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In Bangladesh (BD), delays in infrastructure are common. Many previous studies have explored the causes of infrastructure delays. However, this study investigated the causes of delays by taking responses from the stakeholders who are responsible for planning, design, funding, approval and implementation. There are few studies that have related infrastructure project delays to heterogeneity in stakeholders’ perceptions.

A structural equation (SE) model is developed with 350 normally distributed data points to understand the heterogeneity in stakeholders’ perceptions regarding delays in infrastructure projects in BD. Additionally, the relative importance index (RII) approach is used to assess the responses, validating the SE model.

The study finds that among the three latent variables, “Project itself related delay” has more influence on delays in infrastructure projects. Among the observed variables under the “project itself related delay” latent variable, “DPP approval process” has the most significance. From the heterogeneity analysis, the study found differences in responses among the stakeholders from “the Engineering Department,” “the Planning Office” and “the Construction Firm/Industry.” An important class of stakeholders believes that their stage is not being delayed and that other stages require attention.

The data sample is 350. More data can improve the accuracy of the findings. Most of the respondents are civil engineers (74%) and represent the owner of the project. Sample data from more stakeholders’ will enhance the accuracy of the result.

This study addresses the requirements of Bangladeshi project stakeholders and how their interactions cause delays in projects. Furthermore, the opinions of other stakeholders are taken into consideration when determining the specific factors of individual stakeholders that are causing delays. Practically, the distance between stakeholders should be reduced. A project manager can play a role in this regard. Initiatives should be taken on how to complete the project quickly by eliminating the requirements discussed among the stakeholders and bureaucratic complications. Instead of placing blame on one another, stakeholders should take the initiative to figure out how to work together to finish the project on schedule. The Planning Commission’s approval of the Development Project Proposal (DPP) and Revised Development Project Proposal (RDPP) should be obtained as soon as possible by owner stakeholders. In order to avoid frequently changing the DPP, owners should also exercise greater caution when choosing contractors. Contractor stakeholders should use efficient and proper manpower and equipment so that unexpected delays are not created during the execution of work. Since the role of the contractor stakeholder is the most important among the three types of stakeholders, the contractor should raise awareness and urge the owners to get the RDPP approved quickly.

The findings from the study can help mitigate delays in infrastructure projects in BD, taking into account the perceptions of various stakeholders.

Although trust is generally taken as a fundamental factor in influencing relational behavior in contractor–subcontractor collaboration, the determination of an optimal level of trust is still lacking. Trust with an optimal tipping point that matches dependence best is considered the optimal trust to improve relational behavior between general contractors and subcontractors. To fill the knowledge gap, this study explores how combinations of trust and dependence trigger relational behavior between general contractors and subcontractors through a configurational approach.

Questionnaires were administered to 228 middle management and technical staff members of the general contractor. The data were analyzed using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), and the inductive analytic method allowed researchers to explore configurations of different dimensions and levels of dependence and trust.

Necessity analysis results indicated that neither dependence nor trust was a necessary condition for facilitating relational behavior. Through sufficiency analysis, four configurations of optimal trust matched with dependence were identified in contractor–subcontractor collaboration. Even if contractors rely only on subcontractors for resources, the optimal trust between contractors and subcontractors should include both institution- and cognition-based trust. In the event that contractor–subcontractor collaboration involves relational dependence, both affect- and cognition-based trust are necessary for the optimal trust.

This study enhances existing research by delving deeper into a nuanced understanding of optimal trust in dependence scenarios, and enriches project governance theory by uncovering the internal transmission of relational governance. Practically, this study offers general contractors guidance on how to establish optimal trust strategies based on the dual dependence level with subcontractors, which can facilitate subcontractors' relational behavior, and ultimately improve contractor–subcontractor collaboration performance.

The decisions of contractors could impact the reduction of construction carbon footprint. These decisions are linked to the belief of contractors which equally affects how they behave while delivering projects. This study aims to investigate the behavioural tendencies of contractors that could lead to carbon minimisation during the execution of construction projects.

An industry survey was performed amongst 41 UK construction professionals. Spearman’s correlation and factor analysis were used to analyse the data.

The result of the Spearman’s correlation gave rise to 14 contractors’ carbon reduction behaviour (CCRB) variables and their factor analysis yielded two distinct factors, namely, contractors’ consummate carbon reduction behaviour and contractors’ pragmatic carbon reduction behaviour. The findings suggest that in the UK, contractors are willing to take voluntary practical steps to decrease the carbon footprint of construction projects.

This finding might be unexpected to construction stakeholders, especially construction clients who may believe that infusing strict carbon reduction obligations in contracts is sufficient in nudging contractors to lessen the carbon impact of projects.

The study attempted to quantitatively derive CCRB, thereby extending the breadth of knowledge in the construction carbon reduction domain.

