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In this chapter, the authors argue that organizational controls are best depicted and studied as sets of control configurations. Concepts from extant control research streams describing basic control elements as well as ideal types of control systems are used to identify and classify control configurations. The authors present compositional distinctions among four control configurations using a decade-long case study of a start-up company. By displaying how specific control elements are simultaneously distinct and intertwined in this company, the authors reveal significant theoretical insights that can assist scholars in distinguishing between different configurational patterns and in comprehending dynamics present in holistic perspectives of control. The authors conclude by discussing how conceptualizing controls as configurations most accurately reflects both organizational and managerial practice in ways that can motivate the development of new theories and approaches to studying this key aspect of organizational design. Because control configurations inherently reflect interdisciplinary concerns, and because such configurations affect the attainment of strategic goals, this work provides findings and ideas that fit the interests of a broad audience.

There is a growing concern that contractors can be motivated for environmental protection through effective fund allocation and proper payment mechanisms. However, an in-depth analysis of environmental hazard-controlling methods and related payments to the contractor in road construction in Sri Lanka is not much popular among the extant literature. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to explore different payment mechanisms that are being used with environmental hazard-controlling methods, to achieve better control in such hazards in Sri Lankan road construction projects.

This research was approached through a mixed research method. Initially, hazard-controlling methods and relative payment mechanisms for the contractor were identified through three exploratory case studies using interviews, observations and document survey. Next, the relative effectiveness of payment mechanisms for contractors for better environmental hazard controlling was identified through a questionnaire survey with a sample of 45 professionals involved in 15 road construction projects.

Based on the findings, a comprehensive list of environmental hazard-controlling methods was derived. Furthermore, four types of payment mechanisms were identified: (A)-payments, where a unit price was assigned; (B)-payments, where a provisional sum was established in the contract; (C)-payments, where fixed amounts (lump sums) were assigned in the contract and (D)-payments made along with some main work item in the contract. Relative effectiveness of these four mechanisms for better control of environmental hazards was varied for each hazard-controlling method being practiced in a road construction project.

These findings would be more beneficial for consultants, project managers, bidders and estimators in the pre-contract stage. This is by identifying cost items for environmental hazard controlling and selecting relatively more effective payment mechanisms to motivate contractors for better control of environmental hazards during project execution.

As public organizations strive for higher e‐government maturity, information technology (IT) Project Portfolio Management (IT PPM) has become a high priority issue. Assuming control is central in IT PPM, the purpose of this paper is to investigate how a Danish local government conducts control in IT PPM. The authors identify control problems and formulate recommendations to address these.

Adopting principles from Engaged Scholarship, the authors have conducted a case study using a wide variety of data collection methods, including 29 interviews, one workshop, and analyses of documents.

It is found that the local government relies vastly on informal control mechanisms and five control problems are identified: weak accountability processes between the political and administrative level; weak accountability between the director level and the IT executives; IT projects established on the basis of incomplete information about internal resources; lack of operational goals to hold IT projects accountable; and no account of actual IT project costs. The authors propose a model for highlighting how more formal control can be implemented and address the identified control problems.

As a single qualitative case study, the results are limited to one organization and subject.

The paper has implications for IT PPM in Danish local governments and similar organizations in other countries. The paper shows that the lack of formal control mechanisms makes accountability between hierarchical levels difficult, which deprives organizations of the opportunity to pursue and display unambiguous value from their e‐government initiatives.

This paper fulfills an identified need to understand how local governments can improve IT PPM.

While previous studies have focused on identifying management control (MC) mechanisms in international construction joint ventures (ICJVs), the impacts of such MC mechanisms on the performance of ICJVs remain largely unknown. This study aims to investigate the impacts of MC mechanisms on the performance of ICJVs hosted in the developing country of Ghana.

Through a comprehensive review of the literature, a theoretical model was developed, and data were collected through a questionnaire survey with 190 project managers composed of Ghanaians/locals and their foreign partners of ICJVs. The data were analyzed using partial least squares structural equation modeling.

