Search results
1 – 10 of over 29000
The most basic solution for monitoring position and attitude of an UA is through direct line-of-sight. Because they are usually standing outside, a pilot that maintains direct…
Abstract
The most basic solution for monitoring position and attitude of an UA is through direct line-of-sight. Because they are usually standing outside, a pilot that maintains direct line-of-sight with the aircraft is usually referred to as the EP, as opposed to an internal pilot (IP) who obtains position and attitude information electronically while inside of a ground control station (GCS). Flight using an EP represents the most basic solution to the problem of separating the pilot from the aircraft while still enabling the pilot to monitor the location and attitude of the aircraft. Pilot perspective is changed from an egocentric to an exocentric point of view. Maintaining visual contact with the UA, the EP can control the aircraft using a hand-held radio control box. Many of these control boxes are similar to those used by radio-controlled aircraft hobbyists and provide direct control of the flight surfaces of the aircraft through the use of joysticks on the box. Very little automation is involved in the use of such boxes, which control the flight surfaces of the aircraft.
Valery J. Frants, Jacob Shapiro and Vladimir G. Voiskunskii
Abstract
Purpose
The goal of this paper is to investigate the relationship between government control and firm value in China.
Design/methodology/approach
Government might extract social or political benefits from a state-controlled firm, thus decreases firm value. However, government’s monitoring on firm management reduces managers’ agency problem, which increases firm value. We first build a game-theoretic model to prove the existence of optimal government control given these two roles of government, and we then employ the OLS regression method to test the theory predictions using the length of intermediate ownership chains connecting the listed state-owned enterprises to their ultimate controllers as the measure of government control.
Findings
We find that firm values first increase then decrease as government control weakens. Moreover, we find that government usually retains a stronger control over state-owned enterprises than the optimal level. In addition, we show that government control can be further weakened in firms with good corporate governance mechanisms, which serve as a substitution of government monitoring.
Social implications
Our results demonstrate that government control in China is still a necessary but costly mechanism to mitigate agency costs, especially when corporate governance system is underdeveloped.
Originality/value
We identify the substitution effect between government control and corporate governance using a unique measure of government control.
Details
Keywords
Published below are the course reading list and student notes taken by F. Taylor Ostrander in Frank H. Knight’s course, Current Tendencies, Economics 303, at the University of…
Abstract
Published below are the course reading list and student notes taken by F. Taylor Ostrander in Frank H. Knight’s course, Current Tendencies, Economics 303, at the University of Chicago during Winter term of the 1933–1934 academic year. The reading list is surprisingly casual and uneven in detail among items. The notes are assumed, as usual in these volumes, to be a reasonably accurate summary account of what Knight said.
Michael J. Leiblein and Jeffrey T. Macher
An important question facing business scholars is whether and how organizations may best adapt their investments, resource profiles, and strategies to the demands of their…
Abstract
An important question facing business scholars is whether and how organizations may best adapt their investments, resource profiles, and strategies to the demands of their particular environments. While a broad literature describes organizational design principles that may assist in this regard, more recent work builds on Kauffman's (1993) NK model of biological evolution to explore how selection mechanisms and adaptive principles promote firms' exploitation and exploration efforts. This research stream has made contributions regarding the importance and efficacy of various internal adaptive factors in particular environmental settings. For instance, Levinthal (1997) shows that, despite extensive adaptation efforts, the influence of imprinting persists in complex environments with many local peaks. Rivkin (2000) demonstrates that NK complexity degrades the efficacy of search, compelling imitators to rely on search heuristics rather than adaptation via local learning. Rivkin and Siggelkow (2003) explore the tradeoffs between exploration and stability, and describe how particular organizational attributes, such as vertical hierarchy and group- or firm-level incentive systems, influence the flow of information throughout the organization. These as well as other contributions have added precision to the conceptualization of environments and sharpened understanding of organization by describing precisely how interdependencies across investment choices and/or resource profiles affect adaptation efforts.
I am indebted to Anthony Waterman for identifying the largely illegible phrase cuius regio, eius religio, found near the end of Ostrander’s notes. Waterman writes, in explanation…
Abstract
I am indebted to Anthony Waterman for identifying the largely illegible phrase cuius regio, eius religio, found near the end of Ostrander’s notes. Waterman writes, in explanation, apropos of Martin Luther: Lit. ‘whatever of the king, so of the religion’: it means that L. thought (being the Erastian he was), that the religion of a country should be that of its sovereign prince. Note: (a), the assumption, almost universal at that time, that there can be only ONE church in any Christian nation; and (b) the assumption, standard until the Scottish Enlightenment I should think (though people like Locke begin to chip away at it) that – as Louis XIV put it with admirable economy, ‘l’etat c’est moi’ (Waterman to Samuels, December 12, 2002).
Frances A. Kennedy and Lydia Schleifer
Organizations are reorganizing into collaborative subunits or teams in order to generate innovative ideas and stay ahead of the competition. Traditional control systems were…
Abstract
Organizations are reorganizing into collaborative subunits or teams in order to generate innovative ideas and stay ahead of the competition. Traditional control systems were established to direct employees and prevent control problems, such as fraud or theft, and were designed for vertically managed systems where managers and supervisors made decisions and their subordinates performed tasks. As companies evolve into a team-based structure, decisions are made at lower levels. Restructuring for teams makes information more available and decisions more transparent. Traditional controls no longer apply and can be detrimental to empowerment and the generation of innovative ideas. With increased empowerment there will be a need for different controls and maybe even more control. Innovation can thrive when collaboration takes place and collaboration can occur best when teams are empowered. This chapter presents three separate domains – models of empowerment and innovation, decision-influencing and decision-facilitating information, and management control systems – and illustrates how they interact in a holistic way to either enhance innovative culture or inhibit the generation of ideas.
Seonghee Oak and Raghavan J. Iyengar
Prior research suggests that hospitality firms behave differently than other firms in terms of financing and investment issues. Such behavior may be attributable in part to agency…
Abstract
Prior research suggests that hospitality firms behave differently than other firms in terms of financing and investment issues. Such behavior may be attributable in part to agency problems and corporate governance structures in hospitality firms. This paper contains a report of an investigation into whether corporate governance mechanisms differ in hospitality firms relative to other industries. Our findings suggest that hospitality firms are more likely to experience agency problems than are nonhospitality firms. Hospitality firms have lower governance control mechanisms, better financial performance and higher-quality earnings than nonhospitality firms. An understanding of corporate governance control mechanisms helps to reduce agency problems and improves the hospitality firm's performance in the hospitality corporation.