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We investigate the effect of the adoption of formal board structure and board processes on firm performance in Colombian family firms, in a context where firms can choose specific aspects of board structure and processes. We deploy insights from the behavioral governance perspective to develop arguments about how family businesses may choose board elements based on their degree of control over the firm (absolute control or less), and its effect on firm performance.

We use an unbalanced data panel of 404 firm-year observations. The data was obtained from the annual financial and corporate governance reports of 62 Colombian stock-issuing firms for the period 2008–2014 – due to change in regulation, data could not be added beyond 2014. Panel data technique with random effects was used.

The results show that board structure is positively associated with financial performance, however, this relationship is negative in businesses where family has absolute control. We also found that there is a negative association between board processes and performance, but positive association in family-controlled businesses.

Our research contributes to research streams on effects of family control in firm choices and on the interactive effect of governance choices and institutional context and more generally how actors interact (rather than react) with their institutional context.

This paper aims to analyze the effect of family control and influence dimension of the socioemotional wealth (SEW) on capital structure of large listed firms in the North African region.

The study uses panel data of the top 98 largest listed firms in the North African capital markets over the period from 2018 to 2022. The analysis is conducted employing random effects models.

Findings suggest that large listed firms in North African region rely on more use of equity rather than debt financing. Further, results show that family control and influence dimension of the SEW, has no significant impact on the capital structure of North African large listed firms. This implies that the financing behavior of large firms listed in the North African countries is driven by financial and rationale factors rather than non-economic considerations. Indeed, findings support assumptions of the pecking order theory.

This transnational study provides new insights into relevancy of socioemotional theory in explaining capital structure decisions within large family businesses in emerging markets. Findings have the potential to enhance analysts', investors' and practitioners' understanding of financing decisions by large listed firms in this region. This, in turn, can aid in conceiving adapted financing solutions.

This paper is ambitious. Its central purpose is to examine how a number of developed economies, plus the largest developing economy, vary in terms of corporate governance: USA, Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy, South Korea, Taiwan, Sweden, Switzerland and mainland China. We understand corporate governance in a very broad sense, descriptive not prescriptive: as who controls and influences firms, and how. We are thus dealing very much with varieties of capitalism. In a sense, we shall be seeking to characterise national systems of corporate governance, but we must stress that our concern is always with the situation of the individual firm. We shall find it convenient most of the time to give one label to a country's whole economy, but this will always be an approximation, which conceals variations among that country's firms. At other points, we shall distinguish types of firm and indicate the rough proportions of each type in a particular economy.

Notwithstanding the relevance of managerial control systems (MCS) in any organization, as well the distinctive role they can play in family business, due to its specific features, the literature rarely dealt with the role and characteristics of MCS in family business. Taking into account previous contributions from different disciplines (organization, management accounting, and family business), the current work aims to better understand the state of the art about research in the field of MCS in family business in order to identify main research gaps and propose future research directions.

Forty-five articles have been analyzed, which were issued in 29 sources. Research findings show that the literature on MCS in family business is limited and not very conclusive. Some authors focused on the type of controls, other authors outlined the role of MCS in managerialization and the relation with professionalization. A few studies focused on some specific mechanisms, especially strategic planning and compensation. Some contributes dealt with MCS’ determinants and impacts. Differences between family and non-family firms were proposed. However, a clear and organized picture of the features of MCS in family firms, their determinants, and impacts has not yet been developed. Particularly, the impact of the distinctive features of family business on MCS represents an underdeveloped research field along with how MCS can be differently developed and used in different kinds of family firms. In the light of findings of the literature review, we propose a reference research framework on MCS in family business.

This study seeks to fill a gap in the literature by examining the role of family firm succession in shaping the firm's approach to financialisation, which has received limited attention in the previous research. In addition, the study explores the influence of factors such as clan culture, concentration of control and generational differences on the relationship between succession and financialisation.

Data were based on a sample of 7,023 firm-year observations, compiled from the listed family firms in China's A-share. Several tobit models are used for analysing the data and testing the hypotheses.

Family firm succession is negatively related to the level of financialisation, and this relationship is influenced by clan culture, concentration of control and the stage of succession. Specifically, a higher clan culture, a greater concentration of ultimate control by the controlling family member and the dominance of the first generation in management strengthens the negative relationship between family firm succession and financialisation.

This study offers new insights into the consequence of family firm succession on a new area of the firm's strategy, i.e. financialisation. The study further advances the understanding of family firm succession by considering the role of clan culture, the concentration of control and the stage of the succession process.

This study aims to examine the employment practices of family firms in emerging markets. Drawing from the social exchange theory, the authors propose that transgenerational control intention enhances the motivation for family owners to engage in favorable employment practices as inducement for future contribution of employees.

