Future research may assign weights to each of the corporate governance provisions but this may have the disadvantage of making subjective judgements relative to the importance of each corporate governance provision recommended by the Ghanaian Code.

These results have important implications for both policy makers and companies. For policy makers, it is encouraging for the development of a code of corporate governance to regulate firms rather than enforcing rigid laws that may not be value relevant. For companies, the improvement in compliance with a code of corporate governance can provide a means of achieving improved performance.

This paper adds to the limited evidence on the governance-performance relationship in developing economies and in particular it analyses the role of a governance index. It is also the first paper to compare the pre- and the post-code governance index-performance relationship in an African or developing country.

The purpose of this study is to construct a comprehensive Indian corporate governance index in light of the recently introduced Companies Act, 2013, which is further validated by analyzing its impact on the cost of equity of a firm.

Based on the hand-collected data from firms listed on S&P BSE 500 from 2001 to 2016, this index comprises seven equally weighted sub-indices, comprising a total of 43 corporate governance attributes. This index and the sub-indices have further been regressed with the cost of equity of a firm.

The results suggest a negative significant relationship between the overall corporate governance and the cost of equity. The study also suggests that among all the sub-indices, board composition predicts the cost of equity to a greater extent. Other than this, the audit committee sub-index has a negative significant association with the cost of equity. The findings imply that a well-governed firm enjoys ease of access to equity finance from the market.

The corporate governance index is based on the recent regulatory reforms introduced in India. The index, with certain changes suitable to the local context, can be applied to similar emerging economies as well. The causal relationship tested using this method is the first one done in India. This study adds to the domain of corporate governance literature with special focus on the construction of an index for an emerging economy.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent of corporate governance reporting by United Arab Emirates (UAE) listed corporations.

The paper reports on the study of annual reports of 95 UAE listed corporations representing the major economic sectors (banking, insurance, industrial and service) in the country while crafting a corporate governance reporting index that not only advocates the voluntary publication of corporate governance information but also stresses its underlying ethos of public accountability and transparency.

Overall, the extent of governance disclosure is found to be similar across the major economic sectors in the UAE. The lowest disclosures are associated with information about external auditing and non‐audit services. The highest disclosures are those dealing with management structure and transparency, which are also found to be significantly different across the sectors in the UAE.

The study examines the corporations' annual reports, as this is the only vehicle in which corporate governance information is disclosed. Future research is recommended to include other disclosure channels such as press releases, corporations' websites, and online reporting.

The findings of this study can assist UAE regulators in formulating corporate governance disclosure requirements. The findings also provide the international business community insights concerning the extent of corporate governance reporting in the UAE.

The crafted corporate governance reporting index not only adds a quantitative dimension advocating the voluntary publication of governance information but also considers the socio‐political context in the UAE.

In recent years, the quality and environment of global corporate governance have drawn attention from researchers and practitioners. Based on the public information of Chinese listed companies (CLCs), the Evaluation Research Group of China Academy of Corporate Governance at Nankai University developed the first corporate governance index system that includes six dimensions to evaluate the status of the governance of CLCs.

This paper reports the findings of the annual evaluation in 2017.

The authors found that five of the six dimensions of CLC governance index increased, except for shareholder governance index. Management-level governance and information disclosure index increased most significantly.

Through the evaluation, the authors discovered some governance problems of CLCs and proposed some corresponding suggestions to improve the effectiveness of corporate governance of these companies.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the corporate governance information disclosed by Spanish listed companies on the internet, with the objective of assessing the extent and the influence of several corporate characteristics on the level of information voluntarily disclosed.

The study took as its reference the existing literature on the examination of the quality of web sites and the importance of content as a key variable in determining web site quality. To quantify the corporate governance information disclosed by Spanish listed companies, three transparency indexes were designed. To contrast which variables determine the information provided online, the investigation based itself on studies about voluntary disclosure in companies, and three lineal regressions models and an ANOVA analysis were performed.

The empirical evidence obtained reveals that the firms that score highest for transparency are also those that are most likely to use the internet as a channel for the disclosure of corporate governance information. The results show that disclosure levels depend on the degree to which firms are followed by analysts, their listing age, their “visibility” and the fact of belonging to the communications and information services industry.

The need for this study was clear in view of the increasing interest shown by supervisory authorities for the oversight of the European and US capital markets in regulating not only the content but also the manner in which corporate governance information is disclosed over the internet. During the coming years, regulatory stock market agencies will have to strive to take advantage of the opportunities that the internet offers to increase both the relational and informational capacity of company web sites.

Corporate governance research has focused mainly on the analysis of the information that firms ought to disclose and the effects of disclosure generally, without considering the media involved. This paper suggests a new approach that examines the relevance of technology, particularly the internet, and orients supervisory authorities in the direction to follow for improving corporate governance transparency in listed companies.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate governance strength as measured by the Gompers governance index (gindex) and other related factors on corporate risk as measured by implied volatility of returns.

The research incorporates implied volatility as the measure of risk, as compared to earlier studies that have used historic volatility measures. Governance variables include the Gompers Index, as well as other measures to control for firm size, ownership and leverage.

