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Charitable lotteries represent one of today's most popular fund-raising schemes. This study begins by developing theory examining the optimal design of a charitable lottery. We show that any prize distribution is only optimal for a group of n symmetric agents with given risk preference. However, there exist multiple prize distributions that generate contributions approaching the optimal level over a range of individual risk posture. We test our theory using a battery of experimental treatments. Our results suggest that lotteries dominate the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) in terms of total dollars raised. Moreover, the performance of lotteries weakly depends on individual risk preference.

Purpose: Case studies are detailed empirical investigations into a complex entity that emphasize the uniqueness of the case and are valuable for making a theoretical contribution. We aim to reveal the types of theoretical contributions case study research can make to the field of strategy and management and explore how case study design can create the opportunities for making a theoretical contribution.

Methodology/Approach: The dynamic capability approach focuses on the firm-specific processes through which firms integrate, build, or reconfigure resources. A comprehensive review of case studies in this field is conducted in five search engines, resulting in a data set of 13 in-depth case studies.

Findings: We demonstrate that using case studies to extend and refine theory enhances knowledge in the field of dynamic capabilities. In strategy and management research, case studies identify and refine constructs and their relationships, develop and confirm propositions, and embed constructs within a larger set of relationships. We reveal that sampling strategy, research setting, and multiple lenses are aspects of case study design that create opportunities for making a theoretical contribution.

Practical Implications: We suggest that case study researchers strategically and purposefully sample cases, vary the setting conditions, or draw upon numerous research fields to make a theoretical contribution.

Originality/Value of Paper: Going beyond the current discussion, we show that case studies have the potential to extend and refine theory. We shed new light on how dynamic capabilities can benefit from case study research by discovering the antecedents that shape the development of capabilities and determining the boundary conditions of the dynamic capabilities approach.

Although tax relief on pensions is a controversial area of government expenditure, this is the first study of the tax effects for a real-world defined benefit pension scheme. First, we estimate the tax and national insurance contribution (NIC) effects of the scheme's change from final salary to career average revalued earnings (CARE) in 2011 on the gross and net wealth of the sponsor, government, and 16 age cohorts of members, deferred pensioners, and pensioners. Second, we measure the size of the twelve income tax and NIC payments and reliefs for new members and the sponsor, before and after the rule changes. We find the total subsidy split is roughly 40% income tax subsidy and 60% NIC subsidy. If lower tax rates in retirement and the risk premium effect of the exempt-exempt-taxed (EET) system are not viewed as a tax subsidy, the tax subsidy to members largely disappears. Any remaining subsidy drops, as a proportion of pension benefits, for high earners, as does that for NICs.

Campaign contributions are typically seen as a strategic investment for firms; recent empirical evidence, however, has shown few connections between firms’ contributions and regulatory or performance improvements, prompting researchers to explore agency-based explanations for corporate politics. By studying intrafirm campaign contributions of CEOs and political action committees (PACs), we investigate two hypotheses related to public politics and demonstrate that strategic and agency-based motivations may hold simultaneously. Exploiting transaction-level data, with over 6.8 million observations, we show that (i) when PACs give to specific candidates, executives give to the same candidates, especially those who are strategically important to the firm; and (ii) when executives give to candidates who are not strategically important, PACs give to the same candidates potentially due to agency problems within the firm.

Opinion polls show that contributions to judicial candidates create an appearance of corruption. This perception damages the institutional legitimacy of the courts. This chapter explores the relationship between integrity ratings of Illinois trial judges and campaign contributions. Specifically, it examines the Illinois State Bar Association judicial poll integrity scores of 253 elected judges seated in 101 Illinois counties during 1994–2012. Regression analysis reveals that judicial candidates’ integrity scores declined as (a) the amount of attorney contributions increased; (b) the number of reported attorney contributors enlarged; and (c) the number of large attorney contributors grew. This chapter also discusses the efficacy and limitations of four policies meant to diminish the appearance of corruption: recusal and disqualification rules; anonymous contributions; public financing; and the elimination of the election of judges. Although a radical solution, the policy of abolishing judicial elections is more likely to overcome the appearance of corruption than the other reforms.

This paper replicates four highly cited, classic lab experimental studies in the provision of public goods. The studies consider the impact of marginal per capita return and group size; framing (as donating to or taking from the public good); the role of confusion in the public goods game; and the effectiveness of peer punishment. Considerable attention has focused recently on the problem of publication bias, selective reporting, and the importance of research transparency in social sciences. Replication is at the core of any scientific process and replication studies offer an opportunity to reevaluate, confirm or falsify previous findings. This paper illustrates the value of replication in experimental economics. The experiments were conducted as class projects for a PhD course in experimental economics, and follow exact instructions from the original studies and current standard protocols for lab experiments in economics. Most results show the same pattern as the original studies, but in all cases with smaller treatment effects and lower statistical significance, sometimes falling below accepted levels of significance. In addition, we document a “Texas effect,” with subjects consistently exhibiting higher levels of contributions and lower free-riding than in the original studies. This research offers new evidence on the attenuation effect in replications, well documented in other disciplines and from which experimental economics is not immune. It also opens the discussion over the influence of unobserved heterogeneity in institutional environments and subject pools that can affect lab results.

We explore the simultaneous influence of activist organizations and corporations on institutional change. Focusing on protests, campaign contributions, and lobbyists as the strategies used by activist organizations and corporations to influence institutional change, we study the dynamics between movements and counter-movements and their influence on the probability of institutional change. In the context of the US tobacco industry, the results shed light on the effectiveness of these strategies and uncover potential moderators of this relationship. Overall, we demonstrate the simultaneous and asymmetric effects of activist organizations and corporations that use conspicuous and inconspicuous strategies to change institutions.

Purpose and approach – We examine theoretically and experimentally how unequal abilities to contribute affect incentives and efficiency when players compete for membership in stratified groups based on the contributions they make. Players have either a low or a high endowment. Once assigned to a group based on their group contribution, players share equally in their group’s collective output. Depending on the parameters, the mechanism has several distinct equilibria that differ in efficiency.

Findings – Somewhat counter to conventional expectation our theoretical analysis indicates that as long as certain assumptions are satisfied, efficiency increases rather than decreases the more abilities to contribute differ. The analysis also suggests various follow-up experiments about equilibrium selection, tacit coordination, and the effect of unequal abilities in systems with endogenous grouping. We conduct an experiment that shows that subjects tacitly coordinate the mechanism’s asymmetric payoff-dominant equilibrium with precision; this precision is robust to a change in the structure and complexity of the game.

Implications – The results suggest that people respond to merit-based grouping in a natural way and that competitive contribution-based grouping encourages public contributions even when abilities to contribute differ, which is the case in all communities and societies.

Here I present a theory of collective action that emphasizes the role of status. I argue that collective action contributions earn individuals improved status by signaling their concern for the group's welfare relative to their own. Having received greater prestige for their contributions to group goals, individuals’ actual motivation to help the group is increased, leading to greater subsequent contributions to group efforts and greater feelings of group solidarity. This “virtuous cycle” of costly contributions to group efforts and enhanced standing in the group shows one way in which individuals’ prosocial behaviors are socially constructed, a consequence of individuals’ basic concern for what others think of them. I discuss a variety of issues related to the theory, including its scope of application, theoretical implications, relationship to alternative models of reputation and prosocial behavior, possible practical applications, and directions for future research.