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The decisions of contractors could impact the reduction of construction carbon footprint. These decisions are linked to the belief of contractors which equally affects how they behave while delivering projects. This study aims to investigate the behavioural tendencies of contractors that could lead to carbon minimisation during the execution of construction projects.

An industry survey was performed amongst 41 UK construction professionals. Spearman’s correlation and factor analysis were used to analyse the data.

The result of the Spearman’s correlation gave rise to 14 contractors’ carbon reduction behaviour (CCRB) variables and their factor analysis yielded two distinct factors, namely, contractors’ consummate carbon reduction behaviour and contractors’ pragmatic carbon reduction behaviour. The findings suggest that in the UK, contractors are willing to take voluntary practical steps to decrease the carbon footprint of construction projects.

This finding might be unexpected to construction stakeholders, especially construction clients who may believe that infusing strict carbon reduction obligations in contracts is sufficient in nudging contractors to lessen the carbon impact of projects.

The study attempted to quantitatively derive CCRB, thereby extending the breadth of knowledge in the construction carbon reduction domain.

This research uses contingency theory and Venkatraman’s concept of moderating fit to explore how key project stakeholders (clients, consultants and suppliers) influence project performance from the perspective of small and medium contractors in the Jordanian construction industry.

An anonymous structured survey was performed comprising 200 key informants including senior project managers, construction managers, engineers and general managers working for small- and medium-sized contractors in the Jordanian construction industry. The Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM) was used to analyse the data.

The results of this study show that consultant-related factors (quality of documentation produced, ability to communicate and technical competencies) are perceived to have the most significant direct effect on project performance, followed by client-related factors (payment promptness, decision certainty and documentation control) and supplier-related factors (supplier performance, defects control and logistics management).

The results contribute new theoretical, empirical and practical insights to existing construction project performance research by highlighting the key performance factors which need to be managed for each stakeholder group to ensure effective project performance from a small- and medium-sized contractor perspective.

This study aims to reduce the construction safety accidents of prefabricated building (PB) projects, improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safety supervision by government departments, and provide theoretical reference for improving the safety supervision system of PB construction.

Considering the information asymmetry between government supervision departments and construction contractors and the interactive relationship between the two parties under bounded rationality, we propose an evolutionary game model for the construction safety dynamic supervision of PBs and analyze the evolutionary strategy of the game. The system dynamics (SD) method is used to simulate and analyze the evolutionary game process under a dynamic supervision strategy and the adjustment of external variables.

The cost difference between the government's strong and weak supervision, the construction contractor's additional expenditure for strengthening safety management, and other factors affect system stability. The government can dynamically adjust the penalties based on the construction contractor's subjective willingness to ignore safety management and further adjust their rate of change based on the completion of the supervision goals to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of construction safety supervision.

This study makes contributions in two areas. Through a combination of SD and an evolutionary game, it provides new insights into the strategic choice of the main body related to PB construction safety. Additionally, considering the nonlinear characteristics of construction safety supervision, it provides useful universal suggestions for PB construction safety.

Contractors of different scales, operating in different construction industries of varying institutional and economic settings, have different considerations when making bid or no-bid and mark-up decisions. Focusing on the large and medium-sized contractors in the Jilin province, China, the purpose of this study is to examine important factors affecting their decision to bid (d2b) and mark-up decisions and investigate differences between large and medium-sized contractors in evaluating the importance of the various factors affecting their d2b and mark-up decisions.

This study used a survey design for timely data collection from a large population. Contractors’ bidding attitudes was collected using an online survey questionnaire with a list of 40 key factors. Statistical analytical methods were applied for comparing the two groups of contractors.

The results of this study indicate that factors related to client conditions are most critical for both large and medium-sized contractors in their d2b and mark-up decisions. The results also show statistically significant differences between the two groups of contractors on a subset of factors affecting their d2b and mark-up decisions. The large contractors have placed more emphasis on projects' potential financial and strategic benefits. Another notable finding is that both groups of contractors have placed great emphasise on “government legislations” in their d2b and mark-up decisions.

These findings should be interpreted in consideration of several limitations. Firstly, the sample size is relatively small, and the focus was on a single province in the China construction industry. Next, this study only explores differences between large and medium-sized contractors in evaluating the importance of the various factors affecting their d2b and mark-up decisions.

Contractors could refer list of critical factors in competing for jobs in Jilin province or other provinces of similar institutional and economic settings. Construction clients, on the other hand, should consider the list of critical factors in the formulation of their competitive tendering procedures, thus enhancing the efficiency in their procurement of construction services.

