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The purpose of this study is to identify a typology of procurement contracts in the context of software development projects that allows firms to align design flexibility with design uncertainty at the project level. The theoretical lenses of contract theory and software engineering are used to explain why the five archetypes in the proposed typology provide gradually increasing levels of design flexibility and to develop hypotheses about the associations between design flexibility and a set of project cost dimensions.

The hypotheses are tested with objective contractual data from 270 software development contracts entered into by a leading international bank over a period of three years.

Data analysis confirms the existence of the proposed typology and shows that design flexibility is negatively associated with control and positively associated with coordination, trust, duration and price.

Although the findings are based on the contracting practices of a single, albeit sophisticated, organization, they shed light on the ability of firms to align flexibility with uncertainty at the onset of new projects by taking advantage of nuanced contractual mechanisms to produce a broader set of contractual archetypes.

This paper is the first in the outsourcing literature to analyze a nuanced contractual typology in software development projects through the perspectives of both contract theory and software engineering.

While previous studies explored the argument that allies the notion of complexity to the complex product-service offerings being procured, this paper aims to explore whether there is a corollary with exchange governance complexity. More specifically, the paper analyzes the relationship between systemic complexity and complexity of contractual and relational exchange governance in procuring complex performance (PCP) arrangements.

A multiple, longitudinal case study method is used to examine the relationship between systemic complexity and exchange governance complexity. The study deploys rich data sets by combining government and company reports with 43 semi-structured interviews.

Preliminary conclusions suggest that as a response to increasing systemic complexity, organizations respond with increasing contractual governance complexity. However, better performing PCP arrangements illustrate that the use of simplified contractual governance in form of working agreements in combination with relational governance such as inter-personal relationships may be more effective to counteract complexity.

The paper questions whether organizations should respond with increasing exchange governance complexity to counteract systemic complexity. Managers must consider the manageability and enforceability of complex contracts in combination with the formation of inter-personal relationships and simplified working agreements.

This study adds to the limited empirical understanding on the nature of long-term public-private interactions in PCP. It also contributes through a rare focus on the relationship between systemic complexity and exchange governance complexity in PCP arrangements.

The use of reverse logistics has received increased attention in the literature, although the role that reverse logistics capabilities plays in enabling firms to achieve cost savings has not been empirically examined. Reverse logistics capabilities can enable retailers to enhance their return policies and improve their overall cost position. This paper aims to address these issues.

Based on a survey of 295 retailers, this paper evaluates the influence of customer and retailer related antecedents of reverse logistics capabilities and their subsequent impact on cost savings.

The results indicate that resource commitments and contractual obligations positively influence reverse logistics capabilities and that these capabilities result in cost savings. Customer opportunism is found to be negatively related to reverse logistics capabilities. It is also reported that reverse logistics capabilities partially mediates the relationship between resource commitments, contractual arrangements, and reverse logistics cost savings.

This work builds on the recent research in reverse logistics; however, unlike other contributions in this research stream, the role of retailers who perform a critical role in this area is addressed.

The aim of this paper is to examine the inherent and actual conflicts between venture capitalists (VCs) and entrepreneurs, as well as the possible resolutions of these conflicts.

This paper is based on 42 semi‐structured interviews conducted with Israeli VCs and entrepreneurs (14 VCs and 28 entrepreneurs). In addition, quantitative data were collected about VCs' scope of involvement and their perceived portfolio performance.

It was found that conflict is inherent in VCs and entrepreneurs' relations as both parties have different conceptions of the venture and the contractual arrangements. Actual conflicts were found to be associated with VCs' level of involvement and perceived performance. The findings indicate that VCs' strategic involvement is associated with cognitive conflicts and collaboration, whereas VCs' managerial involvement is associated with managerial replacement and affective conflicts. The findings provide an insight into the dynamic nature of conflicts between VCs and entrepreneurs, suggesting that affective conflicts may sometimes evolve into cognitive mode, as managerial replacement enables both parties to restructure their relations.

The findings call for further examination of interorganizational conflicts involving asymmetry of power and resource dependence. In addition, the findings also call for deeper examination of how coordination mechanisms of interorganizational relations come to be a source of conflict and how such conflicts may vary in different contexts.

The findings of this paper suggest that both VCs and entrepreneurs should establish conflict management mechanisms, such as similar conceptions and a shared vision, to ensure better cooperation.

This paper provides an in‐depth insight into the embeddedness of conflicts in VCs and entrepreneurs' relations. The finding of this study contribute to theory building of VCs and entrepreneurs' conflicts suggesting that VCs' cooperation depends on both parties' ability to resolve inherent and actual conflicts.

This paper aims to analyse the governance structures of the Indonesian chilli value chain, price volatility issues across the chain and to critically explore the value chain actors' perceptions and responses to price volatility.

The authors used semi-structured interviews with 148 primary actors of the Indonesian chilli value chain. In-depth interviews with 22 key stakeholders – from local, provincial and national levels – were conducted in order to obtain additional information about their roles and the current policies and challenges in the chilli industry. The authors also conducted focus group discussions (FGDs) with farmers and support providers and held a national workshop to gather governance and price volatility risk-related information.

The Indonesian chilli value chains are long, complex and involve multiple actors. Most relationships within the value chains are based on market governance in which price regulates transactions. Most value chain actors shared a similar perception of price volatility and its causes. Under different governance structures, the value chain actors identified production, product characteristics and marketing as a major cause of price volatility. Although strategies applied by the value chain actors varied, in the main they are all aimed at minimising the impact of price volatility. Contractual arrangements are viable alternatives to minimising price risk.

