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Since the late 1990s, developing countries have been encouraged by international financial organisations to adopt a shareholder primacy corporate governance model. It was anticipated that in an increasingly globalised financial market, countries which introduced corporate governance practices that favour investors would gain a comparative advantage and attract more capital leading to financial market growth. This paper aims to empirically test this hypothesis.

The present research paper quantitatively investigates whether adopting shareholder primacy corporate governance norms has had any impact on the growth of the financial market, focusing on nineteen developing countries between 1995 and 2014. Time series indices are prepared for corporate governance regulations, financial market development along with three control indices. Then a lagged multilevel regression between these indices is used to investigate the strength of causality between the adoption of pro-shareholder corporate governance and the growth of the financial market.

The research paper finds that shifting towards a shareholder primacy model in corporate governance has a very small effect on growth of financial market in developing countries. Overall the financial, economic and technological controls have much more impact on the growth of financial markets.

This paper conclusively ends the discussion as to whether change in corporate governance has any impact on financial market growth of a country. The papers uses Bayesian econometric model. The paper thus signals the end of LLSV led question as to whether law can affect finance.

Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

Since its independence, Kazakhstan has been improving its corporate governance system according to recommendations of international organizations. It was promised that the adoption of shareholder primacy approach would have a positive impact on its financial market growth. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to quantitatively analyse whether Kazakhstani corporate governance is moving towards a shareholder primacy corporate governance approach and its impact on financial market growth.

The paper will conduct a quantitative analysis. Firstly, the changes in corporate governance that occurred between 1991 and 2017 will be analysed using 52 corporate governance variables. Thus, a questionnaire will be used to collect data. When the questionnaire is completed, all data will be converted into numbers. Then, multiple liner regression will be used to estimate the impact of change in corporate governance.

The paper finds that Kazakhstan is successfully adopting shareholder-friendly corporate governance standards and so-called convergence has also occurred. Moreover, it is suggested that reforms in Kazakhstani corporate governance system have not yet brought the desired result of prosperous financial market and high flows of foreign investments.

Analysis specifically considers the changes in Kazakhstani corporate governance system and uses quantitative methods, whereas there is a lack (if not complete absence) of quantitative studies regarding Kazakhstani corporate governance.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of interactive effect of competition and corporate governance on productivity growth of firms in Nigeria. Studies that have considered this issue were mainly from developed countries possessing strong institutions as against those of developing countries like Nigeria. Moreover, studies from Nigeria have focused exclusively on corporate governance and firm performance. The interaction effect of competition on corporate governance is yet to be addressed in the context of Nigeria.

The study adopts the dynamic panel data analysis approach suggested by Arellano and Bond for productivity growth analysis. Data on 76 non-financial firms for 11 years beginning from 1997 were extracted from the financial statements of companies collected from the Nigerian Stock Exchange and subsequently analysed using General Methods of Moments (GMM).

The results show that competition had a positive impact on productivity growth, however, its interaction effect with corporate governance had a substitute but not significant impact on productivity growth. When competition was interacted with an alternative corporate governance mechanism – bank – a positive and significant impact was, however, observed which shows that competition and bank loans are complementary in stimulating productivity growth of firms in Nigeria.

The study could not be carried out beyond year 2007 owing to the exit of some firms after 2007 which could have reduced the sample size drastically. The findings emanating from this study suggests that government should focus much more on implementing competitive policies and bother less on writing corporate governance codes.

The results demonstrate that corporate governance had no significant impact on productivity growth even when it was interacted with competition. However, competition on its own had a significant impact on productivity which means that Nigeria should concentrate more on building a competitive private sector, and in this regard, government should try and pursue policies that will foster competition and eliminate monopolistic tendencies. Once, there is effective competition, the corporate governance may be strengthened. However, the interactive effect of competition and bank loans was found with a positive and significant impact which indicates that banks as alternate corporate governance mechanism can only be effective if competition is strong. This goes to show that the financial sector may not be able to effectively and positively impact the real sector in Nigeria if the prevailing level of competition is low. In such a situation finance may not be channelled to projects that have long-run implications on sustainable growth and development.

Socially, if the environment for competition is not fostered in Nigeria, the country may face an uphill task in combating the problem of poverty through a private sector-led solution. Hence, there is a need for government to begin to formulate comprehensive competition policies that will ensure that resources are optimally utilized in Nigeria.

In the context of Nigeria, this study is novel, the use of productivity growth as against firm financial performance is unique for Nigeria while the use of GMM method of analysis helps in reducing the effect of endogeneity inherent in corporate governance and performance of firms in Nigeria.

Over the past two decades, China’s stock market has experienced rapid growth. This period has seen the transplantation of many “OECD principles of corporate governance” into the Chinese corporate regulatory framework. These regulations are dominated by shareholder values. This paper aims to discover whether there is a causal relationship between the changes in China’s corporate governance and financial market growth.

This paper uses data from 1995-2014 to create a robust corporate index by looking at 52 variables and a financial index out of five financial market parameters. Subsequently, data are subject to a panel regression analysis, with the financial market index as the outcome variable, corporate governance index explanatory variable and a variety of economics, social and technological control variables.