Results showed that both personnel and support and training control mechanisms have a positive and significant impact on project and company/partner performance. Surprisingly, insignificant and negative impacts exist between both mechanisms and socioenvironmental and company/partner performance from the local partners' view, respectively; the reverse is rather true from the foreign partners' perspective.

This study contributes to the ICJV body of knowledge by analyzing the impacts of MC mechanisms on the ICJVs’ performance, enabling ICJVs frontliners (i.e. top managers) and project managers to better enhance their control structures and the ICJVs’ performance.

This is arguably the first study to take the bipartite perspective rather than the unilateral view of studying the impacts of MC mechanisms on the performance of ICJVs.

HR shared service centers (SSCs) have been claimed to innovate human resource management service delivery by centralizing resources and decentralizing control and, in doing so, create value for other business units. In response, to explain the value of HR shared services for the business units served, the purpose of this paper is to test hypotheses on the joint influence of HR SSC operational and dynamic capabilities and of control mechanism usage by the business units.

A survey methodology was applied to collect data among business unit representatives from 91 business units in 19 Dutch organizations. The data were analyzed using structural equation modeling in AMOS.

This study found that the use of formal control mechanisms (e.g. contracts, service-level agreements) relates negatively with HR shared service value, but that this relationship becomes positive once mediated by informal control mechanisms (e.g. trust and shared language) and operational HR capabilities. Furthermore, it shows that the dynamic capabilities of HR SSCs relate positively to HR shared service value for the business units, but only because of their effect on operational capabilities.

Whereas previous studies into HR SSCs have examined the two antecedents independently, this study shows how organizational control and capabilities interrelate in explaining the value of HR shared services.

The purpose of this paper is to study management control mechanisms (social, behavioral, and output control mechanisms) and their complementary effects on firm performance in lean manufacturing firms.

The study uses second-order structural equation modeling to analyze survey data from 368 different lean manufacturing facilities.

The paper finds that the complementary effects of management control mechanisms in lean manufacturing firms outweigh their additive effects on firm performance.

Applying isolated lean management control mechanisms leads to inferior performance, as these management control mechanisms are complementary. Thus, to realize the full potential of lean manufacturing, this paper suggests that lean management control mechanisms should be implemented as an integrated control system.

Firms seeking to benefit from the implementation of lean manufacturing should understand the complementarity among the management control mechanisms, as the performance effects of lean management control mechanisms when applied together are greater than their isolated additive effects.

This paper is the first to provide empirical evidence of the superior firm performance effects of complementary lean management control mechanisms compared with their additive effects. This paper also expands the understanding of how to conceptualize lean management control mechanisms. Specifically, this is the first paper to distinguish between social cultural control and social visual control mechanisms as well as between non-financial and financial control mechanisms. This paper is also the first to use a second-order structural equation model to properly test and account for the complementary effects on firm performance that stem from multiple control mechanisms.

This study analyses the link between product/service innovation, partnerships and Managerial Control System (MCS). Particularly, it aims to analyse empirically the role of MCS in supporting the innovation partnership successful functioning and management.

The sample of this study consists of 106 Italian manufacturing firms belonging to the sectors of the Italian economy with the largest number of registered patents according to the European trend chart on innovation.

The results show that MCS may play a key role in reducing risks and lowering the likelihood of failure of innovation partnerships. Particularly, the authors found a positive correlation between the use of informal control mechanisms and a partnership’s successful performance. Moreover, among informal control, the findings show that trust is the only true informal mechanism that can guarantee a successful collaboration. The results of this study may offer relevant implications for practitioners. With regard to the control of the partnership’s activities, the initiatives and creativity of those who are actively involved in the innovation process should not be inhibited; therefore, stifling them with strict rules and procedures would be ineffective but if a firm is not willing to give up formal control mechanisms altogether because it does not believe that a trust-based coordination is sufficiently reassuring, it should opt for “weak”, albeit formal, control mechanisms based on a shared production and management of plans and reports, thus ensuring a perfect information symmetry among different partners.