Research on contractors’ bidding decision-making in the context of Chinese construction industry remains scarce; the research findings have implications for the industry stakeholders.

The study explored the disparity between construction clients and contractors on what constitutes “client satisfaction”. Such disparity is important because it can lead to different conclusions and thus disagreement on the assessment of project success.

The philosophical stance was interpretivism, thus the qualitative methodology was adopted. Employing purposive sampling, 30 interviews with clients and another 30 interviews with contractors were conducted in Saudi Arabia. The data obtained were evaluated by thematic analysis.

The results indicate differences in the consensus ad idem (meeting of the minds) between clients and contractors in terms of both their perceptions and prioritisation of the attributes that underpin client satisfaction. For example, some contractors thought that using advanced technologies was very important for client satisfaction, whereas some clients preferred the contractors to be honest with them.

The data collection was limited to Saudi Arabia and only the views of clients and contractors were studied, thereby limiting the generalisability of the findings.

The identification of the differing priorities of clients and contractors on client satisfaction provides an informed basis to make more concerted efforts to satisfy clients and minimise disputes on projects in Saudi Arabia.

The study contrasted the views of clients and contractors simultaneously on the subject matter of client satisfaction in relation to project success, and analysed this through the lens of consensus ad idem. The key influences on clients' satisfaction in Saudi Arabia are also presented.

The construction industry has long been criticized for unethical conduct. The owner usually manages the contractor's opportunistic behaviors by employing a professional supervisor, but there is a risk of covert collusion between the supervisor and contractor. Based on the principal–agent theory and collusion theory, this paper aims to investigate optimal collusion-proof incentive contracts.

This paper presents a game-theoretic framework comprising an owner, supervisor and contractor, who interact and pursue maximized self-profits. Built upon the fixed-price incentive contract, cost-reimbursement contract, and revenue-sharing contract, different collusion-proof incentive contracts are investigated. A real project case is used to validate the developed model and derived results.

This paper shows that the presence of unethical collusion undermines the owner's interests. Especially, the possibility of agent collusion may induce the owner to abandon extracting quality information from the supervisor. Furthermore, information asymmetry significantly affects the construction contract selection, and the application conditions for different incentive contracts are provided.

This study still has some limitations that deserve further exploration. First, this study explores contractor–supervisor collusion but ignores the possibility of the supervisor abusing authority to extort the contractor. Second, to focus on collusion, this paper ignores the supervision costs. What's the optimal supervision effort that the owner should induce the supervisor to exert? Finally, this paper assumes that the colluders involved always keep their promises. However, what if the colluders may break their promises?

Several collusion-proof incentive contracts are explored in a project management setting. The proposed incentive contracts can provide the project owner with effective and practical tools to inhibit covert collusion in construction management and thus safeguard construction project quality.

This study expands the organization collusion theory to the field of construction management and investigates the optimal collusion-proof incentive contracts. In addition, this study is the first to investigate the effects of information asymmetry on contract selection.

Innovation during project delivery is contested space. The aim in this research is to empirically explore the theory of this contested space and how project implementation can be optimized by the contractor to deliver better outcomes. It is hypothesized that project innovation has a proportional and measurable relationship to contractor success.

Based on a novel conceptual framework, this research applies a case study methodology to analyse 31 construction projects undertaken by a single Australian middle-tier contractor. Benefits from innovation are not often equitably shared. There are risks and rewards. The project innovation zone is defined as a combination of three key performance indicators – efficacy, efficiency and margin – merged into a single index that most likely shows evidence of “working smarter”.

Client–contractor project innovation (c2pi) is demonstrated to be strongly correlated with head contractor success (HCS), yielding an r² value of 71%. Innovative projects mostly show positive change in efficacy, efficiency and margin when comparing “planned” and “actual” outcomes. Across the cases studied, 35% demonstrated likely evidence of innovative delivery and 52% demonstrated evidence of success from the construction contractor's perspective.

These findings verify that, within the studied sample, the pursuit of innovation leads to projects that are likely to also have greater success for the head contractor, evidenced by the mix of five critical success factors: finishing on schedule, making profit, and having less defects, less accidents and higher quality workmanship. These outcomes arguably also apply to sub-contractors, where the head contractor assumes the role of “client”.

This research aims to build a three-tiered driver system that entices contractor rule violations and explores the importance and the relationships among these drivers, hence providing theoretical support for the contractor rule violations governance.

