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Concerning that limited explanation exists examining the function of corporate governance in trust processing within entrepreneurial network development, the purpose of this paper is to explore trust evolution and the role of corporate governance in an entrepreneurial network.

This paper makes an innovative exploration based on the case study of NVC Lighting Holding Limited.

It proposes that in the initial period of network relationship which is based on entrepreneur’s individual social network and embodies sole social network embeddness, entrepreneurial network relies more on affective trust than contractual trust. When stepping into extending period of network relationship which reflects separate embeddedness of social and market network, however, entrepreneurial network has an equal reliance on both affective trust and contractual trust. With further development, when ushering in the phase of maturity which undergoes superimposing embeddedness of both social and market network, entrepreneur network inclines to rely more heavily on affective trust than contractual trust. During the whole process, it can be found that the reliance of entrepreneurial network on trust has the tendency to transfer from affective trust to contractual trust. Furthermore, decreasing of equity ratio of founders and strengthening of controlling right heterogeneity in the corporate governance have facilitated the transfer process and the entrepreneurs’ authority has restraining effect on the evolution of the process.

Through case study, this paper presents the trust evolution process in different stages of entrepreneurial network. Another important theoretic contribution of this paper is that it reveals the function of corporate governance in trust processing within entrepreneurial network development.

This paper aims to analyse normative corporate governance evolution in the UK between 1995 and 2014 against the benchmark of Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) regulatory principles.

Methodologically, the authors conduct an empirical, longitudinal data set analysis of the formative years of UK normative corporate governance development between 1995 and 2014. We provide a qualitative discussion of the empirical evidence that links the type of UK regulatory corporate governance development to financial market growth thereby adopting a mixed approach based on quantitative and qualitative research methods.

The authors find that compared to the OECD model of corporate governance, the UK model is less rigid following a more self-regulatory approach based upon a “comply or explain” paradigm. Thus it is scored below corporate governance systems that follow a compulsory implementation model. However, even with such “low” tilt towards formal shareholder primacy norms, the UK has the best performing financial market. As a quasi-empirical study, the authors suggest that there are several historical and economic reasons for this, which together with a robust rule of law in the UK contribute to this performance – and the law especially the type or tilt is less relevant.

This is the first of its kind empirical, longitudinal data set analysis with qualitative elements that links empirical evidence to regulatory developments in the wider context of UK corporate governance evolution.

The purpose of this paper is to focus on the relationship between the corporate governance (CG) environment, governance behavior and governance performance and place it into the research of the evolution and revolution of the Chinese telecommunication industry, a complex economic system.

On the basis of information about the Chinese telecommunication industry from 1949 to 2009 and China Mobile from 1997 to 2007, the authors analyze the Chinese telecommunication industry from two levels, namely industry level and firm level, with the combination of a critical incident method and time series method.

The results demonstrate that the evolution of the Chinese CG environment and governance behavior presents characteristics of punctuated equilibrium; governance behavior lags behind governance environment and it can cause the governance environment to evolve to benefit its development through exerting active effects; governance environment and governance performance strongly relate to and have an effect on each other; and the improvement of governance structure and mechanisms, together with the enhancement of strategic capability, can greatly contribute to the governance performance of firms.

This paper has divided the development of the Chinese telecommunication industry into four stages, revealing the relationship between governance environment, governance behavior and governance performance with a case study of the Chinese telecommunication industry and China Mobile.

This paper questions the issue of the dynamics of corporate governance in Japan using a conceptual framework adapted from North’s theory of institutional change. National systems of corporate governance can indeed be considered a particular case of institutions. We thus suggest transposing North’s propositions about institutional change to national systems of corporate governance. As an illustration for our propositions, we choose to use a case study: the so-called Sogo crisis. The Sogo group is a Japanese chain of department stores, which has encountered financial problems in the late 1990s. The handling of those difficulties by the firm’s main stakeholders highlights both the recent changes in the Japanese system of corporate governance and the resistance opposed to them.

For the past two and half decades, there has been a marked shift in the corporate governance regulations around the world. The change is more remarkable in developing countries where countries with little or no corporate governance regime have adopted “world class” standards. While there can be a debate on whether law in books actually translates into law in action, in the meantime it might be interesting to analyse the law in books to understand how the corporate governance regime has evolved in the past 20 years. This paper quantitatively tracks 21 countries, most of them being developing and emerging economies, over a period of 20 years. The period covers 1995 to 2014; thus, it traverses the pre and post crisis period in 1999 and 2008. Thus, the paper also provides a snapshot of the macrolegal changes that the countries engage in hoping to stave off the next crisis. The paper uses over 50 parameters modelled on the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. The paper confirms the suspicion that corporate governance norms around the developing economies are converging on shareholder primacy end of the continuum. The rate of convergence was highest just before the financial crisis of 2008 and has since then slowed down.

The paper uses data collected from experts. They filled up detailed questionnaire which quizzed them on the rules relating to corporate governance norms in their country and asked them to retrospectively check their data every five years for the past 20 years. This provided an excellent overview as to how the law has evolved in the past two decades on corporate governance. The data were then tabulated using a scoring sheet and then was put together using item response theory (IRT) which is a Bayesian method similar to factor analysis. The paper then follows a comparative approach using heatmaps to analyse the evolution of corporate governance in developing countries.

Corporate governance norms around the developing economies are converging on shareholder primacy end of the continuum. The rate of convergence was highest just before the financial crisis of 2008 and has since then slowed down.