As the foundation of social and economic development, infrastructure development projects are characterized by large initial investment, high technical requirements and thus generally delivered through complex contractor–subcontractor collaboration chains. This study aims to characterize the complexity of collaborative networks between contractors and subcontractors for infrastructure development through comparing the structural characteristics and the formation mechanisms of contractor–subcontractor collaborative networks for the following two different types of infrastructure: public works (PWCN) owned and operated by government agencies, and public utilities (PUCN) owned and operated by nongovernment agencies.

Based on the method of stochastic actor-oriented models and the longitudinal dataset of National Quality Award Projects in China during 2001–2020, this study compares how the structural characteristics of project-based collaborative networks between contractors and subcontractors for the two types of projects are different and how related micro-mechanisms, including both structure-based endogenous network effects and attribute-based exogenous homophily effects (institutional, organizational and geographical homophily), collectively underpin the formation of the networks.

The empirical results provide evidence that while the two networks are both characterized by relatively low levels of network density, PWCN is more globally connected around a minority of superconnected contractors as compared with PUCN. The results further reveal that compared with PUCN, the formation of PWCN is more significantly related to the structure-based anti in-isolates effect, suggesting that PWCN is more open for new entrant subcontractors. With regard to the attribute-based homophily effects, the results provide evidence that while both significantly and positively related to the effects of organizational (same company group) and geographical homophily (same location), the formation of PWCN and PUCN is oppositely driven by the institutional homophily effect (same ownership type).

As an exploratory effort of using network perspective to investigate the formation mechanisms of contractor–subcontractor relationships in the infrastructure development domain, this study contributes to a network and self-organizing system view of how contractors select subcontractors in different types of infrastructure projects. The study also provides insights into how contractor–subcontractor collaborative relationships can be better manipulated to promote the development of complex infrastructure in different contexts.

In construction projects, engineering variations are very common and create breeding grounds for opportunistic claims. This study investigates the complementary effect between an inspection mechanism and a reputation system in deterring opportunistic claims, considering an employer with limited inspection accuracy and a contractor, which can be either reputation-concerned or opportunistic.

This paper applies a signaling game to investigate the complementary effect between the employer's inspection and a reputation system in deterring the contractor's possible opportunistic claim, considering the information-flow influence of claiming prices.

This study finds that in the exogenous-inspection-accuracy case, the employer does not always inspect the claim. A more stringent reputation system complements a less accurate inspection only when the inspection cost is lower than a threshold, but may decline the employer's surplus or social welfare. In the optimal-inspection-accuracy case, the employer always inspects the claim. However, only a sufficiently stringent reputation system can guarantee the effectiveness of an optimal inspection in curbing opportunistic claims. A more stringent reputation system has a value-stepping effect on the employer's surplus but may unexpectedly impair social welfare, whereas a higher inspection cost efficiency always reduces social welfare.

This article contributes to the project management literature by combing the signaling game theory with the reputation theory and thus embeds the problem of inspection mechanism design into a broader socio-economic framework.

This paper aims to study the initial trust of the owner to the contractor, establish the initial trust mechanism, explore the factors that affect the initial trust of the owner to the contractor and analyze its influence mechanism. Based on this, it is easy for the owners and contractors to take targeted measures to improve the initial trust, which is conducive to the sustainable development of the project.

On the basis of reading a large amount of literature, this paper constructs the occurrence mechanism of the owner's initial trust to the contractor from the five factors of trust propensity, trust belief, trustee’s characteristics, institution-based trust, trust motivation and from the perspective of the owner using the structural equation model for questionnaire survey and empirical analysis.

The results of this paper show that the institution-based trust, the trustee’s characteristics and the trust belief of the trustor clearly have a positive effect on trust motivation, and the trustee’s characteristics have the most significant effect on the trust motivation. The influence of trust propensity on trust motivation was not significant.

This paper studies the occurrence mechanism of the owner's initial trust in the contractor, discusses its influencing factors and analyzes the influence of these factors on the initial trust, which enriches the theoretical system of initial trust research. The results of this study can help owners and contractors to develop targeted measures to build good initial trust.

As the complexity and uncertainty of megaprojects make it difficult for traditional management models to address the difficulties, this paper aims to design a performance incentive contract through IT applications, thereby promoting the formation of an information-based governance mechanism for megaprojects and facilitating the transformation and upgrading of the construction management model of megaprojects to informatisation.

This paper introduced IT applications into the performance assessment and used the proportion of IT applications replacing traditional manual management as a variable. It analysed different replacement ratios to obtain the optimal solution for the change of contractors behaviours and promote the optimal performance incentive for the informatisation in megaprojects.

The results show that under the condition of the optimal replacement ratio, achieving the optimal state of a mutual win-win situation is possible for the benefit of both sides. The counter-intuitive finding is that the greater the replacement ratio is not, the better, but those other constraints are also taken into account.

