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This study aims to investigate the influence of contractual flexibility on different types of conflict, determine if contractual flexibility is significantly correlated with project success between contracting parties, verify the mediating effect of project conflicts on the relationship between contractual flexibility and project success and examine the relationship between different types of conflicts and project success in megaprojects.

A theoretical model was developed and a structured questionnaire survey was conducted with 468 professionals. The structural equation modeling technique was used to analyze the data.

The results showed that both types of contractual flexibility – term and process flexibility – were correlated with and significantly positively affected project success, and term flexibility was found to have a greater influence. The introduction of project conflicts significantly weakened the relationship between contractual flexibility and project success, verifying the partial mediating effect of conflicts. All types of project conflicts play a destructive role in achieving project success; relationship conflict had the largest negative effect. Contractual flexibility affects two paths with respect to project success: the direct path (contractual flexibility → project success) and the indirect path (contractual flexibility → conflict → project success). The direct effect of contractual flexibility on project success is positive; the corresponding indirect effect is negative. The direct effect is greater than the corresponding indirect effect.

Different types of conflicts may mutually transform to extent certain degree. However, this study did not address the potential influence of conflict transformation on project success. The results implied that more emphasis should be placed on contractual terms, particularly on developing flexible terms in the contractual document, when implementing megaprojects. Meanwhile, this study reveals the effects of conflicts on project success in megaprojects, which provides a useful reference for project stakeholders to avoid the negative effect of conflicts.

This study provides a better understanding of the relationship between contractual flexibility, types of conflicts in megaprojects and a reliable reference for the project manager to effectively deal with these related issues. This implies the contracting parties strengthen communication and cooperation to establish a trust mechanism, while reducing the negative influence of project conflicts and enhancing the positive effect of contractual flexibility.

Few studies have investigated the effects of contractual flexibility on conflict and project success in megaprojects; this study contributes significant theoretical and practical insights to contract management and conflict management and provides a reliable reference to achieve project success.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate relational contracting (RC) practices that give rise to higher quality interpersonal relations between these pairs of stakeholders at the end of public projects: clients and contractors; contractors and consultants; and clients and consultants. It developed models to predict the level of quality of interpersonal relations between the stakeholders at the completion of public projects.

Using a set of questionnaire, data were collected from randomly selected construction industry practitioners who have had experience in public projects in Singapore. The data were analysed to identify association between the use of RC practices and quality of interpersonal relations between stakeholders. In-depth interviews with experts were conducted.

It was found that when certain RC practices were adopted to a larger extent, public projects also have significantly higher quality of interpersonal relations between clients, contractors and consultants. Three mathematical models were developed to predict the relationship quality between stakeholders at the end of the public project.

The limitations include the subjective nature of the Likert scale that was used in answering the questionnaire survey and the limited number of interviews. The effect of existing good relations among stakeholders was not taken into account.

Suitable RC practices for adoption by public clients, contractors and consultants in public projects are recommended. These include developing deeper mutual trust and understanding, sharing project information, and having real gain-share/pain-share among contracting parties.

RC practices that are significantly associated with relationships among contracting parties in public projects in Singapore are uncovered. Contracting parties may use the recommendations to help enhance their relationships with one another in a public project.

There is a tension between the literatures on incomplete contracting and transactions cost economics regarding the importance of ex post governance and the extent to which formal theories of incomplete contracting capture salient aspects of exchange relations. In this paper, we empirically examine how firms structure joint R&D agreements to illuminate how contracts can be incomplete and how governance can matter. We employ a dataset of 96 contracts to construct a taxonomy of the types of mechanisms firms use in organizing collaborative R&D, and indicate how groups of mechanisms line up with various types of contracting hazards. The results suggest that the allocation of property rights over innovations at the time of contracting between R&D partners is an important aspect of contract design. But they also suggest that weak property rights admit scope for other dimensions of contract. In particular, the research indicates that while knowledge spillovers may give rise to appropriability hazards, efforts to contain or channel knowledge spillovers may enable joint venture members to strategically block other members’ follow-on commercialization or research. Firms design joint R&D governance mechanisms to balance spillover hazards and strategic blocking.