Multilevel regression models were applied to test the hypotheses with a sample of 3033 Chinese private family firms.

The results show that the employment practices of family firms are positively associated with transgenerational control intention, and the effect of transgenerational control intention is contingent on regional social trust.

This study highlights the role of transgenerational control intention of family owners in motivating favorable employment in family firms. The study adds nuance to the variances in employment behaviors of family firms as well as the family owner-employee exchange relationship in emerging markets.

This paper examines whether family control exerts any influence on corporate cash holdings in Indian listed firms. It also examines how this accumulated cash of family firms impacts firm value.

The study uses dynamic panel data regression estimated using two-step system generalized method of moments (GMM) on S&P BSE 500 firms during 2009–2018 for testing the repercussions of family control on the cash levels of a firm. Further, fixed effects regression has been employed for the valuation analysis.

Estimation results showed that family control negatively impacts cash holdings in Indian firms. Further, the cash accumulation by family firms adversely affects the market valuation of the firm. These findings signal a principal–principal (P-P) agency conflict in Indian family firms, i.e. friction between family owners and minority shareholders' interests. Minority shareholders fear that a part of the cash reserves will be used by family members for personal benefits. Thus, they discount cash reserves in family firms.

The study adds to the determinants of corporate cash holdings in emerging markets. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study from India investigating family control as a determinant of cash policy. It sheds light on the P-P agency conflict in Indian family firms. P-P agency conflict is less researched in cash holdings literature as opposed to the principal–agent managerial disputes. Also, the study uses a more comprehensive definition of family control rather than just considering the ownership as used in prior cash holding research.

This paper examines the capital structure decisions of family firms in Southeast Asian (ASEAN) countries, considering the moderating effects of various firm-level and country-level factors.

The authors apply various panel data models to analyze the data of listed firms in six ASEAN countries over the period of 2007–2017.

The authors find that family firms tend to use more debt, particularly short-term debt, than non-family firms, which is explained by family owners' concern about the risk of losing control. The authors further document that family firms would use more debt when they have lower ownership concentration, have more family members on the board of directors and are young firms. The authors also find that the impact of family ownership on capital structure is moderated by the level of investors' legal protection of a country.

This study, for the first time, provides comprehensive analyses of the financing decisions of family firms in ASEAN using a unique hand-collected dataset, which highlights that regional culture and market conditions can shape family firms' financing decisions. The authors also manage to mitigate the endogeneity issues that pervade most research on family firms. In addition, this research further explores the heterogeneous impacts of family control on capital structure given different levels of board involvement, firm age, ownership concentration, and most importantly, institutional differences. Such insights provide useful information for prospective investors as well as regulators to make more efficient investment and legislative decisions.

First, this study assesses the link between research and development (R&D) expenses and firm efficiency. Second, this study explores how family control moderates the link between the two.

This study uses two measures of time-based firm efficiency, namely, a window slacks-based measure (WSBM) and a window epsilon-based measure (WEBM) of data envelopment analysis (DEA). Then, 216 firm-year observations are analyzed in the Taiwanese cultural and creative industries from 2005 to 2017.

This study finds that R&D expenses significantly worsen firm efficiency, and that family control positively moderates this effect. A further test separating the sample into family-controlled and nonfamily-controlled firms indicates that R&D expenses negatively affect the efficiency of nonfamily-controlled firms but positively affect that of family-controlled firms.

The existing literature has examined the link between R&D expenses and corporate performance. However, the process by which R&D expenses affect corporate performance from a production perspective remains unknown.

Overall, this study provides insights for policymakers to scrutinize resource management and R&D expenses from the production and resource-based perspectives.

The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the effect of French family control on the cash flow sensitivity of cash (CFSC). It also investigates the moderating effect of board of directors’ features on this relation.

Based on a sample of French-listed companies from 2012 to 2014, the authors use GLS regression models on panel data estimated with robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level.

The results show that family control is positively associated with the CFSC. This finding suggests that families are likely to hold more cash out of their cash flows for entrenchment and expropriation purposes. A further analysis shows that board size, independence and the two-tier board structure negatively affect the CFSC in family firms. Board efficiency is then a guarantee of minority shareholders’ interests against family expropriation risks in France.

These findings suggest that French family firms are likely to expropriate minority interests by extracting rents through their cash holding behavior. However, in the presence of high-quality board features, the relation turns negative, suggesting that the quality of the board is an efficient corporate governance device that is likely to monitor family corporate decisions.

This paper extends previous research by investigating the moderating effect of board features on the relation between family control and the CFSC. The research provides a metric for agency problems that is the sensitivity of cash to cash flows and offers theoretical support for the agency argument of hoarding cash.