The findings indicate that corporate risk is significantly inversely‐related with the gindex, which essentially gauges how extensively antitakeover provisions are adopted by a firm. Firm size is the other variable significant in both univariate and multivariate models. Financial leverage and the percentage of outsiders on the board are significantly related to firm risk when not controlling for other factors. Board percentage of voting power does not appear to affect firm riskiness statistically.

Future research needs to examine specifically why higher takeover defenses lead to lower implied volatility. This includes exploring whether the lower level of expected volatility is due to lower levels of takeover activity or whether firms with poor governance assume a suboptimal amount of risk.

The paper contributes to the literature by the use of implied volatility as the measure of risk. The results are robust and provide further support for the relationship between corporate governance and risk. While counter to initial expectations, these results suggest, at the very least, a firm with good governance may not necessarily have low implied volatility in its stock price.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nexus between corporate governance and dividend policy of listed Indian firms.

Using new corporate governance stipulations, five new indices were constructed, namely, overall board governance index, board structure index, audit committee index, compensation committee index and nomination committee index. Using the newly developed indices, disclosure index and different firm-specific control variables, different panel Logit and Tobit regression models were estimated for 482 non-financial and non-utility listed firms during 2006–2017. Also, before the econometric analysis, mean difference test was conducted to examine the differences in dividend behaviour and corporate governance practices during pre- and post-Companies Act, 2013 and between payers and non-payers.

The overall evidence suggests that the firms having stronger corporate governance tend to pay higher dividends suggesting that the firm’s propensity to pay dividends increases with the improvement in corporate governance standards. Among the corporate governance indices board structure, audit committee and disclosure norms show a significant and positive relationship, whereas compensation committee and nomination committee show a positive but insignificant relationship with dividend policy. Control variables mostly had the expected impact on the dividends of the firms.

This study suggests that the establishment of the strong and effective corporate governance system is desirable to mitigate the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders and limit managers’ opportunistic behaviour in dividend payout policy.

This study is one of the latest studies to use several newly constructed indices on corporate governance mechanism based on new stipulations which bring new evidence on their specific impact on the dividend policy for an emerging market economy like India.

Prior research, in mainly Western economies, suggests the level of corporate governance is financially important. As an emerging economy case study, the purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the Thai Institute of Directors (IOD) corporate governance index provides investors with financial information about fundamental value and arbitrage portfolio decisions, and if/how information content changes over time.

Logistic regressions using 11 financially dependent variables and a “good governance” dummy variable, constructing zero‐cost buy‐sell portfolios, and Fama‐French cumulative average returns (CARs), over the period 2001‐2006.

The predicted significant relationships between a “good governance” categorization and financial proxies for firm performance; and zero‐cost portfolios that generate very high future monthly excess returns early in the study period, which are then dissipated by 2006, are found. These high returns were also associated with insignificant or inconsistent ten‐day CARs after the announcement of an improving (deteriorating) index category, but with a more rapid reaction in 2006.

Results suggest that either (or in a combination): the Thai stock market had a slow learning adjustment to the governance index because of uncertainty as to information content; the IOD was incomplete and needed fine tuning and updating before full information impact was realized; and other time‐specific factors meant the IOD was of a lesser importance. One limitation is the data time period and the extension of the governance analysis to the global financial crisis years.

Governance information content in Thailand was not (initially) fully integrated into prices with substantial arbitrage returns available to astute investors. Continual re‐assessment and improvement of governance reporting should be an agenda requirement.

The paper forms an extension of governance studies into an Asian emerging economy, and determination of time‐varying information content and arbitrage opportunities.

For the past two and half decades, there has been a marked shift in the corporate governance regulations around the world. The change is more remarkable in developing countries where countries with little or no corporate governance regime have adopted “world class” standards. While there can be a debate on whether law in books actually translates into law in action, in the meantime it might be interesting to analyse the law in books to understand how the corporate governance regime has evolved in the past 20 years. This paper quantitatively tracks 21 countries, most of them being developing and emerging economies, over a period of 20 years. The period covers 1995 to 2014; thus, it traverses the pre and post crisis period in 1999 and 2008. Thus, the paper also provides a snapshot of the macrolegal changes that the countries engage in hoping to stave off the next crisis. The paper uses over 50 parameters modelled on the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. The paper confirms the suspicion that corporate governance norms around the developing economies are converging on shareholder primacy end of the continuum. The rate of convergence was highest just before the financial crisis of 2008 and has since then slowed down.

The paper uses data collected from experts. They filled up detailed questionnaire which quizzed them on the rules relating to corporate governance norms in their country and asked them to retrospectively check their data every five years for the past 20 years. This provided an excellent overview as to how the law has evolved in the past two decades on corporate governance. The data were then tabulated using a scoring sheet and then was put together using item response theory (IRT) which is a Bayesian method similar to factor analysis. The paper then follows a comparative approach using heatmaps to analyse the evolution of corporate governance in developing countries.

Corporate governance norms around the developing economies are converging on shareholder primacy end of the continuum. The rate of convergence was highest just before the financial crisis of 2008 and has since then slowed down.

This is the first time that corporate governance panel data analysis has been carried out on top developing countries across so many parameters for such a long period. This paper also uses Bayesian IRT modelling to analyse the evolution which is novel in its approach especially in the corporate governance literature. The paper thus provides a clear view on the evolution of corporate governance norms and how they are converging on a particular ideology.