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how accountability is expressed in contractual arrangements found in network governance structures that provide public transport services and to raise discussion of how to understand contracting accountability in network governance contexts.

The paper is rooted in two research traditions: contracting studies and studies of accountability in government/governance contexts. Content analysis is used in examining contracts from two cases. These contracts are of five types: contracts between public organizations, contracts within a public organization, contracts between public organizations and private firms, and contracts between political parties within a municipality and contracts within a network. Various contracting approaches are identified within these types.

The paper concludes that the contracts' functions differ between the cases. The first case did not have an overall contract that defined the network, relying on different two-party contracts instead. In the other case, an incentive-based contract was used to link the organizations. From an accountability perspective, the latter contracting structure clarifies the roles and responsibilities of the actors and increases the possibility of accountability to citizens.

The paper brings new insights to the field of contracting and accountability by focusing on the role of contracts in network governance structures, taking account of various accountability relationships. It also contributes new theoretical categories usable when analysing contracting accountability in a network context.

Investigates the differences in protocols between arbitral tribunals and courts, with particular emphasis on US, Greek and English law. Gives examples of each country and its way of using the law in specific circumstances, and shows the variations therein. Sums up that arbitration is much the better way to gok as it avoids delays and expenses, plus the vexation/frustration of normal litigation. Concludes that the US and Greek constitutions and common law tradition in England appear to allow involved parties to choose their own judge, who can thus be an arbitrator. Discusses e‐commerce and speculates on this for the future.

To increase university–industry collaboration and research commercialisation, the Australian government recently introduced the Intellectual Property (IP) Framework, a set of online standard contracts. This follows a predecessor standard contract initiative, the IP Toolkit, which has not previously been evaluated. This paper aims to examine standard contracting in the innovation sector, tracing the policymaking behind the IP Toolkit using the lens of Macneil’s relational contract theory, to assess prospects of success for the new IP Framework, and similar initiatives in other jurisdictions.

This is a disciplined-configurative case study, drawing on qualitative secondary data analysis and applying Macneil’s relational contracting theory to guide case construction and generate hypotheses around likely success of standard contracting initiatives (stakeholder sentiment, stakeholder adoption). Within-case analysis process-traces development of the IP Toolkit, to discover what the policymakers wanted, knew and computed – and to detail observable implications Macneil’s theory predicts. Its themes are triangulated with multiple sources.

The case study, via Macneil’s theory, confirms the first hypothesis (resistant stakeholder sentiment) and partly validates the second hypothesis (low levels of adoption), demonstrating limited suitability of standard contracting in the dynamic and highly uncertain space of university–industry collaboration.

The study provides insights into the limited role that standard contracts can play in improving national collaborative research and development performance.

This is a novel theory-driven case study triangulated with previously unpublished data on the IP Toolkit’s website usage, and data from recent consultations on the new IP Framework. It has broader implications for other jurisdictions considering adoption of the standard contract model.

This paper reports the outcomes of the first of three planned questionnaire surveys in the first phase of a broader Hong Kong based study on ‘Joint Risk Management’ (JRM). The survey compared perceptions on both present and preferred risk allocation, including JRM, in construction contracts. Data was mainly collected in Hong Kong and mainland China (with most respondents having working experience from Hong Kong) from various professionals and practitioners representing broad groups of academics, consultants, contractors and owners (clients). Survey results reinforce previous observations (in Canada) of the divergences in perceptions on both present and preferred risk allocation, both within and between different contracting parties. The present study reveals quite wide (marked) divergencies with many individual cases of diametrically opposing views on allocating particular risks within specific groups. Despite such divergencies, respondents professed a general enthusiasm towards JRM, irrespective of their contractual or professional affiliation. Moreover, they generally preferred to assign reduced risks from either one or both contracting parties to JRM, rather than shifting more risks to the other party. This is indicative of a perceived trend towards more collaborative and teamwork based working environments.

