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This study aims at examining the impact of corporate governance on dividend policy among Indonesian companies. There are two theories of the effect of corporate governance on dividend policy: substitution and outcome theory. Substitution theory argue that corporate governance have negative effect on dividend policy, while outcome theory argue that corporate governance have positive effect on dividend policy. Therefore, this study investigates the effect of corporate governance on dividend policy in Indonesia. This study aims at examining the impact of corporate governance on dividend policy among Indonesian companies. There are two theories of the effect of corporate governance on dividend policy: substitution and outcome theory. Substitution theory argue that corporate governance have negative effect on dividend policy, while outcome theory argue that corporate governance have positive effect on dividend policy. Therefore, this study investigates the effect of corporate governance on dividend policy in Indonesia.

The sample of this research comprises 248 firms from Indonesian Stock Exchange during 2004-2006. This research using Transparency and Disclosure Index (TDI) to measure corporate governance in Indonesia

We find that TDI are low among Indonesian firms, with a score of 32 per cent out of the maximum point. This score indicates that Indonesian corporate governance is still low. The results show that there is a negative relation between corporate governance and dividend policy in Indonesia. Thus, the Indonesian companies pay more dividends when corporate governance practice is low. This result confirms applicable of substitution theory in Indonesia.

This research focuses on manufacturing industry in Indonesia. Therefore, the conclusions of this research apply on the manufacturing companies in Indonesia

This research shows that companies with poor corporate governance pay dividend higher than companies with better corporate governance. Thus, investor can use this information to make investment decision.

This research provides evidence on the negative effect of corporate governance on dividend policy in Indonesia (substitution theory).

This paper aims to investigate the relation between corporate governance and dividend policy in Sri Lankan firms.

The data set consists of market data using 1,608 firm-year observations from 201 firms listed on the Colombo Stock Exchange and survey-based data from 151 respondents from the same 201 firms. The authors use data triangulation to examine the two approaches.

The analysis of the market data reveals that a significantly positive relation between corporate governance on both the propensity to pay dividends and dividend payout. Survey analysis confirms these findings. Triangulated evidence supports the outcome model of dividends, free cash flow and agency cost theories.

The findings are useful not only for management in developing suitable corporate governance practices and dividend policies for their firms but also for shareholders in evaluating both existing and new investments. Future researchers should investigate the same phenomenon in other contexts using triangulation approaches to confirm their findings.

This study is the first to use governance indices both in terms of survey and market-based data to examine the relation between corporate governance and dividend policy.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which corporate board characteristics influence the level of dividend pay-out ratio using a sample of UK small- and medium-sized enterprises from 2010 to 2013 listed on the Alternative Investment Market.

The data are analysed by employing multivariate regression techniques, including estimating fixed effects, lagged effects and two-stage least squares regressions.

The results show that board size, the frequency of board meetings, board gender diversity and audit committee size have a significant relationship with the level of dividend pay-out. Audit committee size and board size have a positive association with the level of dividend pay-out, whilst the frequency of board meetings and board gender diversity have a significant negative relationship with the level of dividend pay-out. By contrast, the findings suggest that board independence and CEO role duality do not have any significant effect on the level of dividend pay-out.

This is one of the first attempts at examining the relationship between corporate governance and dividend policy in the UK’s Alternative Investment Market, with the analysis distinctively informed by agency theoretical insights drawn from the outcome and substitution hypotheses.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nexus between corporate governance and dividend policy of listed Indian firms.

Using new corporate governance stipulations, five new indices were constructed, namely, overall board governance index, board structure index, audit committee index, compensation committee index and nomination committee index. Using the newly developed indices, disclosure index and different firm-specific control variables, different panel Logit and Tobit regression models were estimated for 482 non-financial and non-utility listed firms during 2006–2017. Also, before the econometric analysis, mean difference test was conducted to examine the differences in dividend behaviour and corporate governance practices during pre- and post-Companies Act, 2013 and between payers and non-payers.

The overall evidence suggests that the firms having stronger corporate governance tend to pay higher dividends suggesting that the firm’s propensity to pay dividends increases with the improvement in corporate governance standards. Among the corporate governance indices board structure, audit committee and disclosure norms show a significant and positive relationship, whereas compensation committee and nomination committee show a positive but insignificant relationship with dividend policy. Control variables mostly had the expected impact on the dividends of the firms.

This study suggests that the establishment of the strong and effective corporate governance system is desirable to mitigate the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders and limit managers’ opportunistic behaviour in dividend payout policy.

This study is one of the latest studies to use several newly constructed indices on corporate governance mechanism based on new stipulations which bring new evidence on their specific impact on the dividend policy for an emerging market economy like India.

This study aims to examine the effect of corporate governance on firms' dividend payout policy in sub‐Saharan Africa. The study also aims to examine how dividend payout influences corporate governance.

Using a sample made up 27 Ghanaian firms, 177 Nigerian firms, 51 Kenyan firms, and 270 South African firms covering the period 1997‐2006, the paper employs a simultaneous panel regression model in its estimation.

The results show that board composition and board size exhibit significantly positive relationship with dividend payout in Kenya and Ghana, respectively. Institutional ownership positively influences dividend payout among South African and Kenyan firms. In the case of Nigeria, all the corporate governance measures show significantly negative effects on dividend payout. The findings clearly suggest that, with respect to South Africa, Kenya and Ghana, good corporate governance structures lead to high‐dividend payout, probably due to easy access to and low cost of external finance. However, in Nigeria, improving the governance structures may be associated with high‐earnings retention or low‐dividend payment in order to reduce cost of external finance. We found in the case of Ghana that, dividend payout positively affects board composition, suggesting that Ghanaian firms with high‐payout tend to adopt good corporate governance structures in order to ensure protection of shareholder interest. The findings of this study certainly have important policy implications.