Notwithstanding the different opportunities provided by partnerships and strategic alliances to support there is a growing body of evidence of a high failure rate in such organisational forms. One of the causes cited in the literature is the high level of risk associated with alliances as compared to internal development of innovation. The risks mainly arise from the difficulties to obtain cooperation with partners that might have different objectives, and from the potential opportunistic behaviour of some of the partners. This is particularly true in innovation networks where the uncertainty of producing an interesting result is very high and the investments that the partners make are considerable. In this context, MCS could play a relevant role in reducing the risks and decreasing the likelihood of failure.

The article seeks to explain the impact of the adoption of control mechanisms by a manufacturer as a safeguard against the betrayal of trust, which could consequently have performance implications for its relationship with its supplier.

This study was conducted within the context of the relationship between a manufacturer and its major supplier and the framework was tested by survey data collected from 174 manufacturers. LISREL was used in the testing of the hypotheses.

This study reflects that a manufacturer may reduce the risk associated with trusting its suppliers by either monitoring them directly or adopting the norm of information sharing. Alternatively, it could seek to reduce risk by adopting both types of control mechanism simultaneously. Conversely, the results of this study indicate that control mechanisms, when used individually, are not effective in increasing supplier performance. However, when used in combination as plural control mechanisms, increased supplier performance can be attained.

A high level of trust placed in an exchange partner does not necessarily ensure greater success of the relationship. What this means is that firms cannot take performance for granted where trust plays a key role within the professional relationship. Therefore, firms still need to put mechanisms in place to ensure that, in the event of betrayal, their assets are protected. Among the different types of control mechanisms, the plural control mechanism results in enhanced supplier performance.

This study uses factual performance data but does not use perceptual performance measures. The ideal way to measure channel performance is to measure both perceptual and factual performance data to increase reliability.

There has been little research on control mechanisms that guarantee the protection of the trustor. This study clarifies which control mechanisms manufacturers rely on to protect themselves from breach of trust, and investigates the effects of control mechanisms on supplier performance when used as a safeguard against the betrayal of trust.

This paper aims to analyse the extent to which health and safety action controls, results controls and informal controls affect the integration of health and safety issues into management actions, which in turn leads to improve health and safety performance. It also investigates the extent to which those health and safety control mechanisms contribute complementarily to the integration of health and safety issues.

A survey of 108 Italian non-listed firms tests a set of hypotheses based on complementarity theory and object of control framework.

Not all the health and safety control mechanisms positively influence the integration of health and safety issues into business practices and external stakeholder relations. Complementarity between health and safety control mechanisms is significant only for higher health and safety performance companies, indicating that the health and safety control mechanisms operate as a package.

The health and safety performance measure could be replaced in future research by improved inter-subjectively testable information, although collecting health and safety quantitative data is difficult. An additional limitation is the response rate.

The findings encourage companies to design and use a comprehensive set of health and safety control mechanisms to promote a healthy workplace.

The paper contributes to the management control, sustainability management control and health and safety accounting literature. The paper provides an in-depth interdisciplinary analysis of the effectiveness of different control mechanisms in the context of health and safety that hitherto has rarely been investigated despite the multiple importance of the topic.

The purpose of this paper is to consider how different governance mechanisms affect the level of franchisees' compliance with their franchisor's directives. The research objectives are threefold: to investigate how franchisors can use explicit contracts and develop relational norms as governance mechanisms to prevent their franchisees from deviating from the franchise system directives; to show how information systems allow to control franchisees at a distance; and to throw light on the ways in which these three control mechanisms can play alternatively or simultaneously in the management of franchise relationships.

The paper takes the form of a multiple regression analysis with interaction effects of survey data collected from franchisees of various French franchise systems.

Overall, the results support an emphasis on contract and information systems in the management of the risks of “free riding” behaviour in franchise systems. The results indicate that formal control mechanisms are more efficient in the management of franchise systems whereas relational norms are less so. The results do not reveal that all combinations of control mechanisms are more efficient in disciplining agents. Recommendations will be used by franchisors to implement an effective control strategy.

Future research should focus on replicating the findings using a contingency perspective. Cross‐cultural studies should also be carried out.

This paper applies to the governance of franchise relationships a research framework that validates the role of explicit contracts and information systems in the management of franchise systems.