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Charitable giving in China has moved from being subjected to government attention and public skepticism to receiving government encouragement and public support. The role played by political connections in philanthropy is indisputable, although very few studies have explored their association from the perspective of the country’s first Charity Law of 2016. This study aims to contribute to the ongoing debate about the 2016 Charity Law and offers an understanding of the future trends in corporate charitable giving.

Using empirical analysis of data collected from listed companies in China, this study analyzes the impact of political connections on corporate charitable giving before and after the 2016 Charity Law. The study adopts three leading theories from previous research into corporate charitable giving and political connections: corporate social responsibility, resource dependence theory and stakeholder theory. A conceptual framework is outlined, and hypotheses are formulated accordingly.

The results show that political connections have a substantial positive impact on corporate charitable giving, both before and after the implementation of the 2016 Charity Law, which has significantly promoted and increased the amount and proportion of charitable giving. Although the 2016 Charity Law attempted to weaken the political connections of enterprises, the influence of political connections on corporate charitable giving has proved difficult to diminish or eliminate, as charity is dominated by the state.

This study explores the association between political connections and corporate charitable giving from the perspective of China’s Charity Law of 2016.

A key goal of this research is to examine empirically whether politically connected board members are likely to impact corporate philanthropy. A further goal of this study is to contribute to the existing literature by examining the moderating role of political connections on the relationship between family ownership and corporate donations.

Based on the content analysis approach, the authors determined the level of cash and in-kind donations made by a group of 94 non-financial Jordanian companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange. This study examined 658 annual reports spanning over seven years from 2010 to 2016. Ordinary least squares regression (OLS) is used to test the study hypotheses. In addition, this study used the probit regression to validate those results reported by the OLS regression.

Compared to unconnected companies, politically connected companies in Jordan are more likely to donate to philanthropic causes. Moreover, the results revealed that the presence of significant family ownership shareholding in a firm can weaken the firm tendency to donate. Despite this, the regression analysis results indicate that family-controlled firms with political connections are more likely to engage in charitable giving activities compared to those without political nexuses.

The study contributes to the conversation surrounding corporate giving and sheds light on the role political connections and ownership structure (particularly family-owned firms) play in affecting donations by firms.

Managers of Jordanian firms listed on the stock exchange can use the study's findings to make better decisions about their donations and other philanthropic activities.

This study is the first to examine the relationship between firm donations and political connections in Jordan, and how political nexuses can moderate the relationship between family ownership and corporate donations. Hence, it extends prior research significantly.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between political connections and corporate tax aggressiveness in Malaysia. In addition, this paper investigates the relationship between corporate governance variables and corporate tax aggressiveness. Next, the study investigates the mitigating role of corporate governance in the relationship between political connections and corporate tax aggressiveness.

The sample of this study is based on 2,538 firm-year observations during the 2000-2009 periods. This study employs a panel least square regression with both period and industry fixed effects. The study retrieved the corporate governance variables from the downloaded annual reports, whilst the remaining data were collected from Compustat Global.

This study finds that politically connected firms are more tax aggressive than non-connected firms. Furthermore, the study finds that large board size decreases the likelihood of tax aggressiveness and a non-linear relationship exists between institutional ownership and tax aggressiveness suggesting increase in monitoring as the ownership increases. However, the study finds no evidence to suggest that corporate governance mitigates the influence of political connections in promoting tax aggressiveness behavior. The findings suggest that the impact of political connections could outweigh the benefits of changes in corporate governance in Malaysia.

The data are not recent, but it reflects a rather longitudinal research period.

This paper extends the literature of tax research in Malaysia which is in its’ infancy stage. Furthermore, it investigates the role of political connections in tax-planning research.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship among consumers’ corporate associations, consumer-corporate connection, and corporate brand loyalty, with a particular focus on the moderating role of national culture.

The conceptual framework is tested on American and South Korean subjects. Structural equation modeling is used to test the hypothesized framework.

The positive influence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) associations on social self-concept connection is stronger in collectivist than individualist culture, whereas the positive influence of personal self-concept connection on his/her loyalty to the corporate brand is stronger in individualist than collectivist culture.

The study relied on participants’ memory about a product and a manufacturing company of a product. It is possible that their memories about the product and manufacturing company could be incomplete and be tainted by their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with a particular product they experienced rather than overall brand image of the company’s products.

Firms are advised to assess how customers of the target market across different national cultures perceive their CSR initiatives and corporate competences in deciding on the type of images and associations to invest and build, that is, either authentic CSR activities or product quality competence.

A substantiation of the moderating role of national culture on the impact of a consumer’s corporate associations on his/her self-concept connections as well as on the impact of self-concept connections on his/her corporate brand loyalty.

Customer co-creation behaviors significantly affect a firm's performance and sustainable growth. This study tested the mediating role of corporate reputation in the relationship between corporate hypocrisy and two types of customer co-creation behaviors: customer citizenship behavior and customer participation behavior. The study also investigated the moderating effect of self-corporate brand connection on the corporate hypocrisy–corporate reputation relationship and the indirect relationship between corporate hypocrisy and customer co-creation behavior through corporate reputation.

The authors conducted a two-wave research survey with 346 Korean bank customers and tested our hypotheses using PROCESS Macro.

Corporate reputation mediated the relationship between corporate hypocrisy and customer citizenship/participant behavior. The negative effect of corporate hypocrisy on corporate reputation was more pronounced when self-corporate brand connection was high. Self-corporate brand connection further moderated the indirect effect of corporate hypocrisy on customer citizenship/participant behavior through corporate reputation.

The results clearly explain how corporate hypocrisy affects customer co-creation behavior. This study advances corporate hypocrisy and corporate reputation research by proposing and verifying a moderated mediation model.

