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This study aims to investigate how contract complexity and relational trust could impact offshore outsourcing innovation (OOI) performance of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). This study further examines the moderating effects of knowledge routines and joint actions on the relationships between contract complexity, as well as relational trust and OOI performance.

The empirical investigation extends transaction cost economics and the relational view of buyer-supplier dyads in the context of offshore outsourcing SMEs. To test the hypotheses, the authors collected and analysed survey data from 200 European manufacturing SMEs that have existing offshore supplier relationships.

The results suggest that both complex contracts and relational trust as governance structures positively affect SMEs’ OOI performance. Additionally, while both formal knowledge routines and joint actions help strengthen the relationship between complex contracts and OOI, they showed no significant moderating effect on the relationship between relational trust and OOI. Furthermore, based on the results, the authors also develop a governance framework covering four configurations – fit, firm, flexible and fragile (4F).

The 4F governance scenarios – fit, firm, flexible and fragile – introduced in this study emphasise the need for a combination of contract complexity and relational trust mechanisms in OOI relationships. The 4F labelling has rich implications for practitioners on how interfirm outsourcing innovation relationships can be managed based on configurations of contractual and relational governance. The study also adds to the understanding of how SMEs’ specific characteristics (e.g. resource shortcomings and flexibility) may influence their OOI decisions in comparison with large firms.

The purpose of this paper is to unpack the “black box” of the relationship between contract and inter-organizational trust, both theoretically and empirically. Two mediators, namely perceived safeguard and restriction, are identified to build up two seemingly contrary possible paths between contract and trust from current literature. Both paths are tested in the context of Chinese construction industry due to our access to sample.

A survey of 295 contractor-subcontractor relationships from Chinese construction industry was conducted. A three-step multiple regression model was employed to test the mediating effect of perceived safeguard and restriction. Then, a hierarchical regression model was used to test the possible moderating effect of bilateral transaction-specific investment.

The empirical results support the mediating effect of perceived safeguard between contract and trust in the construction subcontracting industry. Bilateral transaction-specific investments enhance the positive effect of contract on safeguard perception.

Theoretically, this study contributes to governance literature by opening up the “black box” of the relationship between contract and trust. It provides a better understanding of how and when contract complexity impacts trust, instead of simply focusing on whether contract and trust act as complements or substitutes. Practically, this study provides guidelines for construction firms to decide the degree of contract complexity under various degrees of bilateral transaction-specific investments to enhance the other party’s trust, so as to improve performance outcomes.

This paper aims to investigate that how to mitigate the weaker party's risk perception in imbalanced supply chain relationships by framing contracts according to complexity and recurrence. The level of information technology (IT) integration is considered as the moderator influencing the effectuation of contract framing.

The authors conducted a questionnaire survey with 229 firms involved in imbalanced supply chains. Hierarchical regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses.

The authors found contractual complexity positively influenced performance and relational risk, while contractual recurrence negatively impacted performance and relational risk. This study further reveals the positive moderating effect of IT integration in influencing contractual complexity on relational risk and performance risk and the negative impact of IT integration in influencing contractual recurrence on relational risk and performance risk.

Overall, this study posits the coordinating role of contracts in reducing the weaker party's risk perception in imbalanced supply chain relationships.

The authors concluded by illustrating how to customize contracts based on the level of IT integration to maximize their role in reducing risk perception.

This study is embedded in imbalanced supply chain relationship, aiming to solve the problem of high-risk perception held by the weaker party, which is a salient threat to the sustainability of collaboration. Contract framing is proposed as an effective approach for mitigating risk perception, which should be carefully designed based on the level of IT integration of the relationship. The authors found that contractual complexity has a positive influence on performance and relational risk, but contractual recurrence has a negative impact on performance and relational risk. This study further reveals the moderating effect of IT integration on the effectuation of contractual framing.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate the effects of cooperation history on contractual governance and the moderating effects of dependence asymmetry on those relationships from the perspective of a weaker firm in emergent economies. Drawing from resource dependence theory and contingency theory, this paper develops a conceptual model to investigate the impact of cooperation history on contractual governance.

