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As there is inclusive evidence on relationship between board characteristics and firm performance in the Thai context, and mixed findings of this relationship are usually reported from previous studies, this study tries to clarify a reason for the mixed finding by determining the impact of board structures on different quantile levels of firm performance. Building on extant literature and using a developed econometric technique, the Quantile Analysis, on a sample of 446 listed firms in Thailand for a 15-year period ranging from 2000 to 2014, empirical evidence is provided which is consistent with prior studies that some characteristics of the board as the core mechanisms of corporate governance, i.e., board independence, board size, board meeting frequency, and dual role leadership on board, have significant influence on performance of Thai firms. In particular, when considering different quantile levels of firm performance, board structures are found to have different effects across quantile of performance distribution. Board independence and dual role leadership on board are found to have a significant influence on only moderate-performing firms, while board size and board meeting frequency are revealed as having significant impact on only firms with high-performance which need more effectiveness of the board in overseeing and supervising decision-making of the executives. Thus, these findings indicate that considering different quantile levels of firm performance for the board structures and performance relationship should be a reason of previous mixed findings. Moreover, the findings should be important information in encouraging better understanding an optimal governance system in Thailand for related stakeholders such as policymakers, corporate firms, and investors.

This study contributes to the existing literature that corporate governance consist of internal and external governance behavior which refers to the complementarity of the elements of (1) competing values framework and (2) corporate legality framework theories and proper orientation in the provisions of the elements leads to a good corporate power in the modern legal environment. A questionnaire is designed, a survey is conducted based on the constructed corporate governance model in the study, which investigates the evolutionary background of the elements with the view of establishing the right corporate culture and corporate legality behavior. The empirical results revealed that there is a positive linear relationship between the elements of corporate culture provisions with internal governance behavior and a significant positive association between the elements of corporate legality provisions with external governance behavior. The model does not take into account long-term external factors. Therefore, measuring corporate governance may not be an easy task and may not be suitable for specific countries that have strong legal systems and corporate ownership. The elements in the model are practical to implement and facilitates corporate to improve shareholder involvement and governance reporting and hence prevent failure. The constructed model span almost every attribute embedding high quality corporate social responsibility and corporate governance for corporate to identify areas for improvement and contributes to existing corporate governance literature that, connecting corporate culture and corporate legality behavior positively affect financial markets and firm performance.

Corporate governance is regarded as a major issue during the post-financial crisis period in Asia. These countries have implemented corporate governance reforms to enhance the protection of shareholders and stakeholders interests. Such reforms have affected the conduct of business of all corporations in the region as it allows for greater monitoring especially by the shareholders. Unlike earlier studies which focused on non-financial firms, this study analyzes the corporate governance of listed banking firms in nine Asian emerging markets. Corporate governance mechanisms that serve to monitor the banking firms can be classified into Ownership Monitoring Mechanism, Internal Control Monitoring Mechanism, Regulatory Monitoring Mechanism, and Disclosure Monitoring Mechanism. This paper suggests that there are differences in the monitoring mechanisms of banking firms and non-bank firms.

Whitehead's notion that if you say something for long enough, it will be believed, aptly describes the development of the latest corporate governance regimes. Curbing managerial opportunism is the current focus, but the regimes contain only more of what has failed in the past. Inexplicably, at a time when reformers are declaring their allegiance to principles over rules, long-standing principles are being by-passed and more rules imposed. Whereas much of what the rules address is contestable, the frequency with which it is proclaimed has been seductive – it is being accepted as if it were true, not by virtue of either convincing evidence or argument, but through the power of repetition. Stock options in executives remuneration packages are to be expensed, not because they satisfy expensing criteria, but because of the penetration of the mantra that they are expenses; independence is being accepted as the consequence of not being in particular relationships, not because that will change one's state of mind, so much as it will appear likely to have done so; and impairment calculations are being declared superior to conventional amortization techniques, not because of any demonstration that they better indicate the decrease in the market price of a physical asset, but because of the repetition of the impairment litany. Corporate governance is being perceived as a set of processes, rules to be complied with, rather than the desired outcome of them – that is, the authority exercised with probity and unquestionable integrity over corporations’ affairs, for the public good. There is a less than clear explanation of whether or how the separate governance processes mesh with one another. The governance miasma confuses rather than clarifies corporate activity. Underpinnings of the mechanisms in the governance regimes have achieved a false status of concreteness. Contrary to the universal indoctrination, the case is stronger for fewer, rather than more, governance rules.

This study aims to exploit Tobin’s Q model of investment to examine the relationship between corporate governance and green innovation.

The study is based on a sample of 3,896 firms from 2002 to 2021, covering 45 countries worldwide. The authors adopt Tobin’s Q model to conceptualize the relationship between corporate governance and investment in green research and development (R&D). The authors argue that agency costs and financial market frictions affect corporate investment and are fundamental factors in R&D activities. By limiting agency conflicts, effective governance favors efficiency, facilitates access to external financing and encourages green innovation. The authors analyzed the causal effect by using the system-generalized method of moments (system-GMM).

The results reveal that the better the corporate governance, the more the firm invests in green R&D. A 1%-point increase in the corporate governance ratings leads to an increase in green R&D expenses to the total asset ratio of about 0.77 percentage points. In addition, an increase in the score of each dimension (strategy, management and shareholder) of corporate governance results in an increase in the probability of green product innovation. Finally, green innovation is positively related to firm environmental performance, including emission reduction and resource use efficiency.