This study aims to empirically examine whether the political connection is related to risk disclosure practices. The study also seeks to contribute to the existent risk disclosure literature by investigating the moderator effect of family ownership on this relationship.

The content analysis approach was used to collect data and determine the level of risk disclosure over the non-financial Jordanian firms listed on 1Amman Stock Exchange. The sample of this study contains 376 annual reports over four years from 2014 to 2017. It used the random effect regressions to examine the hypothesis of the study.

The results show that politically connected companies disclose less risk information than the unconnected ones in Jordan. The results also refer that family ownership contributes in mitigating the negative effect of the political connection on the level of corporate risk.

The results have implications for regulatory institutions such as the Jordan Securities Commission to take the negative effect of political connection in their consideration and impose further regulations to monitor this board’s attribute and control politicians’ domination on the board decisions.

The current study also contributes to the body of literature by investigating the effects of the political connections on the level of risk disclosure in the financial reports. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the current study is the first to examine the effect of the political connection on the risk disclosure practices. Moreover, the study is among the first studies that examine the moderating role of family ownership on such relationship.

This study aims to examine how the political career concerns of top executives affect corporate environmental practices.

Based on rent-seeking theory, this work uses empirical analysis to investigate the impact of top executives’ political connection and political promotion on corporate environmental information disclosure (EID). Data were collected from Chinese listed firms in heavily polluting industries in the Shanghai Stock Market in 2014–2016.

The results reveal that the highly politically connected top executives are more likely to be promoted in their political positions than their counterparts. However, the firms under the management of these highly politically connected executives show low level of EID. The results suggest that the political motivations of top executives with political connection hinders corporate EID.

This paper extends literature system about the impact of executives' rent-seeking on corporate EID by examining the informal mechanisms in terms of political connection and political promotion. It provides insights for studies of corporate environmental strategies and governmental environmental responsibility.

Motivated by the agency theory, this paper primarily intends to empirically investigate the impact of board attributes on corporate cash holdings and how the mentioned nexus is moderated by the level of corporate political connections in a developing country, namely, Palestine during the period of 2011–2018.

Multiple regression analysis on a panel data was employed. Moreover, the authors applied three different approaches of static panel data “pooled OLS, fixed effect and random effect”. Fixed-effects estimator was selected as the optimal and most appropriate model. In addition, to control for the potential endogeneity problem and to profoundly analyze the study data, the authors perform the one-step system generalized method of moment estimator.

The results of this study provide support for the agency theory ideology, which considers that sturdy and well-established corporate governance (CG) paradigms minify the magnitude of cash held by companies. Furthermore, the findings distinctly unveil that the impact of board attributes is more positive under a high level of political connections.

This study was solely restricted to one institutional context “Palestine”; therefore, the results reflect the attributes of the Palestinian business environment. In this vein, it is possible to generate different findings in other countries, particularly in developed markets.

The findings of this study can draw responsible parties, top management and policymakers' attention in developing countries to introduce and contextualize new mechanisms that can lead to better managing of corporate cash holdings.

Empirical evidence on the moderating role of political connection on the effect of board attributes on corporate cash holdings something that was predominantly neglected by the earlier research and has not yet examined by ancestors. Hence, to protrude nuanced understanding of this novel idea, this study minutely bridges this research gap and contributes practically and theoretically to the existing CG–cash holdings literature.

The purpose of this paper is to comprehensively investigate the combined influence of a firm's political connection and diversification on corporate performance, and to explore whether firm's political connection has an impact on the diversification effect, and whether this diversification effect would promote its performance significantly or not.

The research used a regression model to explore the correlation among political connection, diversification strategy, and corporate performance. The research subjects are the private enterprises listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China for the period 2002‐2005.

The study found that: first, for those firms without political connections, the relationship between diversification strategy and corporate performance displayed an “inverted U” curve; for firms with political connection, the relationship was a “reverse L”. Second, firms with political connections are more likely to implement a diversification strategy, especially unrelated diversification. Third, when implementing an internationalization strategy, private enterprises with political connections are more likely to expand through unrelated diversification strategy. Fourth, the diversification of the enterprises with political connection are more likely to promote the short‐term accounting performance than those without political connection, but the unrelated diversification of politically connected enterprises would have a negative impact upon its future performance, that is to damage the company's market value.

The paper expands the literature on the relationship between diversification and firm performance. It contributes to the research about the influence of political connection upon corporate performance.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the value of corporate political connections resulting from the revolving door of employment between political office and the for-profit corporation. The authors test whether there is value to firms from political connections provided by the appointment of former politicians to corporate boards or management teams. The authors also test to see if passage through the door in the other direction, from the corporate world to public office, generates value for firms. Do firms whose former employees gain public office earn excess returns following their appointment or election to these positions?

The methodology used in this study focusses on an empirical analysis of the political connections of US firms over the sample period 1996-2011. The analysis emphasizes the wealth effects associated with the announcement of hiring former politicians to corporate boards or the gaining of political office by former corporate employees.

The authors find that politicians becoming corporate directors is 2.5 times more common than corporate executives gaining public office. The authors determine that industries with extensive government regulation most often hire former politicians. The authors find that the office held by former politicians matters. The authors find that longevity in a cabinet position is important while formal Congressional or Senate leadership positions are not. Surprisingly, the authors determine the longer politicians are out of office, the more value they are able to provide to the firm. Finally, the authors discover that firms which hire former politicians have significantly positive long-term abnormal returns, but firms whose managers enter politics do not.

This study is highly original in its examination of political connections resulting from door swing in both directions. Further, the analysis of longevity, time out of office, and position held adds to the contributions made by this study.