This research relies primarily on qualitative data derived from purposive data collection methods, which may reduce the ability to generalise the findings. A quantitative analysis is required to validate the level of price volatility perceived by the stakeholders and to assess the cause and impact of price volatility across the chain. Future research should focus on proposing and assessing potential policy interventions that address price volatility, in order to facilitate the development of the Indonesian chilli industry.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the governance structures of the Indonesia chilli value chain, the value chain actors' perceptions of price volatility and their responses under the different types of governance in a developing country context.

Inefficiencies in public-private partnership (PPP) has been attributed to deficient and poor governance practices and structures. It has been recognized that a veritable way to achieve efficiency in PPP governance is through gaining an understanding of the theoretical, practical and contextual factors that underline governance practices in PPP project delivery. The purpose of this study is to explore the significant governance factors in PPP project performance and delivery.

Using a questionnaire survey on major players in PPPs in policy, research, consultancy and professionals, the study sought to delineate the significant governance factors that impact PPP project delivery performance.

A step-wise multiple regression analysis revealed effective communication and openness in sharing project information systems, competent, responsible and effective project leadership, trust-building processes, systems and practices, best practice organizational and team norms, team culture, cohesion practices, effective relationship management practices, robust policy diffusion and transfer processes, friendly business environment and government support and contractual and renegotiation flexibility as the key contractual and non-contractual governance factors that can predict about 79% level of PPP project delivery performance.

The findings offer support to improve PPP delivery in governance.

These findings are, thus, useful toward evolving regulatory quality governance mechanisms, flexible supervision and quality decisions that can enhance value for money in PPP projects in PPP project delivery.

The construction industry is complex, human-intensive and driven by monetary values. Hence, disputes are widespread. Initial conflicts among parties may develop into a disastrous dispute that costs the project success and good relationships and affects stakeholders' expectations. There has been a focus on causes of construction-related disputes, and studies over the past three decades have attempted to identify a more comprehensive list of reasons for disputes. Some of these studies' limitations were geographical, project delivery methods and project types. The purpose of this study is to identify the most recent and conclusive list of causes of disputes based on current literature by undertaking a systematic literature review (SLR).

Considering the large number of studies that focused on causes of disputes, this study aims to develop a comprehensive list of causes, using a SLR, as it ensures that all previous articles in multiple databases are reviewed to produce a comprehensive outcome. A six-stage SLR was followed from background study to analysis and reporting.

Not surprisingly, the number of publications has increased over time, most from the Middle East region. The interconnected nature of the causes was widely emphasised. The SLR has produced eight common core causes of disputes. They are: poor contractual arrangements, employer-initiated scope changes, unforeseen site changes, poor contract understanding and administration, contractor’s quality of works, the inability of the contractor to achieve time targets, non- or delayed payments and poor quality of design. The majority of previous authors realised that disputes could be avoided by parties’ involvement during the early stages, avoiding being opportunistic and acting collaboratively.

Even though numerous studies have been carried out to identify the causes of disputes in the construction industry, none did a SLR. This study aggregates all the previous studies that focused on construction-related disputes systematically. Categorising causes based on the party primarily responsible help various stakeholders by providing a distinct list of factors to avoid that contribute to disputes.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the use of commercial‐in‐confidence arrangements within the public sector allows the deliberate manipulation of accounting figures to generate support for the privatisation agenda.

A case study is presented of an Australian power entity, United Energy, where the privatisation was subject to commercial‐in‐confidence restrictions and differing opinions as to the accuracy of the entity's financial accounts during the privatisation process. It examines many of the key “commercial‐in‐confidence” documents, which are now available through parliamentary and official document sources, together with pre‐ and post‐privatisation financial statements.

The accounting figures were shaped to support a privatisation agenda and this was obscured by the commercial‐in‐confidence provision. Some attempts were made to use accounting arrangements to reduce federal taxes but this failed. A substantial element of the reported sale price represented internal transfers between the state‐owned entity and the government with the actual price paid by the purchaser being substantially lower than the reported price. The price paid was based on the financial statements which were openly challenged by the Auditor‐General. The paper strongly supports the contention that manipulation of accounting figures occurs under commercial‐in‐confidence privatisations.

This was limited to one example at one time. Further work is needed on other settings.

The paper challenges the success claimed for the privatisation process and for the social benefits of privatisation by tender.

There was little evidence of a substantial improvement in financial performance following privatisation or that the pre‐privatisation performance was substantially boosted to support the privatisation agenda. It did show that the accounting served political ends.

Regarding the global development of the wine industry, China has gained a notable share in terms of wine consumption, and its domestic wine production has increased steadily since 2000. The wine production process requires close coordination between growers and processors to avoid disruption and instability in the supply chain of the wine grapes. However, vertical coordination in the Chinese wine regions has received little attention. Based on the existing theoretical background on vertical coordination, this study aims to detect the evolution processes of vertical coordination in the Chinese grape market.

Exploratory qualitative research fits with the aim of this study. From December 2018 to January 2019, interviews with grape growers and wine processors of various Chinese wine-producing areas took place. After transcribing all recorded files into text, a qualitative data analysis following the approach of Mayring (2015) was used to analyse and interpret the data.

The models of vertical coordination in the grape supply in China vary between the producer's requirements on grape quality/quantity and the arrangements of grape supply chains, which are diverse depending on regional strategies of the local government.

However, in this research, the authors did not get into details on the organization of the contractual coordination, and due to the limited access to grape growers, the relationship between farmers and processors cannot be analysed in detail. With a better understanding of the coordination relationship and enhanced contract enforcement, the vineyard management and grape supply chain management can be better performed, inducing a steady industrial development.

Regarding the global development of the wine industry, China has gained a notable share in terms of wine consumption, and its domestic wine production has increased steadily since 2000. However, vertical coordination in the Chinese wine regions has received little attention. The study provides a first insight into the grape market structures, as very little is known.