The findings provide implications to support managers and policymakers on how to improve sustainability through corporate governance. Governance mechanisms will help resolve agency problems and, in turn, encourage green innovation.

Understanding the impact of corporate governance on green innovation may help firms combat climate change, a crucial societal concern. The present study helps achieve one of the precious UN’s sustainable development goals: Goal 13 on climate action.

This study goes beyond previous research by adopting Tobin’s Q model to examine the relationship between corporate governance and green R&D investment. Overall, the results suggest that effective corporate governance is necessary for environmental efficiency.

Purpose – This chapter discusses the role that indices of corporate governance have had in comparative corporate governance research.

Design/Methodology/Approach – The authors begin with a short discussion of what corporate governance is and its main debates. Then, the authors review the main indices (which are also summarized in Table 1), highlighting their strengths and limitations as well as describing some of the findings that emanate from them. Then, the authors discuss the methodological and conceptual assumptions of corporate governance indices that may compromise their construct validity. The authors conclude with some encouraging suggestions for key methodological and research design issues to take into account in future comparative corporate governance.

Findings – Many methodological issues in the measuring and analysis of (comparative) corporate governance remain to be solved. First, although corporate governance practices have a direct effect on some of the firms’ strategic decisions, they may only have an indirect effect on firm performance. Second, it is possible that, after all, causality goes the other way around, i.e., the firm performance explains the adoption of certain governance practices. Third, there are also important challenges in measuring firm financial performance as well as measuring and comparing corporate governance effectiveness between firms from different governance settings.

Originality/Value – This is one of the first chapter to give an overview of the most current corporate governance indices, both academic and commercial, to discuss their underlying assumptions and limitations, and, finally, to provide specific directions for future research regarding comparative corporate governance.

Recent spectacular collapses globally have sparked renewed public interest in corporate governance and the pursuit of a new global model. The prevailing dominance of an American model has overshadowed constructive attempts to derive a model that is more appropriate for ‘non-western’ and developing countries. In this paper, I examine the discourse of corporate governance in China. I argue that rather than being a mere captive of the American model, it could have crafted and developed an alternate and more appropriate model that takes into account the economic and social needs of China instead of a corporate governance model developed for other countries.

The lexicon of corporate governance has ‘transparency’ as a key imperative. Yet transparency as a management principle begs explanation. It also raises several questions: transparent to whom, how and why? Who decides? Is full transparency desirable? What are its merits and benefits? What are the risks of increased transparency? The answers may lie somewhere between the shareholder and stakeholder views of the modern corporation, with the former defending shareholder-owner primacy and firm profit-maximisation, and the latter offering a values-based approach towards balancing the needs and expectations of all stakeholders. While corporate governance broadly addresses the needs of shareholders and investors, driven by the position that companies need to be better governed for stockholder value, the ‘stakeholder’ view of the corporation has gained ground over the past 20 or so years whereby the modern corporation is accountable not only to its owners, but also society.The transparency debate has emerged in parallel, and with it, issues of privacy and/or secrecy on one hand and the notion of ‘sunlight’ on the other. Transparency’s role has been variously described as the promotion of corporate disclosure and protection of the rights of minority shareholders in the information environment (Bushman & Smith, 2003); the promotion of corporate accountability and advancement of the rights of stakeholders (Clarke, 2004; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Hess, 2007; Mallin, 2002); a tool to limit information asymmetries (Boatright, 2008; Florini, 2007a, 2007b; Hood, 2006; Lev, 1992); a means to create a level playing field through ethics and fairness (Boatright, 2008; Oliver, 2004); the promotion of market efficiency (Bessire, 2005; Heflin, Subramanyam, & Zhang, 2003); and the prevention of abuse through stakeholder activism (Bandsuch, Pate, & Thies, 2008; Roche, 2005). Aspirations aside, there is lack of consensus as to transparency's dimensions, drivers and dilemmas in corporate behaviour. Indeed, its perceived value to stakeholders and corporations alike remains questionable. In this chapter, the author discusses the governance of corporate transparency and argues that clarity and Board policy are needed to manage transparency activism and its resultant risks.

Companies are wishing to incorporate good corporate governance practices into their organization in order to be more attractive to investors, knowing whether this influences their financial indicators and profitability or not. This, in fact, is beneficial for investors so they know that a company who applies the principles of corporate governance (CG) presents best management practices and transparent information, safeguarding the interests of all its stakeholders, which helps their investment decision; reducing market uncertainty, making it more efficient and liquid. The research focuses on the companies listed in the Stock Exchange of Lima that had implemented CG strategies in their organizations.

This paper questions the issue of the dynamics of corporate governance in Japan using a conceptual framework adapted from North’s theory of institutional change. National systems of corporate governance can indeed be considered a particular case of institutions. We thus suggest transposing North’s propositions about institutional change to national systems of corporate governance. As an illustration for our propositions, we choose to use a case study: the so-called Sogo crisis. The Sogo group is a Japanese chain of department stores, which has encountered financial problems in the late 1990s. The handling of those difficulties by the firm’s main stakeholders highlights both the recent changes in the Japanese system of corporate governance and the resistance opposed to them.