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The literature on labor-managed firms identifies the source of under-capitalization in the Furubotn–Pejovich effect. Appropriable capital accounts can counteract the horizon problem, but they engender little-examined problems connected with the distribution, reinvestment, and reimbursement of net surpluses. This paper proposes that the introduction of cooperative bonds would provide a better match between the horizons of members and their firms. However, bonds generate risks of their own due to capital variability, thus requiring the imposition of various constraints and the retention of appropriate levels of collective reserves. Finally, a hierarchy of liabilities is proposed to protect parties who undergo information disadvantages.

Literature on nontraditional firms has focused on behavioral differences with for-profit firms. Less attention has been given to the variations in behavior among nontraditional firms. This chapter examines differences across three types of Uruguayan nonprofit health care organizations.

This chapter draws on a unique dataset of Uruguayan health care organizations during the period 1982–1990, as well as interviews with doctors working in the three types of nonprofits during spring 2010. We use a simple OLS regression to identify differences in average behavior, and differences in reaction to a regulatory change.

The chapter shows that structure of stake holding and governance significantly affect behavior, even where many behaviors are highly regulated.

These findings highlight the importance of specifying governance structure when predicting behavior of nontraditional firms. Empirical tests of behavioral differences between traditional and nontraditional firms will be more meaningful if the governance structure of nontraditional firms is common and specified. A limitation of our study is our inability to control for the timing of degeneration of producer cooperatives. This would be one element of governance structure to consider in future data collection.

These findings highlight the need to avoid drawing broad policy conclusions from the behavior of a specific subset of nontraditional firms.

This chapter highlights the importance of carefully specifying stakeholder and governance structure when predicting behavior of nontraditional firms. It is of interest to anyone using a sample of nontraditional firms to test general hypotheses about their behavior.

Although people have been working together for their mutual benefit throughout human history, the cooperative form of business organisation began during the Industrial Revolution.

Alternative enterprises – organizations that operate as a business while still also being driven by a social purpose – are sometimes owned by workers or other stakeholders, rather than shareholders. What role does ownership play in enabling alternative enterprises to prioritize substantively rational organizational values, like environmental sustainability and social equity, over instrumentally rational ones, like profit maximization? We situate this question at the intersection of research on: (1) stakeholder governance and mission drift in both hybrid and collectivist-democratic organizations; and (2) varieties of ownership of enterprise. Though these literatures suggest that ownership affects the ability of alternative enterprises to maintain their social missions, the precise nature of this relationship remains under-theorized. Using the case of a global, social, and environmental values-based banking network, we suggest that alternative ownership is likely a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to combat mission drift in enterprises that have a legal owner. A supermajority of this network’s banks deploy alternative ownership structures; those operating with these structures are disproportionately associated with social movements, which imprint their values onto the banks. We show how alternative ownership acts through specific mechanisms to sustain enterprises’ missions, and we also trace how many of these mechanisms are endogenous to alternative ownership models. Finally, we find that ownership models vary in how well they enable the expression and maintenance of these social values. A ladder of mission-sustaining ownership models exists, whereby the dominance of substantive, non-instrumental values over operations and investment becomes increasingly robust as one moves up the rungs from mission-driven investor ownership to special shareholder and member-ownership models.

Building social capital between groups of people and developing social enterprises that integrate social goals into commercial business models are rapidly adopted as innovative poverty relief mechanisms across countries. Together, the translation of social relationships into increased accessibility to resources, and the entrepreneurial dynamics resulting in additional services and goods, are thought to meet the survival and developmental needs of poor families and communities. However, the socio-economic contexts, in which new public policies and initiatives have been taken, vary from country to country. In China, its strong Confucian culture, state-led development strategy, weak civil society, and hierarchical social relationships have contributed to a value structure of social capital, but decreased the efficiency of business practice in social enterprise. This chapter presents a case study of Rural Cooperative Program, a poverty relief initiative in China’s southwest Guizhou Province. With the introduction of China’s new policies in welfare and rural development, this chapter presents evaluation results of whether social enterprises and entrepreneurship can improve poor villagers’ socio-economic wellbeing and promote sustainable development of poor rural villages in China, and to what extent social capital has been mobilized to facilitate the Rural Cooperative Program.

