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This study aims to examine the impacts of formal and informal hierarchical governances (HGs) on the performance of mega-projects and the mediating role of contractor behavior (i.e. perfunctory and consummate behaviors) in these relationships.

A total of 375 valid data entries from managers representing 375 mega-projects were analyzed through path analysis.

Both formal and informal HGs exert positive effects on the performance of mega-projects. While formal HG positively affects contractor perfunctory behavior and contractor consummate behavior, informal HG affects contractor perfunctory behavior only. Contractor behavior mediates the relationship between formal HG and project performance.

The impacts of potential moderators (e.g. institutional arrangement and complexity) on the relationship between HG and contractor behavior have not been considered in this study.

This study is useful for owners to enhance formal HG to improve contractor perfunctory and consummate behaviors, which in turn can enhance the performance of mega-projects.

This study expands the knowledge of mega-project performance management from the perspective of HG. It also contributes to the literature of contractor behavior within the context of mega-projects.

Due to the increasing risk and uncertainty of construction projects, contractual flexibility has been considered as an effective tool to cope with emergences and to promote cooperation between owners and contractors. However, in practice, owners often failed to build an efficient cooperative relationship via contracts, resulting in a lacking of appropriate justice. Furthermore, due to a lack of available empirical research, the influence of contractual flexibility on the cooperative behavior of contractors requires further investigation. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap by conducting empirical research from the perspective of justice perception.

A theoretical model was developed and a series of hypotheses were proposed. Then, partial least squares structural equation modeling analyses were conducted on a sample of 188 respondents.

The results show that contractual content and executing flexibility both have a positive influence on the cooperative behavior of a contractor, which was partially mediated by distribution, procedural, and interactional justice perceptions. Moreover, content flexibility has a significant impact on all three types of justice perception, and the execution of flexibility has more impact on interactional justice compared to other justice perceptions.

The findings contribute to an improved understanding of how contractual flexibility affects the cooperative behavior of contractors, indicating that the owner could develop a fair exchange relationship through flexible contracting and motivation of the other party.

The decisions of contractors could impact the reduction of construction carbon footprint. These decisions are linked to the belief of contractors which equally affects how they behave while delivering projects. This study aims to investigate the behavioural tendencies of contractors that could lead to carbon minimisation during the execution of construction projects.

An industry survey was performed amongst 41 UK construction professionals. Spearman’s correlation and factor analysis were used to analyse the data.

The result of the Spearman’s correlation gave rise to 14 contractors’ carbon reduction behaviour (CCRB) variables and their factor analysis yielded two distinct factors, namely, contractors’ consummate carbon reduction behaviour and contractors’ pragmatic carbon reduction behaviour. The findings suggest that in the UK, contractors are willing to take voluntary practical steps to decrease the carbon footprint of construction projects.

This finding might be unexpected to construction stakeholders, especially construction clients who may believe that infusing strict carbon reduction obligations in contracts is sufficient in nudging contractors to lessen the carbon impact of projects.

The study attempted to quantitatively derive CCRB, thereby extending the breadth of knowledge in the construction carbon reduction domain.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, determining which factors critically influence asymmetrical trust behaviors in construction projects within the Chinese context; second, proposing corresponding measures to deal with the asymmetrical behaviors of both the owner and the contractor promoting cooperative relationships among participants in construction organizations.

A theoretical model was developed and a questionnaire survey was conducted with 183 professionals. The data collected were analyzed by the structural equation modeling (SEM) technique.

The results identified six critical factors influencing trust asymmetry behavior in construction projects. The power imbalance, information asymmetry and cognitive difference have a positive influence on both upward-trust behavior and downward-trust behavior in the construction organization, while the competence, performance capacity and relationship satisfaction have negative effects.

This paper based on the assumption that trust asymmetry behavior has a negative impact on project performance, which should be further studied. Besides, future research may carry out a comparative analysis among the trusting relationships and behavior of different participants dynamically.

