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In this study, a dynamic contracting model is developed between a venture capitalist (VC) and an entrepreneur (EN) to explore the influence of asymmetric beliefs regarding output-relevant parameters, agency conflicts and complementarity on the VC's posterior beliefs through the EN's unobservable effort choices to influence the optimal dynamic contract.

The authors construct the contracting model by incorporating the VC's effort, which is ignored in most studies. Using backward induction and a discrete-time approximation approach, the authors solve the continuous-time contract design problem, which evolves into a nonlinear ordinary differential equation (ODE).

The optimal equity share that the VC provides to the EN decreases over time. In accordance with the empirical evidence, the EN's optimistic beliefs regarding the project's profitability positively affect its equity share. However, the interactions between the optimal equity share, project risk and both partners' degrees of risk aversion are not monotonic. Moreover, the authors find that the optimal equity share increases with the degree of complementarity, which indicates that the EN is willing to cooperate with the VC. This study’s results also show that the optimal equity shares at each time are interdependent if the VC is risk-averse and independent if the VC is risk-neutral.

In conclusion, the authors highlight two potential directions for future research. First, the authors only considered a single VC, whereas in practice, a risk project may be carried out by multiple VCs, and it is interesting to discuss how the degree of complementarity affects the number of VCs that ENs contract. Second, the authors may introduce jumps and consider more general multivariate stochastic volatility models for output dynamics and analyze the characteristics of the optimal contracts. Third, further research can deal with other forms of discretionary output functions concerning complementarity, such as Cobb–Douglas and constant elasticity of substitution (See Varian, 1992).

The results of this study have several implications. First, it offers a novel approach to designing dynamic contracts that are specific and easy to operate. To improve the complicated venture investment situation and abate conflict between contractual parties, this study plays a good reference role. Second, the synergy effect proposed in this study provides a theoretical explanation for the executive compensation puzzle in economics, in which managers are often “rewarded for luck” (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Wu et al., 2018). This result indicates a realistic perspective on financing and establishing cooperative relationships, which enhances the efficiency of venture investment. Third, from an empirical standpoint, one can apply this framework to study research and development (R&D) problems.

First, the authors introduce asymmetric beliefs and Bayesian learning to study the dynamic contract design problem and discuss their effects on equity share. Second, the authors incorporate the VC's effort into the contracting problem, and analyze the synergistic effect of effort complementarity on the optimal dynamic contract.

Smart contracts using blockchain technology (BCT) is a tool that decentralizes authority and makes it easier to upgrade the contract administration process by providing an efficient system. Current literature provides a good overview of contracts in the construction industry; however, the specific details of BCT's smart contracts applications in the three categories have not been addressed adequately: (1) information quality, (2) enhancing project schedule and progress payment time and (3) reducing conflicts among project stakeholders. Thus, this study aims to analyze smart contracts using BCT by creating a computerized contract model, specifically evaluating its impact on the three identified categories.

In this paper BCT-SmContract was developed through an automated program that utilizes blockchain to define the contractual agreements between different parties in a construction project. BCT-SmContract model provides a new technique to overcome the current challenges associated with factors identified in this study, i.e. (1) information quality, (2) enhancing project schedule and progress payment time and (3) reducing conflicts among project stakeholders. Afterward, the model was tested to ensure validity and reliability through a construction project.

The findings indicated that BCT-SmContract was approximately 90% faster to execute the contract and 100% accurate in reflecting the correct information about the project status, resulting in reduced conflicts.

This study has contributed in upgrading the traditional contracting method in construction by developing an automated smart contract model to enhance the processes and achieve higher accuracy.

This study aims to empirically test the effects of key characteristics of performance-based contracting (PBC) (i.e. reward/payment scheme, increased supplier autonomy and transfer of responsibilities) on supplier goal commitment.