The aim of this chapter is to ascertain the degree to which a training policy developed through corporate training centers is recognized as a source of competitive advantage for attracting, developing, and retaining valuable staff. The fieldwork is based on a survey of Human Resource (HR) managers from 66 cooperatives of the Spanish Mondragon cooperative group. The empirical test carried out confirms that Mondragon's training policy, backed up by its corporate training centers, is perceived by HR managers as a tool that provides advantages to attract, develop, and retain valuable human resources. The results also suggest that those advantages are more moderate than has been cited in classic literature on Mondragon. The results of this study can be helpful for the growing number of companies choosing to create and reinforce corporate training centers. The link between training policy and the perceived ability to attract and retain valuable employees showed in this case can also be helpful for other companies that, as Mondragon, face limitations in wage policy. This chapter contributes to the literature on the educational fabric of Mondragon adding updated empirical evidence and incorporating the point of view of HR managers of the group's cooperatives. With respect to the contribution of this chapter to the literature on training policy, the chapter's findings, in particular those regarding the effect of training on worker attraction and retention, add empirical evidence to the few studies on the subject.

When radical new approaches to entrepreneurship are sought, they almost invariably return to the origin point of conventional firms. This chapter, however, will show that radical entrepreneurship, far from being the purview of capitalist enterprises, can be found in abundance in the cooperative sector. Cooperatives, which are democratic economic enterprises owned by members on a one person, one-vote basis, are a hotbed of new economic thinking. The ways in which cooperatives use advances in technology to create more democratic, decentralized, and egalitarian economic relationships stands in stark contrast to the monopolizing and centralizing tendencies of conventional firms. This chapter will show that cooperatives are both a worthy adversary, and potential ally of, conventional capitalist businesses in moving the field of entrepreneurship into areas that will be of greatest benefit to humanity.

Post COVID-19 crisis, healthcare has become a priority for every government. Furthermore, the pandemic has also made us realise why do we need an affordable healthcare delivery service at the grassroots level. As a result, the Government of India has come out with the Ayushman Sahakar scheme. This scheme has been launched by the Union Government with an aim to assist the cooperatives in the creation of healthcare infrastructure in this country. It is pertinent to note that the cooperatives in the last few years have transformed rural areas and have pushed them out of poverty. As a result, it will be interesting to see the impact cooperatives will have in the field of healthcare.

The authors in this work have discussed the history of healthcare cooperatives in India. After this, the authors have analysed the government schemes and legal provisions which regulate the functioning of healthcare cooperatives in this country. In the next part, the authors studied the Ayushman Sahakar scheme. The authors have discussed the features of the scheme and the impact it has generated in the field of healthcare. Lastly, the author has discussed the challenges which healthcare cooperatives face in this country and how we can overcome those challenges.

Purpose – Investigate the causes and consequences of foreign financial institutions' divestments in China's banking sector which is an example of cross-border transactions by institutional investors.

Methodology – Use a sample of 26 foreign financial institutions' strategic investments in Chinese banks. Ten of those investments are divested after the global financial crisis. We investigate determinants of the divestment, business cooperation after the divestment, and Chinese banks' stock price reactions to the divestment announcement.

Findings – The poor performance of foreign financial institutions, which is attributable to the global financial crisis, and the institutions' regulated low equity ownership are important causes of divestment (or whole divestment). In contrast, Chinese banks' poor performance does not cause foreign divestments. Foreign financial institutions that fully divest their equity stakes usually terminate their cooperative business, which was required by the strategic investment agreement. The Bank of China and the China Construction Bank, which experienced large H-share divestments, experienced large economic declines in A-share values.

Social implications – Foreign financial institutions' strategic investments created substantial shareholder value before the divestment. Banking sector developments that rely on foreign investments are vulnerable to economic downturns in developed countries.

Originality/value of paper – To the best of our knowledge, this is the first trial to analyze the impact of divestments on divested bank performance.