This paper contributes to the literature in three aspects. First, the factors influencing trust behavior in project organization have been identified for the first time. Second, a comprehensive view of trust asymmetry behavior has been theorized by SEM method. Third, the result bridges the existing gap caused by the lack of empirical evidence to understand the genetic mechanisms of trust asymmetry behavior in the construction industry.

The purpose of this study is to analyse, from the perspective of agency theory, differences between client and contractor in their perceptions of changes in uncertainty and in inclination to opportunistic behaviour while using a performance-based procurement procedure. In agency theory, dealing appropriately with the uncertainty and opportunism that results from information asymmetry is an essential precondition for successful procurement.

The procurement procedure analysed is the Performance Information Procurement System (PiPS). PiPS is a performance-based procurement method that uses historic performance information to select the expected best performing contractor. In a theoretical model, a PiPS is interpreted as a set of contractual and organisational safeguards. Through a survey, based on this model, the perceived effects of the PiPS safeguards for both clients and contractors are investigated.

Both clients and contractors believe that applying PiPS introduces safeguards that reduce transaction uncertainty. The perceived changes in the discouragement to use opportunistic behaviour when using PiPS differ between client and contractor. Clients do not know and contractors are sceptical as to whether applying PiPS discourages opportunistic behaviour. This difference in perceptions can be explained by the often-traditional background of the two parties’ project teams and the existence of information asymmetry.

This is one of the first studies to show that changes in the transaction environment in a performance-based procurement process are perceived differently by the client and the contractor. It is necessary to align the roles of both parties to avoid problems related to opportunistic behaviour.

Although trust is generally taken as a fundamental factor in influencing relational behavior in contractor–subcontractor collaboration, the determination of an optimal level of trust is still lacking. Trust with an optimal tipping point that matches dependence best is considered the optimal trust to improve relational behavior between general contractors and subcontractors. To fill the knowledge gap, this study explores how combinations of trust and dependence trigger relational behavior between general contractors and subcontractors through a configurational approach.

Questionnaires were administered to 228 middle management and technical staff members of the general contractor. The data were analyzed using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), and the inductive analytic method allowed researchers to explore configurations of different dimensions and levels of dependence and trust.

Necessity analysis results indicated that neither dependence nor trust was a necessary condition for facilitating relational behavior. Through sufficiency analysis, four configurations of optimal trust matched with dependence were identified in contractor–subcontractor collaboration. Even if contractors rely only on subcontractors for resources, the optimal trust between contractors and subcontractors should include both institution- and cognition-based trust. In the event that contractor–subcontractor collaboration involves relational dependence, both affect- and cognition-based trust are necessary for the optimal trust.

This study enhances existing research by delving deeper into a nuanced understanding of optimal trust in dependence scenarios, and enriches project governance theory by uncovering the internal transmission of relational governance. Practically, this study offers general contractors guidance on how to establish optimal trust strategies based on the dual dependence level with subcontractors, which can facilitate subcontractors' relational behavior, and ultimately improve contractor–subcontractor collaboration performance.

The purpose of this paper is to find how those uncertainty factors influence transaction costs generated and to identify ways to minimize the transaction costs borne by the construction owner.

The literature indicates that there is no consensus on a standard definition of transaction costs in the construction industry. A detailed literature review of research work on transaction costs in construction is conducted in order to identify the determinants of transaction costs in construction projects. A structural equation model is tested on data collected by means of a survey administered to construction owners.

The findings indicate that the transaction costs borne by the owner can be minimized if the owner minimizes the uncertainties inherent in the construction project by making sure the engineering design is as complete as possible before bids are sought from contractors; harmonious relationships between project participants; fair risk allocation; have experience in similar type projects; and contractor selection practices that routinely detect irregular behavior.

The data used in this research are primarily based on the experiences of public owners and the markets in which they operate; a larger representation of private owners could make the conclusions more general. Another limitation of the study is that it relies on a survey of opinions rather than actual records of costs and other hard data.

No empirical study has ever been conducted of transaction-related issues in the construction industry because of the lack of a common understanding of transaction cost. This paper provides the groundwork for such a study.