The authors use data from 188 buyer–supplier relationships in China

The authors find that cooperation history is positively associated with contractual governance when dependence asymmetry is high but negatively associated with contractual governance when dependence asymmetry is low. Furthermore, the negative moderating effect of dependence asymmetry on the relationship between cooperation history and contractual complexity is stronger than the relationship between cooperation history and contract enforcement.

This study contributes to a better understanding of how cooperation history affects contractual governance with respect to the various levels of dependence on partners by incorporating a contingency view. This study also advances the literature on interfirm governance by distinguishing contractual governance into contractual complexity and contract enforcement.

The purpose of this study is twofold: first, to identify major project management (PM) complexities in principal construction contracting; and second, to study the contribution of project management offices (PMOs) to addressing such complexities.

A two-stage research design was adopted through a structured literature review (SLR) and a qualitative survey study.

The two-stage study resulted in mapping out the contribution of 10 functional areas to 15 complexity factors that were retrieved from the literature and categorized using the TOE (technical, organizational and environmental) framework. Six outcomes including (1) facilitated processes, (2) improved decisions, (3) improved coordination, (4) enhanced alignment, (5) addressed uncertainties and (6) integrated oversight were identified that describe how PMOs can contribute to tackling complexities.

Similar to other qualitative studies, this study has some limitations in terms of the replicability of results. Regarding the exploratory nature of this study to explain the contribution of PMO to complexity, further quantitative surveys can be conducted using a larger sample to statistically examine the significance of proposed relations between capabilities and complexity factors.

This study provides an understanding of the contribution of PMOs to tackling ever-increasing complexities embedded in construction contracting. The authors suggest requirements to be considered by professionals toward overcoming such complexities.

Although prior studies have separately investigated PMO functions and PM complexities, this study explores the link between these two spheres to discuss one important application of PMO in this context.

This study aims to (1) validate the efficacy of contractual and relational governance in enhancing operational performance and (2) explore the influence of product complexity on the effectiveness of these governance mechanisms, thereby determining the optimal approach for varying levels of product complexity.

By utilizing a comprehensive theoretical framework encompassing transaction cost economics, social exchange theory and contingency theory, this research explores the intricate interplay between governance mechanisms, product complexity and operational performance, drawing insights from a dataset comprising 246 responses within Mainland China’s manufacturing sector. To rigorously test the proposed hypotheses, this study employed a hierarchical regression analysis.

The findings of this study are summarized as follows: (1) while both contractual governance and relational governance have a significant impact on operational performance, relational governance is found to be more effective than contractual governance in enhancing operational performance; and (2) the moderation effect of product complexity is evident, as it weakens the impact of contractual governance while simultaneously enhancing the positive influence of relational governance on operational performance.

The study uncovers a moderation effect of product complexity on the relationship between governance mechanisms and operational performance. This finding adds an original contribution to the literature by highlighting how product complexity can interact with governance strategies, providing practical insights for industries dealing with varying levels of product complexity.

This study aims to investigate how contract design influences supplier performance. This study synthesises three theoretical views (efficiency, relational, contingency) and provides empirical support on how effective contract design improves supplier performance.

This study reviewed contract design literature and uncovered 18 factors that may impact supplier performance. Multi-criteria, decision-making analysis examined the impact of contract factors on three supplier groups: average-, over- and under-performers. Procurement experts working with a large multinational company dealing with hundreds of procuring contracts, yearly, provided their judgement on the impact of these factors on supplier performance. Semi-structured interviews with experts and other evidence were used for data and method triangulation.

Results show that contracting with under- and over- performers presents significant differences: in the case of over-performers, contracts have a dual, yet discrete, efficiency and relational role: at transaction level, they emphasise formality, protect from opportunism and include both liquidated damages and legal action clauses. At relational level, they focus on relational learning and incentivising suppliers. However, in the case of under-performers, contracts appear to focus on contingency factors, which can be a source of ambiguity, particularly in complex environments, and trust, which has a negative impact on supplier performance.

Improving contract design can help reduce partner opportunism, reduce inter-firm conflicts and avoid disputes that can bear a social cost. This study demonstrates that companies can use advanced analytical tools to reflect upon their own decision-making process of contact design in making transparent supplier performance assessments.

