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Purpose – By means of this case study, we aim to learn from failure and provide an explanatory approach why the promising prospects in a developing country could not be exploited and strategic actions failed.

Design/methodology/approach – Based on literature within the areas of uncertainty, entrepreneurial activity and political strategy, we provide an event-based case analysis and develop an explanatory model as to why the foreign direct investment (FDI) failed.

Findings – Results provide insights on the effectiveness of political strategies and point to the relevance of entrepreneurial overconfidence as a diminishing cognitive process leading to a misinterpretation of both internal and external conditions.

Originality/value – The exploratory study provides in-depth insights on a failed business and presents an explanatory approach for the business’ collapse.

The legal devices crafted within large organizations are a key component of legal endogeneity theory (LET). While symbolically complying with legislation, legal devices allow organizations to infuse managerial logics into the legal field, which eventually diverts law from its initial political goals. Although the LET has considered legal devices such as anti-discrimination guidelines and grievance procedures, this chapter argues that contracts also constitute a locus of symbolic compliance and contribute to the eventual endogenization of regulation. Supplementing LET with a focus on legal intermediation, this chapter explores how contracts are crafted and used by large organizations to respond to regulatory pressure. While other legal instruments are unambiguously managerialized from the outset, contracts are highly versatile legal objects that perform the seemingly opposite functions of symbolically complying with regulation and serving substantive commercial purposes. This discussion of the role of contracts as compliance mechanisms is based on an in-depth empirical study of the French retail industry and its response to a set of regulations that aimed at making their business practices fairer.

In social work, as in other disciplines, activism receives mixed responses within the academy, in professional practice and for those who cling to unyielding professionalism. There is a gulf between those who favour research and practice neutrality and those striving for systemic change. The co-option of non-state actors into political discourses, policies and practices is increasingly normalised. Drawing on reflections, observations and campaign examples, this chapter discusses social work activism as resistance to racialised neoliberal politics. It highlights endeavours by civil society actors of conscience, devised to restore humanity at a time when national and international norms have severely ruptured. Two illustrative examples from Australia are used: ‘illegalised’ people seeking asylum and Islamophobia. Although dissent and disruption are hallmarks of critical social work, with social workers having the potential to position themselves as human rights defenders, this prospect is weakened through expectations in research, teaching and practice.

Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) continue to gain increased attention from the Nigerian government. However, since PPP adoption in the country not all have attained expected outcomes. The purpose of this chapter is to explore PPP implementation practices and implications on contractual expectations of partner organizations. A qualitative approach using data collected from 23 semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders involved in a Road Partnership and in a Transport Partnership in Nigeria was employed. Documentary evidence was also collected. The institutional nature of the PPP environment; bureaucratic practices in government institutions; disruptive actions of external actors and ineffective mitigation of project risks were main challenges faced in the implementation of the Road and Transport Partnerships. This study is based on the opinions and experiences of key stakeholders on PPP implementation practices in Nigeria, and this is most appropriate to elicit data richness. Partner organizations involved in infrastructure PPPs have the obligation to ensure that they are effectively implemented. If partnerships are poorly implemented, there is no reason to expect that the partnership objectives will be achieved, and this is likely to have a negative impact on the collaborative nature of partnership working in fulfilling the contractual obligations. This study is imperative to provide an understanding of challenges inherent in achieving partnership implementation goals in a developing economy. Findings will inform practices within the PPP policy area in the Nigerian context.

This study investigates the conditions that shape the contractual structure of pharmaceutical-biotechnology R&D agreements and whether these collaborations have produced measurable impact on the overall R&D productivity of pharmaceutical companies. In one section, the effect of uncertainty due to the advances in technology on the structure of R&D contracts is discussed. Specifically, it is shown that newer technologies associated with higher uncertainty result in the choice of more hierarchical contract structures. In addition, the significance of R&D collaborations on the overall innovation process of pharmaceutical companies is evaluated. The results indicate that only some types of R&D alliances, signed in earlier stages of research, have a significant role in the patent production and drug discovery process.

The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) creates rights for covered employees, defines conduct that violates those rights, and deems that conduct an unfair labor practice. But while given broad remedial powers under the Act, the Board's options were curtailed by the Supreme Court's limit on the use of deterrence as an express remedial justification. The Board was left with a strongly make-whole, i.e., ex-post, focus to undo the consequences of a violation.

Put differently, the current NLRA remedies reflect a pay-or-play philosophy. The goal is restoration after the fact, using ex-post remedies to give parties the benefit or status quo that they expected. An actor willing to pay may use a cost–benefit analysis and strategically choose to violate the Act, accepting the make-whole remedies later. But the Act created ex-ante statutory rights, not agreed-upon contractual terms. By statutory enactment, employees are given something of value deemed worthy of protection. Assigning value to compliance with the law in the first instance not only prevents sometimes irreparable harm but also reaffirms the inherent value of the right itself.

The impact of the Board's limited remedies is therefore a broad value-driven one. Without ex-ante deterrence, the available ex-post make-whole remedial options make a normative statement about individuals' rights under the Act: those rights may not be inherently worth enough to incentivize legal compliance. The make-whole focus can imply that financial compensation for the portion of harm that can be calculated and “undoing” some nonfinancial effects is sufficient. There is little drive to deter infringement before the fact. By examining the remedial philosophy behind contrasting approaches in the common law of torts and contract, this Article asserts that the current remedial strictures and framework undermine both the Act and the worth of its rights in the eyes of the public and the employees who hold them.

There exists a tremendous number of studies in strategy and management journals concerning contracting issues between private firms. Those studies are usually grounded in competing theoretical frameworks such as transaction cost economics, the resource-based view of the firm, incentive and agency theories and few others. However, very few studies, especially in those reviews (this is also true to a lesser extent in economic journals), are concerned with the issue of contracting between private firm and government. This is particularly surprising since existing theoretical frameworks qualified to tackle contracting strategies between private firms can also provide insights into issues related to contracting with government.

Firms tend to transfer more knowledge in technology joint ventures compared to contractual technology agreements. Using insights from new institutional economics, this chapter explores to what extent the alliance governance association with interfirm knowledge transfer is sensitive to an evolving industry norm of collaboration connected to the logic of open innovation. The chapter examines 1,888 dyad-year observations on firms engaged in technology alliances in the U.S. information technology industry during 1980–1999. Using fixed effects linear models, it analyzes longitudinal changes in the alliance governance association with interfirm knowledge transfer, and how such changes vary in magnitude across bilateral versus multipartner alliances, and across computers, telecommunications equipment, software, and microelectronics subsectors. Increases in industry-level alliance activity during 1980–1999 improved the knowledge transfer performance of contractual technology agreements relative to more hierarchical equity joint ventures. This effect was concentrated in bilateral rather than multipartner alliances, and in the software and microelectronics rather than computers and telecommunications equipment subsectors. Therefore, an evolving industry norm of collaboration may sometimes make more arms-length governance of a technology alliance a credible substitute for equity ownership, which can reduce the costs of interfirm R&D. Overall, the chapter shows that the performance of material practices that constitute innovation ecosystems, such as interfirm technology alliances, may differ over time subject to prevailing institutional norms of open innovation. This finding generates novel implications for the literatures on alliances, open innovation, and innovation ecosystems.