This study developed a conceptual model applying goal-setting theory (GST), expectancy theory (ET) and job characteristics theory (JCT). Survey data were collected and analyzed using structural equation modeling (SEM) to establish a validated measurement instrument for testing the hypotheses.

The findings revealed that PBC positively affects supplier goal commitment due to its unique characteristics, which translates into improved supplier performance. Furthermore, this study validated the mediating role of goal alignment and felt accountability operating between PBC characteristics and supplier goal commitment.

This study explored the buyer–supplier relationship from the supplier's standpoint. Using a more inclusive data set, future research may involve a dyadic analysis and focus on the effects of the following factors on the supplier goal commitment: relational aspects (e.g. trust and collaboration), the risk transfer from the buyer to the supplier, different incentive schemes and successful PBC implementation factors.

This study presents new, validated insights for contract selection, design and management. It underlines the importance of choosing the proper contract, having the appropriate contract design based on the desired outcomes and effective contract management by exhibiting the psychological/behavioral effect of fundamental PBC characteristics.

PBC represents an active research stream, but its psychological/behavioral implications are understudied. Therefore, this research puts forth a conceptual framework with multiple testable hypotheses illustrating the relationship between PBC and supplier goal commitment.

This paper aims to highlight how the Greek State tried to improve public procurement processes during the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and propose measures that could be implemented in a future force majeure event where the global supply chain will not operate efficiently.

The authors investigated the existing scientific literature. Afterwards, they designed a questionnaire to gather primary data and add value to the current literature.

The research paper results highlight that in future force majeure events, the best way for effective public procurement is to implement central procurement, framework agreements with more than one economic operator and use the newly established Public Buyers Community in the European Union. The questionnaire interviews also highlighted that payment terms could be adjusted to the needs of the suppliers to improve their financial flows, which are disrupted in case of a force majeure event.

One of the limitations of the present case study is that apart from the Greek procurement Laws and policy documents related to the COVID-19 pandemic, only scientific articles written in English were used by the authors in the literature review section.

The findings could benefit public contracting authorities and central procurement bodies when designing their processes in case of a force majeure event like the COVID-19 pandemic. As the public contracting authorities and the procurement officers are more informed about potential ways to improve the public procurement processes, they might apply measures that could facilitate the flexibility of the procurement processes.

The research paper can provide lessons learned to policy makers, when they have to cope with similar challenges in the future.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, no previous scientific article has examined how the Greek State has tried to respond to the supply shortages created during the pandemic. Furthermore, this is the first study in Greece that gathers primary data from public procurement practitioners.

This study aims to investigate whether social reputation via corporate social responsibility (CSR) awarding facilitates access to debt and decreases the cost of debt and whether governance mechanisms moderate this relationship.

The sample covers the period between 2002 and 2021, during which CSR award data were available in the Thomson Reuters Eikon/Refinitiv database. The empirical models are based on country, industry and year fixed-effects regression.

While the main findings produced an insignificant result for access to debt, they indicated strong evidence for the positive relationship between CSR awarding and the cost of debt. Moreover, the moderating effect highlights that while the sustainability committee helps CSR-awarded companies access debt more easily, independent directors help firms decrease the cost of debt via CSR awarding. Furthermore, the results differ between the US and the non-US samples, earlier and recent periods, high- and low-leverage firms and large and small firms.

For the first time, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, the authors assess whether social reputation via CSR awarding facilitates access to debt and decreases the cost of debt in an international and cross-industry sample. Little is known about the effect of social reputation on loan contracting, although social reputation conveys broader information that goes beyond the firm’s internal (performance) and external (reporting) CSR practices. The authors also draw attention to the differing roles of distinct governance mechanisms in leveraging social reputation for loan contracting.

Outsourcing is a common practice that is often adopted to reduce costs and enhance capabilities. The underlying logic of a firm's outsourcing strategy is not always evident due to multiple antecedents with interacting effects. This study identifies critical factors that influence outsourcing strategies and reveals their interactions with empirical evidence from Chinese construction firms.