A literature review based on fraud diamond theory identified drivers from Pressure, Opportunity, Rationalization and Capability that drive contractor rule violations. In the Chinese context, through feedback, discussion and analysis of semistructured interviews with ten experts, an improved three-tiered driver system was drafted. Based on this system, a survey was conducted and scored with experts to provide the data for this research. The decision-making trial and evaluation laboratory (DEMATEL) method was used to determine relationships and influences between factors, and the DEMATEL-based analytic network process method was used to weigh these factors.

This paper systematically studied the drivers of contractor rule violations, specifically, the results showed that pressure had an important driving effect across the driver system, and those five factors – poor cultural atmosphere, weak internal control, prior experience, moral disengagement and information asymmetry – had the most influence on contractor rule violations. The results also indicated the strong effect pressure has on enticing rule violations and revealed that culture atmosphere and internal company governance played crucial roles in the occurrence of rule violations.

This study provided construction practitioners with a robust tool to analyze the drivers of contractor rule violations. The rule violation drivers in the construction practice scenes identified in this study can provide more direct and effective violation-related guidance for contractors, regulators and the industry.

Based on the new perspective of fraud diamond, this paper systematically bulit a three-tiered driver system combining theory with practice. This study contributed to understand the driver mechanism of contractor rule violations especially the importance of internal factors of contractors, which provided theory reference for compliance governance of construction industry.

Small and medium-sized contractors are critical to micro and macroeconomic performance. These contractors in South Africa have long been confronted with the problem of business failure because of a plethora of factors, including poor productivity. The purpose of this study is to investigate salient issues undermining the productivity of small and medium-sized contractors in South Africa. This study proposes alternative possibilities to engender productivity improvement.

Qualitative data were collected using semi-structured interviews with 15 contractors in Gauteng Province, South Africa. The research data were analysed using content and causal layered analyses.

Challenges to contractors’ productivity were associated with inadequately skilled workers, management competence and political factors. Skills development, construction business and political factors were dominant stakeholders’ perceptions. Metaphors for construction labour productivity are presented and reconstructed as alternative directions for productivity improvement.

Contractors lose a substantial amount of South African Rand to poor productivity. Alternative directions provided in this study can be leveraged to increase profitability in construction organizations, enhance the social well-being of South Africans and ultimately improve the contribution of contractors to the South African economy.

The causal layered analysis (CLA) applied in this study is novel to construction labour productivity research. The four connected layers of CLA, which make a greater depth of inquiry possible, were explored to investigate labour productivity in construction organizations.

In Bangladesh (BD), delays in infrastructure are common. Many previous studies have explored the causes of infrastructure delays. However, this study investigated the causes of delays by taking responses from the stakeholders who are responsible for planning, design, funding, approval and implementation. There are few studies that have related infrastructure project delays to heterogeneity in stakeholders’ perceptions.

A structural equation (SE) model is developed with 350 normally distributed data points to understand the heterogeneity in stakeholders’ perceptions regarding delays in infrastructure projects in BD. Additionally, the relative importance index (RII) approach is used to assess the responses, validating the SE model.

The study finds that among the three latent variables, “Project itself related delay” has more influence on delays in infrastructure projects. Among the observed variables under the “project itself related delay” latent variable, “DPP approval process” has the most significance. From the heterogeneity analysis, the study found differences in responses among the stakeholders from “the Engineering Department,” “the Planning Office” and “the Construction Firm/Industry.” An important class of stakeholders believes that their stage is not being delayed and that other stages require attention.

The data sample is 350. More data can improve the accuracy of the findings. Most of the respondents are civil engineers (74%) and represent the owner of the project. Sample data from more stakeholders’ will enhance the accuracy of the result.

This study addresses the requirements of Bangladeshi project stakeholders and how their interactions cause delays in projects. Furthermore, the opinions of other stakeholders are taken into consideration when determining the specific factors of individual stakeholders that are causing delays. Practically, the distance between stakeholders should be reduced. A project manager can play a role in this regard. Initiatives should be taken on how to complete the project quickly by eliminating the requirements discussed among the stakeholders and bureaucratic complications. Instead of placing blame on one another, stakeholders should take the initiative to figure out how to work together to finish the project on schedule. The Planning Commission’s approval of the Development Project Proposal (DPP) and Revised Development Project Proposal (RDPP) should be obtained as soon as possible by owner stakeholders. In order to avoid frequently changing the DPP, owners should also exercise greater caution when choosing contractors. Contractor stakeholders should use efficient and proper manpower and equipment so that unexpected delays are not created during the execution of work. Since the role of the contractor stakeholder is the most important among the three types of stakeholders, the contractor should raise awareness and urge the owners to get the RDPP approved quickly.

The findings from the study can help mitigate delays in infrastructure projects in BD, taking into account the perceptions of various stakeholders.