This study enriched the research of the performance configuration incentive from a practical perspective. It extended the research framework of IT incentive mechanisms in the governance of megaprojects from a management theory perspective. It clarified the role of IT applications in incentive mechanisms and the design process of optimal incentive contracts under different performance incentive states. The incentives made the contractors work harder to meet the owner's requirements, and it could improve the efficiency of megaprojects, thus better achieving megaproject objectives.

The construction industry has long been criticized for unethical conduct. The owner usually manages the contractor's opportunistic behaviors by employing a professional supervisor, but there is a risk of covert collusion between the supervisor and contractor. Based on the principal–agent theory and collusion theory, this paper aims to investigate optimal collusion-proof incentive contracts.

This paper presents a game-theoretic framework comprising an owner, supervisor and contractor, who interact and pursue maximized self-profits. Built upon the fixed-price incentive contract, cost-reimbursement contract, and revenue-sharing contract, different collusion-proof incentive contracts are investigated. A real project case is used to validate the developed model and derived results.

This paper shows that the presence of unethical collusion undermines the owner's interests. Especially, the possibility of agent collusion may induce the owner to abandon extracting quality information from the supervisor. Furthermore, information asymmetry significantly affects the construction contract selection, and the application conditions for different incentive contracts are provided.

This study still has some limitations that deserve further exploration. First, this study explores contractor–supervisor collusion but ignores the possibility of the supervisor abusing authority to extort the contractor. Second, to focus on collusion, this paper ignores the supervision costs. What's the optimal supervision effort that the owner should induce the supervisor to exert? Finally, this paper assumes that the colluders involved always keep their promises. However, what if the colluders may break their promises?

Several collusion-proof incentive contracts are explored in a project management setting. The proposed incentive contracts can provide the project owner with effective and practical tools to inhibit covert collusion in construction management and thus safeguard construction project quality.

This study expands the organization collusion theory to the field of construction management and investigates the optimal collusion-proof incentive contracts. In addition, this study is the first to investigate the effects of information asymmetry on contract selection.

Given their interrelationship, international market selection (IMS) and entry mode selection (EMS) must be considered jointly if an optimal entry strategy is to be realized. However, researchers in the field of international construction have the tendency to consider IMS and EMS independently or sequentially. Therefore, this paper aims to explore a holistic framework that can accommodate IMS and EMS concurrently and test it using empirical data.

his study includes theoretical and empirical research. In theoretical part, an integrated decision model of IMS and EMS is proposed adopting literature review and theoretical derivation, then hypotheses are developed for the impact of decision-making factors. In the latter part, the IMS and EMS of 54 Chinese contractors in 67 countries were investigated, empirical data are collected according to hypotheses, an ordinal logistic regression model is established for statistics analysis. Finally, findings are drawn by comparing literature-based hypotheses with data-based analysis results.

Results show that empirical data fit theoretical model well. Findings are: IMS and EMS can be integrated into a holistic decision-making framework when be properly sequenced. When IMS and EMS are determined simultaneously, the decision can benefit from a sharing of common information. And the roles of at least 13 common factors are empirically demonstrated in this study.

The integrated decision sequence proposed in this study is applicable for a specific market, and cannot compare multiple alternative markets directly. The decision-making factors identified in this paper do not cover the enterprise strategic objectives and some other factors. Empirical data and some theoretical assumptions are based on the international market entry strategy of Chinese contractors. Therefore, the conclusions may not be completely applicable to global contractors though have certain reference value.

Based on the idea of holistic decision-making of IMS and EMS, this study proposes an international market entry strategy (IMES) sequence and an explicit model for determinants, then tests them with empirical data. This paper provides a new idea to manage IMS and EMS concurrently, which can improve the efficiency of IMES decision-making and avoid missing optimal alternatives. This study paves the way for a practical model and provides reference for contractors' international market entry strategy.

This study aims to (1) develop a structural equation model in understanding the relationships between corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance and contractor competitiveness and (2) test the moderating effect of firm sizes on this relationship.

A literature review showed an urgent need to investigate the relationship between CSR implementation and contractor competitiveness holistically. CSR and contractor competitiveness variables were identified through the literature review and discussions with experienced professionals. Using a survey questionnaire, a total of 252 completed questionnaires were received. A structural equation modeling technique was then applied to analyze the data collected. Multigroup analysis was employed to test the moderating effect of firm sizes on the relationship between CSR implementation and contractor competitiveness.

The results indicated a strong relationship between CSR implementation and contractor competitiveness. This relationship is not moderated by firm size.

This research is one of the first studies to holistically explore the linkages between CSR implementation and contractor competitiveness. The findings can be served as a solid foundation to promote CSR performance in construction firms. Contractors of different sizes are suggested to implement CSR activities to foster competitiveness.