The quantitative decision-making trial and evaluation laboratory (DEMATEL) method was applied to analyze the interrelationships among the antecedents of project outsourcing strategies. First, 24 experts from 13 Chinese construction firms were invited to evaluate and score the influence of each factor on the other. Second, the graph theory and matrix tools of DEMATEL were used to quantitatively obtain the causality among factors and the prominence of each factor within the system.

Among the antecedents, a firm's pursuit of cost efficiency, identity, technological capability and contracting capability are the most prominent factors influencing project outsourcing strategies. For the interactions among these factors, this study reveals that the focal firm's technological capability significantly influences its contracting capability, and they jointly influence the firm's outsourcing practices, the selection of outsourcing vendors and, eventually, its pursuit of cost efficiency. Moreover, legal restrictions in the institutional environment strongly shape this capability–cost efficiency relationship.

Twelve critical factors following different theoretical perspectives at varying levels of analysis were identified from the literature review. By revealing the interrelationships among these factors, this study develops a holistic framework that integrates the transaction cost and capability perspectives for understanding project outsourcing strategies embedded in different institutional environments.

I historically compare changes in institutional frameworks creating academic positions linked to temporary employment by analyzing university employment statistics in Chile, Colombia, Germany, and the USA. I find that temporary academic positions were institutionalized through the creation of previously inexistent academic categories called a contrata in Chile, de cátedra in Colombia, “junior professor” without tenure in Germany and “postdoc” in the USA; used in higher education and employment laws since 1989, 1992, 2002, and 1974, respectively. Under institutional frameworks demanding the maximization of students and research, universities have increasingly contracted academics through temporary contracts under rationales that differ between regions. In Colombia and Chile, public university leaders and owners of private universities contract such teaching positions to expand student numbers through lowering costs. In Germany and the USA, employment insecurity is mostly driven by temporary scientific positions under a main rationale of scientific expansion. The share of temporary positions has increased exponentially in Colombia and Germany in recent decades, whereas in the USA there has only been an increase since 2012. Moreover, in Chile, the share of permanent positions has decreased since 2012. The common trend is one of isomorphism of vertical academic structures sharing a pyramidal form, with a wide base of academics working under conditions of contractual insecurity. Such trends follow a rationale for maximization of student numbers as well as administration, and scientific production that is in tension with prioritizing wellbeing and improvement of academics’ working conditions. Yet, in these environments, the institution of tenure in the USA and recent Chilean regulations on accreditation represent mechanisms counteracting precarious employment.

Integrated project delivery (IPD) project that does not use multiparty agreement is identified as IPD-ish. The use of IPD-ish arrangement by incorporating integration practices in conventional contract can be viewed as the part of the adoption process of IPD. Moreover, inappropriate integration practices invite new forms of risks and the absence of multiparty agreement adds to the challenges of risk management in IPD-ish projects. This study discusses such challenges and proposes the use of joint risk management to address the potential pitfalls in IPD-ish arrangement.

A mixed research method was applied. First, the criticality of IPD-ish general and integration-specific risks was examined through a survey. Second, a real IPD-ish project was used to exemplify the use of joint risk management (JRM) to manage IPD-ish risks.

Two types of risks, namely integration risks (IRs) and general risks (GRs), are identified in IPD-ish projects. Two major findings for the IRs: (1) the most critical IRs are related to unbalanced incentivization and inefficient multidisciplinary teams; and (2) only team formation related pre-contract JRM strategies affect IRs. As for the GRs, the most critical ones are associated with design issues and can be effectively mitigated by post-contract JRM.

Using IPD-ish arrangement is an inevitable part of implementation of full IPD. This happens as many change-averse owners would like to test the integration principles using a conventional contract that they are familiar with. In fact, success in IPD-ish would pave the path for further adoption of IPD. This study offers insight into categorization of risks in IPD-ish projects. Appropriate use of post-contract and organization related pre-contract JRM would improve the chance of teasing out the values of IPD through IPD-ish arrangements. Care should be taken to introduce some contracting integration initiatives, such as risk/reward sharing incentive.