This present study contributes to the corporate governance literature by looking at the importance of corporate governance in influencing firms' dividend behaviour in selected African countries.

This paper aims to examine the extent to which corporate board attributes influence dividend payout policies.

A total number of 2,842 firm’s year-observations of Malaysian non-financial firms representing from various industries. The firms were scrutinized over a period of 14 financial years covering from 2005 to 2018. The data was in a panel form given the cross-sectional and time-series nature. The fixed effect is used as the main technique for analysis. The OLS and random effects techniques are used for robustness for this study.

The results revealed that the proportion of board independence, board tenure, board size and CEO duality have a positive and statistically mixed effect on dividend pay-out. However, the corporate board diversity and board member age had a negative association with dividend payouts. Overall, the results suggest that firms with well-organized corporate board attribute affect positively on dividend pay-out policy.

This research contributes to a nuanced understanding of internal governance mechanisms by presenting evidence of the substitution hypothesis in an emerging economy in which firms operate within a unique regulatory framework and board composition.

Numerous researchers have developed theories and studies to uncover the issues pertinent to dividend policy dynamics, but it is still one of the unresolved problems of finance. The purpose of this paper is to focus on a new dimension, i.e., financial expertise on the corporate board for explaining the dividend policy dynamics in the emerging equity markets of China and Pakistan.

The study employs static (fixed effect (FE) and random effect (RE)) and dynamic models – two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation techniques by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) – during the timespan from 2009 to 2014. Further, this study re-estimated FE, RE and GMM two-step estimation techniques by excluding the non-dividend-paying companies, and also employed instrumental variable regressing by using two instrumental variables – industry average financial expertise of the board and board size – as proxies for board financial expertise to control the possible endogeneity.

The study reveals that Chinese firms having more financial expertise on the board do not take dividends as a control mechanism (substitution hypothesis), while Pakistani firms support the compliment hypothesis and use dividends as a control mechanism to mitigate agency conflict to protect shareholders’ interests and keep additional funds from the manager’s opportunism. Further robustness models also confirm the presence of a significant association between dividend policy and board financial expertise in both equity markets.

This study introduces the financial expertise on a board as a determinant of dividend policy. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no previous studies have focused on board-level financial expertise as a contributing factor toward dividend policy.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of investment opportunities and corporate finance on dividend payout policy.

This issue is tested with a sample of 34 emerging market countries covering a 17‐year period, 1990‐2006. Fixed effects panel model is employed in our estimation.

A significantly negative relationship between investment opportunity set and dividend payout policy is found. There are, however, insignificant effects of the various measures of corporate finance namely, financial leverage, external financing, and debt maturity on dividend payout policy. Profitability and stock market capitalization are also identified as important in influencing dividend payout policy. Profitable firms are more likely to support high dividend payments to shareholders. However, firms in relatively well‐developed markets tend to exhibit low dividend payout policy.

The main value of the paper is in respect of the fact that it uses a large dataset from emerging market countries. The results generally support existing literature on investment opportunity set and dividend payout policy.

The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of the ownership structure and board governance on dividend policy in emerging markets. The authors test whether the effects of corporate governance on dividend policy change during crisis periods.

The authors use a panel regression approach on a sample of 362 non-financial listed firms from East Asian and Gulf Cooperation Council countries.

The results provide evidence that dividend payout decision increases with institutional ownership and board activity. The authors find that in emerging countries, dividend policy of firms with CEO duality and without CEO duality does not depend on the same set of factors. It is shown that the ownership concentration and board independency affect significantly the dividend policy of firms with COE duality. Finally, the results show that during the recent financial crisis, dividend decision is inversely related to CEO duality, board size and the frequency of board meetings.

Other variables of corporate governance and ownership structure can be studied more in depth. The results can be directly compared to an alternative sample of developed countries.

This study is of particular interest for managers and shareholders when adjusting their strategies of dividend payout during financial crisis.

The authors employ a specific approach to investigate the impact of CEO duality on dividend policy in East Asian countries. An important aspect of the results is that that for firms with CEO who is also the chairperson, the dividend decision is negatively related to ownership concentration and board independence. This research contributes to the understanding of dividend policy by testing whether the impact of corporate governance on dividend policy changes during crisis periods in emerging countries. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this work is the first to directly address this issue from this perspective.

This paper aims to examine the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate life cycle as well as dividend policy in Indonesia.

The paper develops two hypotheses that are tested empirically through multivariate settings. The tests are conducted using a sample of 527 Indonesian listed firms and 923 Indonesian firm-year observations between 2008 and 2015.

The findings support the hypothesis that CSR expenses increase when firms enter the maturity stage of their life cycle. On the triple bottom line components of CSR, firms which invest on CSR economic are in their maturity stage of their life cycle. The evidence also suggests that firms’ social donation and charitable giving increase as firms become mature. Furthermore, the strong evidence supports the hypothesis that firms’ CSR expenses positively affect dividend policy. This finding is robust to the alternative measurement of dividend payout, additional firms’ characteristics and instrumental variable to address endogeneity.

For investors in Indonesian listed firms, it is more profitable to invest in socially responsible firms than socially irresponsible firms. For firms, the results imply that spending in CSR does not reduce performance, thus becoming attractive for investors.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there is thin literature investigating the relation between corporate life cycle, CSR, and dividend policy in emerging markets while it is important as it could encourage companies to integrate CSR into their business strategy and transparently disclose their CSR activities. Further, as previous research on these topics mainly conducted using the US data (Rakotomavo, 2012; Benlemlih, 2014; Hasan and Habib, 2017), which most of CSR disclosures are voluntary, this paper contributes to the existing literature by examining these topics in a country where CSR is mandatory by the law.