This paper attempts to reconcile the many determinants of transaction costs in construction projects under uncertainty considered by different researchers in a multitude of research studies.

In order to compete successfully, international contractors need to have an understanding not only of the make‐up of the different competitive environments within each country, but also of contractors' competitive behaviour within those environments. Contractors' mark‐up decision making in public sector contracting is directly compared in two construction markets – Hong Kong and Singapore.

Regression analysis is used to compare the lowest percentage mark‐up in both markets against four mark‐up decision factors that fall into two groups – market‐environment factors (i.e. number of bidders, market conditions) and project‐specific factors (i.e. type and size of project). Data were gathered using a designed bidding experiment.

In line with de Neufville et al.'s “good year‐bad year” study, the effect of market conditions was found to be independent of the number of bidders in both markets; contractors' mark‐up decreases as the number of bidders increases, with lower mark‐up in recession. In addition, this study provides evidence that contractors' mark‐up behaviour varies in different markets: Hong Kong contractors' mark‐up behaviour is more straightforward, in that only the market‐environment factors are significant. However, Singapore contractors' mark‐up behaviour is affected by project type in addition to the market‐environment factors. Project size was not found to be significant in either market.

The empirical findings provide a valuable insight into contractors' mark‐up behaviour, especially those contractors intending to bid for jobs in these two internationally renowned construction markets.

The purpose of this paper is to identify and analyse factors that affect contractors’ behavioural strategies in resolving disputed claims.

Factors were explored by a literature review and an open-ended questionnaire survey. In total, 9 hypotheses involving 12 factors were developed accordingly. Then a structured questionnaire survey was conducted, and 248 valid questionnaires were received from Chinese contractors. Partial least squares structural equation modelling was employed to test the hypotheses.

Factors that have the largest impacts on the contractual approach and the relational approach regarding obliging and compromising are favourability of evidence, time pressure and reputation, respectively. Unexpected results show that obliging behaviours are negatively correlated with procedural fairness but positively correlated with occurrence time of the dispute.

The results are based on correlation, although the research design improves the internal validity. Furthermore, this study belongs to single-level research. In the future, researchers can conduct multilevel research to enrich theories.

The findings not only enhance practitioners’ understanding of the factors influencing contractors’ behavioural strategies when dealing with disputed claims, but also offer insights into both parties’ ex ante focus of attention on specific factors to facilitate the subsequent dispute resolution.

This study furnishes a nuanced picture of multiple factors’ impacts on contractors’ behavioural strategies of claim-related dispute resolution, and thus supplements the relevant construction dispute management literature. From the perspective of contractual governance, it is one of those exploring drivers of contract application in problem situations. It extends the body of knowledge on this topic and hopefully will encourage more research on contractual governance from the reactive perspective.

Subcontractor payments typically come through the contractor, though there can be exceptions to this, and their timing and quantum can be affected by the upstream payment practices of the owner to the contractor, as well as the payment practices of the contractor. The purpose of this paper is to study the linked effect of late and incomplete payments of both the owner and contractor on what the subcontractor receives.

The paper's analysis develops on an existing Markov chain formulation of owner payments. The probability of getting payment from an owner or contractor is represented as a function of time since claim submission. Such functions are established through goodness of fit tests using actual project data. The downstream progression of payment from owner to contractor to subcontractor is treated as a collection of series and parallel systems, for which the likelihood of payment is assessed.

A model that enables subcontractors to calculate the likelihood of getting their claims paid, based on owner and contractor historical payment practices, is developed. Subcontractors are able to calculate the conditional and unconditional probabilities of their claims being paid at any time after claim submission. The model may be used with historical payment records, or with identified typical owner and contractor payment types.

The paper presents a practical method by which a subcontractor is able to calculate age‐dependent probabilities of outstanding claim amounts being paid. Such information feeds into the subcontractor's tendering practices before entering a new project, and in the subcontractor's contract administration practices in terms of pursuing claims.

The modelling of the owner‐contractor‐subcontractor payment linkage is original. No similar modelling exists in the literature.