This paper concludes that changes in corporate regulation have in fact had no statistically significant impact on China’s financial market growth, which must therefore be attributed to other factors.

The study is the first in the context of Chinese corporate governance impact studies to use Bayesian methodology to analyse a panel dataset. It uses OECD principles as the anchor to provide a clear picture of evolution of corporate governance for a 20-year period which is also longer than previous studies.

The past few decades have seen a gradual convergence in corporate governance norms the world over, entailing a discernible shift towards shareholder primacy models. It holds particularly true of developing countries, many of which have steadily amended corporate governance norms to enhance the scope of shareholder rights. This is usually justified through the rationale that increasing protection for foreign investors and shareholders would mean greater investment in capital market and overall financial market development. In India, the shift coincides with a series of fundamental economic and financial policy reforms initiated in the 1990s: collectively and loosely referred to as “liberalisation”, this process marks a paradigm-shift from a tightly controlled welfare economy to one considerably more laissez-faire in its orientation. A fallout of which was that the need to attract and sustain foreign investments acquired an unprecedented significance. The purpose of this paper is to help the readers understand in this larger context the corporate law reform initiatives in India, particularly those pertaining to shareholder rights and allied issues.

This paper empirically tests the hypothesis that enhanced shareholder protection leads to greater levels of investments, and financial developments generally. It then uses regression analysis to detect if the change in corporate governance, making it more shareholder-friendly, has had any effect on growth in financial market. It is divided into two broad parts. The first tracks the evolution of corporate governance norms in India. A robust qualitative and quantitative analysis is used to determine the tilt towards a shareholder primacy regime that Indian corporate governance regime now displays. The second chapter deals with the regression analysis where the outcome variable is financial market growth, and explanatory variable is the change in the governance regime with relevant control variables.

The authors find that change in shareholder primacy corporate governance has little effect on financial market growth in India. The authors would suggest that instead of changing the law in books, more emphasis should be given to implement those regulations and increase the overall rule of law.

This is the first time that such a wide-scale study has been conducted in India, using Bayesian methods. It ought to be of immense value to professionals and academics both.

The effectiveness of corporate governance enforcement is a complex issue requiring the understanding of the role of institutional factors. The latter may or may not converge towards best practices, depending upon the extent to which history and politics matter more than purely economic or efficiency‐related considerations for convergence. The appropriateness and effectiveness of corporate governance enforcement mechanisms differ among market economies and cannot be attributed to one single factor nor does any such factor have the same significance in all countries as it depends on the relative state of development of financial intermediation. This paper aims to address these issues.

A critique is launched on the hypothesis of legal conformity used to explain the deviation of corporate governance practices and enforcement efficiency from is considered as best practice. The critique follows an historical development approach and is substantiated with some new empirical evidence of ownership structures and market views.

Empirical evidence on ownership structures and on the market views regarding the effectiveness of corporate governance legislation shows that for an understanding of the relationship between financial intermediation and corporate governance broader institutional influences must be taken into consideration.

The analysis of empirical evidence needs detailed expansion and proper association with institutional elements to provide a more comprehensive understanding of corporate governance enforcement efficiency.

The exercise of corporate governance enforcement is an interactive process that goes beyond the role of legal rules and must combine an optimal set of private and public mechanisms properly tailored to each corporate governance regime.

New empirical evidence is provided on ownership structures and on the market view regarding the effectiveness of corporate governance legislation and a broader account is provided on institutional setting for understanding corporate governance policy.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of corporate governance, investor sentiment and financial liberalization on downside systematic risk and the interplay of socio-political turbulence on this relationship through static and dynamic panel estimation models.

The evidence is based on a sample of 230 publicly listed non-financial firms from Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) over the period 2008–2018. Furthermore, this study analyzes the data through Blundell and Bond (1998) technique in the full sample as well sub-samples (big and small firms).

The authors document that corporate governance mechanism reduces the downside risk, whereas investor sentiment and financial liberalization increase the investors’ exposure toward downside risk. Particularly, the results provide some new insights that the socio-political turbulence as a moderator weakens the impact of corporate governance and strengthens the effect of investor sentiment and financial liberalization on downside risk. Consistent with prior studies, the analysis of sub-samples reveals some statistical variations in large and small-size sampled firms. Theoretically, the findings mainly support agency theory, noise trader theory and the Keynesians hypothesis.

Stock market volatility has become a prime area of concern for investors, policymakers and regulators in emerging economies. Primarily, the existence of market volatility is attributed to weak governance, irrational behavior of market participants, the liberation of financial policies and sociopolitical turbulence. Therefore, the present study provides simultaneous empirical evidence to determine whether corporate governance, investor sentiment and financial liberalization hinder or spur downside risk in an emerging economy. Furthermore, the work relates to a small number of studies that examine the role of socio-political turbulence as a moderator on the relationship of corporate governance, investor sentiment and financial liberalization with downside systematic risk.