The purpose of this paper is to increase the understanding of the main challenges of the contracting process and project contracts in the context of project business characterized by a high level of complexity and uncertainty. The authors argue that understanding contracting as a flexible process and as a business tool will contribute to creating more value in projects which are implemented in constantly changing circumstances or which require gradual and iterative development.

This is a conceptual paper with illustrative examples from the software industry.

A prevailing approach for both managing contracts and the contracting process focuses on careful planning and drafting of contracts that protect each party in the case of conflicts and disagreements. The underlying assumption is that all activities can be planned and documented in a formal contract. According to this approach, the contracting process is seen only as a bargaining negotiation and the project contract as a detailed agreement of the responsibilities and safeguarding clauses to protect one’s position in the event of conflicts and failures. However, in the context of project business characterized by complexity and uncertainty, there is a need for flexible project contracts. The authors suggest that there are two fundamentally different approaches to implementing flexibility in both the contracting process and the project contract: postponing the decision until there is adequate information for decision making or making decisions that allow flexible adaptation to changes during the project lifecycle.

The authors suggest that organizations in project business should pay closer attention to how contracts are formed and how flexibility is introduced to projects. Organizations are encouraged to see contracts as a business tool, not as rigid documents which are taken into use in case something goes wrong.

This paper contributes to the understanding of how to adapt the contracting process to overcome challenges related to uncertainty, especially during the early phases of the project lifecycle. The authors provide a novel perspective on contracting as a process that extends over the lifecycle of a project and on the project contract as an agreement between parties formed during the contracting process. This perspective includes formal contract documents as well as various other documents, oral communication, commitments, actions and incidents.

The purpose of this paper is to better understand how commercial contracts are interpreted and the level of control that contracting parties have over the judicial interpretation of their contracts.

The paper approaches the subject of commercial contract interpretation through an analysis of four dichotomies debated in legal scholarship and found in judicial decisions. The four dichotomies are formalism versus realism, literalism versus contextualism, facilitation versus regulation, and rules versus standards.

The main finding of the paper is that both poles of each of the dichotomies play important roles in the interpretation and enforcement of commercial contracts. For example, contract interpretation characterized by a high degree of formalism looks to the four‐corners of the contract for interpretive answers. In turn, some courts make use of external factors – such as distributive justice or public policy concerns in interpreting contracts.

One of the research implications of the paper is the need for a more in‐depth analysis of how contracting parties may agree on how their contracts are to be interpreted and whether courts should be obligated to enforce party‐mandated rules of interpretation.

The practical implication of understanding the means and methods of contract interpretation is that it leads to a better understanding of commercial contracts in transborder transactions.

The value of this research lies upon the fundamental premise that the same philosophies and theories of interpretation found in most legal systems are replicated in the area of international commercial contracting.

New business models, such as life‐cycle contracting, challenge the narrow and static understanding of contracts with hard and precise terms. The aim of this paper is to examine how flexibility could be incorporated into contracting processes.

The data of the paper have been gathered applying the triangular method; first, by interviewing key personnel participating in contracting at eight Finnish firms; second, examining contract and other documents of those companies; and third, studying earlier research on contracting practices. Theoretically, the paper is based on relational contract and proactive approaches to law on the one hand and on organizational studies based on new institutional economics on the other.

Flexibility is often introduced to contracts with relational methods, relying on good personal relationships between business partners or negotiation power and negotiation skills. Contract documents often do not contain mechanisms for dealing with contingencies, or “soft” contract terms. The paper finds the following reasons that may explain this. First, firms heavily rely on model contracts to develop their own templates and the lack of contract models in new business areas hinders firms to develop their templates. Second, unfamiliarity with using soft elements makes it difficult to use them. Additionally, in some cases firms may prefer using relational capability.

The findings need verification from further multidisciplinary empirical research.

The findings support firms in developing their contracting capabilities to meet the requirements of the changing business environment and gain competitive advantage from well‐organized contracting.

This paper is one of the first empirical studies comprising also the legal approach.