This is the first time that corporate governance panel data analysis has been carried out on top developing countries across so many parameters for such a long period. This paper also uses Bayesian IRT modelling to analyse the evolution which is novel in its approach especially in the corporate governance literature. The paper thus provides a clear view on the evolution of corporate governance norms and how they are converging on a particular ideology.

This paper makes the first attempt to provide a new analytical framework for research on the evolution of China's corporate governance models. The purpose of this paper is to investigate developmental corporate governance mechanisms in China the over past decades from a synthetic and dynamic analytical viewpoint.

This is a conceptual paper.

The evolution of corporate governance from an administrative to an economic model in China was not a smooth process and was confronted with various unavoidable institutional and ideological obstacles. Consequently, the transition of governance models has demonstrated the following four salient characteristics: gradualism, dualism, systematization and path dependency.

This paper makes the first attempt to provide a new analytical framework for research on the evolution of China's corporate governance models.

This paper aims to examine the evolution of corporate governance in Nigeria and how the duplication of code of corporate best practices is impacting compliance with the key recommendations of these guidelines. The issues of corporate governance and reforms especially those related to the development and implementation of code of corporate best practices have been a subject of academic discuss over the years with more research emphasis placed on developed economies. This paper intends to add the sub-Sahara Africa and the emerging economic perspective to this vibrant stream of research.

This paper adopts an explanatory approach in the review of the four different codes of corporate governance that were issued in Nigeria in the past ten years.

The paper demonstrated that corporate governance has been a fundamental issue of concern in Nigerian public enterprises since the country gained independence in 1960. The paper equally established that the application of recent corporate governance reforms has been challenged, not on competency grounds but rather by the proliferation of codes which have created implementation and monitoring difficulties for both the affected firms and the regulatory agencies.

Unlike other previous studies, this paper offers comprehensive analysis of corporate governance evolution in Nigeria and found through documented literatures that shortage of experienced local personnel and the absence of effective external control mechanisms have been the bane against the development of corporate governance in Nigeria. The originality of this paper also lies in being the first paper to have linked developments in the public enterprises to the renewed focus on corporate governance. This is the most inclusive paper to have identified key implications of multiplicity of corporate governance codes and the direct application of governance system within the context of the country’s socio-cultural distinctiveness.

The past few decades have seen a gradual convergence in corporate governance norms the world over, entailing a discernible shift towards shareholder primacy models. It holds particularly true of developing countries, many of which have steadily amended corporate governance norms to enhance the scope of shareholder rights. This is usually justified through the rationale that increasing protection for foreign investors and shareholders would mean greater investment in capital market and overall financial market development. In India, the shift coincides with a series of fundamental economic and financial policy reforms initiated in the 1990s: collectively and loosely referred to as “liberalisation”, this process marks a paradigm-shift from a tightly controlled welfare economy to one considerably more laissez-faire in its orientation. A fallout of which was that the need to attract and sustain foreign investments acquired an unprecedented significance. The purpose of this paper is to help the readers understand in this larger context the corporate law reform initiatives in India, particularly those pertaining to shareholder rights and allied issues.

This paper empirically tests the hypothesis that enhanced shareholder protection leads to greater levels of investments, and financial developments generally. It then uses regression analysis to detect if the change in corporate governance, making it more shareholder-friendly, has had any effect on growth in financial market. It is divided into two broad parts. The first tracks the evolution of corporate governance norms in India. A robust qualitative and quantitative analysis is used to determine the tilt towards a shareholder primacy regime that Indian corporate governance regime now displays. The second chapter deals with the regression analysis where the outcome variable is financial market growth, and explanatory variable is the change in the governance regime with relevant control variables.

The authors find that change in shareholder primacy corporate governance has little effect on financial market growth in India. The authors would suggest that instead of changing the law in books, more emphasis should be given to implement those regulations and increase the overall rule of law.

This is the first time that such a wide-scale study has been conducted in India, using Bayesian methods. It ought to be of immense value to professionals and academics both.

The purpose of this study is to provide a high-level review of the evolution of shareholder activism and institutional investor engagement in the corporate governance ecosystem in South Africa. Furthermore, it specifically seeks to explain the incorporation of such aspects into the various key codes and reports on corporate governance in South Africa since 1994.

Historical narrative and analysis.

This study highlights how shareholder activism and institutional investor engagement in the corporate governance ecosystem have been considered and addressed in South Africa since the publication of the First King Report in 1994. The progress that has been made specifically with regard to the introduction of a code for institutional investors is highlighted. The study ultimately acknowledges that this evolution is a continuing journey on the road to stakeholder inclusivity and engagement, and then concludes that the specific role and impact of institutional investors, particularly given some of the recent corporate governance failures, will require further consideration going forward. This should ensure the continued alignment of all stakeholders and assist in making the necessary improvements to the overarching governance framework and attendant culture.

This study is a part of a special issue that looks at the contribution of the King reports to governance globally.

Differentiates market (e.g. USA) from group‐based (e.g. Germany) corporate governance systems, traces their evolution and asks whether they are converging. Puts forward a theoretical convergence model based on the belief that agency problems can best be solved by specific corporate control mechanisms, recognizing that it would demand more changes from group‐based than from market systems. Examines current trends for both relating to institutional/regulatory environments, the market for corporate control and the focus on shareholder value creation/activism. Presents statistics from the USA, UK, Germany and France to show their trends towards the convergence model and discusses them in some detail. Concludes that they have all moved towards the model although in different ways and at different rates.