To the author’s knowledge, this is the first study using decision-making techniques to enhance supplier performance by improving the contract design process.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the information that manufacturing companies have available when competitively bidding for service contracts.

A semi-structured interview study was undertaken with industrialists in various sectors, which are currently facing the issue of servitisation.

One of the main findings was that, despite the novelty of the process, the decision makers at the competitive bidding stage have an understanding of the involved uncertainties. In particular, the uncertainty arising from the customer as the user of the product and evaluator of the competitive bids in addition to the uncertainty connected to the competitors were identified as the main influences on the pricing decision.

The research implications show the influences and considerations during the decision-making process at the competitive bidding stage for service contracts. These include the customer and the competitors.

Shortcomings in the current industrial practice were identified such as the approaches used to communicate the cost estimate for the service contract. The approaches currently used contradict research findings in the area of communicating uncertainty information, which means that further research is to be done to identify optimal approaches to displaying the uncertainty connected to the communicated information.

This paper offers a basis for research to understand the challenges industry faces when competitively bidding for service contracts. This can be used to develop novel approaches in supporting the decision maker such as a model that presents the probability of winning in comparison to the probability of making a profit.

This article aims to explore how knowledge-intensive service firms design inter-firm contracts to govern the exchange of highly intangible and inseparable knowledge under varying degrees of property right protection.

This research uses a multiple case study of management consulting firms domiciled in Serbia and Albania.

Firms domiciled in relatively weak property right settings prefer more informal contracts, whereas those in settings of superior property right protection favour greater formality as a means of encouraging the creation and sharing of knowledge, whilst concurrently mitigating the threat of opportunism.

This article contributes new knowledge with regard to the design of inter-firm contracts to govern the sharing of highly intangible and inseparable knowledge. In terms of theory, it employs a transaction cost economics approach in which inter-firm contracts are decomposed into five requisite provisions, which are then related to the degree of formality.

Knowledge-intensive service firm managers should assess the degree of property right protection when considering the degree of formality of inter-firm contracts.

The study constitutes the first attempt to empirically examine how knowledge-intensive service firms craft contracts in different property right settings. With the burgeoning number of cross-border collaborative partnerships between such firms, it offers important insights into the choice of governance mechanism in different property right protection settings.

The role of conventional contracts in achieving sustainability goals in public–private partnership (PPP) projects has been questioned. From the multifunctional perspective of contract theory, joint-contract functions that combine contractual control, coordination and adaptation may be a potential approach for improving PPP project sustainability performance. This research intends to investigate the link between the joint-contract functions and PPP project sustainability performance, and their underlying mechanism, by analyzing the mediating role of relationship quality and moderating roles of environmental uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty.

Based on 170 valid survey data collected from the Chinese PPP professionals, partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) was adopted to test the hypothesis.

The results reveal that joint-contract functions are positively associated with the PPP project sustainability performance. This relationship is strengthened by environmental and behavioral uncertainty. Moreover, the relationship between the joint-contract functions and PPP project sustainability performance is mediated by relationship quality.

This research extends contract governance theory and sustainability research in PPP projects. The research implications are as follows: (1) joint-contract functions are a second-order construct consisting of three first-order dimensions: control, coordination and adaptation and are positively associated with PPP project sustainability performance; (2) joint-contract functions enhance the sustainable benefits of PPP projects during environmental uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty; (3) informal relationships are a critical bridge connecting formal institutions with the sustainability performance of PPP projects.

In general, these findings guide project participants who aim to achieve sustainable outcomes in PPP projects. (1) Project participants should consider the process of contract design and sign contracts that focus on joint-contract functions. (2) Project participants should investigate the degree of uncertainty of a PPP project before designing contracts, and design the contracts with corresponding complexity. (3) Project participants should work to enhance PPP sustainable benefits by improving the relationship between partners, such as encouraging mutual trust and joint problem-solving.

This research verifies the relationship between joint-contract functions and PPP project sustainability performance, and the boundary and intermediary conditions between them.