The purpose of this paper is to propose a disruption claim management (DCM) life cycle and a risk management framework to provide comprehensive guidance to construction practitioners for facilitating effective and efficient DCM.

DCM life cycle was initially developed through a focus group discussion (FGD) with the participation of the construction practitioners who have diverse experiences about DCM. The life cycle is comprised of 6 phases and also includes proper reactions of the owners and contractors. Then, 42 risk factors that can impact the deliverables of DCM were identified through a literature review and an additional FGD session. This was then followed by a Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchy Process (FAHP) which was performed to evaluate the importance of each risk factor in terms of the factor's impact on the success of DCM. Additionally, consistency analysis was performed to further maximize the reliability of the results.

Findings revealed that a proactive and systematic approach should be adopted and DCM practices should be initiated before any disruption event is triggered. Accordingly, the proposed framework recommends DCM practices to be initiated early in the contract development phase since compensation for the disruption might be recovered only to the extent that the contract permits. The contract-related risks were given top priority by the experts so that the results of the fuzzy AHP analysis also verified the significance of the contract development phase. Besides contract-related risks, risks related to insufficient site observation, ignorance of the project team, cognitive bias and conflict of interest were determined as the most significant DCM risks, needing an urgent and sophisticated risk response plan. Lastly, results suggested that “Site observation and record-keeping” is the most formidable phase since the phase's implementation on a continuous basis could create unforeseen organizational challenges such as mismanagement of project records, especially in the dynamic and turbulent environment of the construction projects.

Disruption – which is caused mostly by change – is inevitable in construction projects due to their sophisticated nature. DCM, therefore, becomes crucial to compensate losses of contractors and eliminate or diminish the prolonged dispute resolution process. Existing studies, however, do not provide a comprehensive theoretical basis for the DCM life cycle and DCM life cycle's potential risks so that DCM life cycle's promising benefits can hardly be materialized. Thus, developing a DCM life cycle and associating DCM life cycle with risk management, this study is highly believed to make a promising theoretical contribution to the DCM domain since this is one of the earliest attempts in the literature. Additionally, this research provides construction practitioners with an insight into the effective implementation of DCM practices in construction projects.

This study which is positioned in the ambit of control research investigates the impact of ex ante contractual completeness on opportunistic behaviors and ex post transaction costs, while assessing how these affect relationship termination intention. This study aims to examine alternative attractiveness as a necessary moderator of the nexus between transaction cost and relationship termination intention.

Data gathered from 211 companies in South Korea that have installed and run outsourced vending machines are analyzed and used to validate the study’s theoretical and empirical contributions.

The findings, which rely only on data from companies that outsource and those that run outsourced vending machines, show that contractual completeness negatively affects both active and passive opportunism. The study also discovers that active opportunism positively affects both bargaining costs and monitoring costs, whereas passive opportunism has a positive and direct effect on maladaptation costs but a negative effect on monitoring costs. It further finds that both bargaining and maladaptation costs have positive and direct effects on relationship termination intention, while monitoring costs have a negative effect on the same. Furthermore, it is observed that alternative attractiveness moderates the relationships between bargaining costs and relationship termination intention, as well as maladaptation costs and relationship termination intention.

This study demonstrates that contractual completeness can serve as an important ex ante control mechanism, whereas the two types of opportunism can raise transaction costs. Furthermore, alternative attractiveness is identified as a driver of the impact of transaction costs on relationship termination intention.

A key point of the departure of this study is that it examines the moderating role of alternative attractiveness in the relationship between transaction cost and relationship termination intention. The paper also advances the control literature by emphasizing the critical role that contractual completeness plays in reducing the occurrence of (both active and passive) opportunism in business relationships (especially companies that outsource).