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The purpose of this paper is to explore and evaluate the current legal position on the admissibility and exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in money laundering cases.

A thorough exploratory analytical analysis signifies that such illegally obtained evidence from money laundering offences is admissible, provided it does not undermine the administration of justice or the right to a fair trial.

By virtue of the lack of written or codified rules governing the admissibility and exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in cases involving money laundering, the rule of admissibility remains the primary foundational principle for the governance of the admissibility and exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in money laundering cases.

The Malaysian Criminal Justice System has historically relied on the long-standing admissibility principles to admit and exclude illegally obtained evidence. For decades, courts have used their discretion to admit illegally obtained evidence based on the relevancy test, and they have further demonstrated to use the same discretion to exclude gravely prejudicial evidence. Evidence obtained illegally but if relevant to the matter in issue is deemed admissible. Evidence derived from an act associated with unlawful activities or a predicate offence in money laundering may be obtained illegally, which may influence the prosecution case and conversely, defend the accused’s rights to a fair trial.

This paper aims to fill gap in the literature and explore policy options for resolving the problems of accountability by framing three research questions. The research questions are (i) whether certain elements of Scott’s (2014) institutional pillars attenuate (accentuate) corporate and public accountability; (ii) whether the presence of ruling party-affiliated enterprises (RPAEs) create an increase (decrease) in the degree of corporate (public) accountability; and (iii) whether there is a particular form of ownership change that transforms RPAEs into public investment companies.

Using a qualitative research methodology that involves term frequency and thematic analysis of publicly available textual information, the paper examines Mechkova et al.’s (2019 forms of government accountability. The paper analyzes the gaps between the de jure and de facto accountability using the institutional pillars framework.

The findings of the paper are three. First, there are gaps between de jure and de facto in all three (vertical, horizontal and diagonal) forms of government (public) accountability. Second, the study finds that more than three fourth of the parties that contested the June 2021 election did have regional focus. They did not advocate for accountability. Third, Ethiopia’s RPAEs are unique. They have regional focus and are characterized by severe forms of agency and information asymmetry problems.

The main limitation of the paper is its exploratory nature. Extending this research by using cross-country data could provide a more complete picture of the link between corporate (public) accountability and a country’s institutional pillars.

Academic research documents that instilling modern corporate (public) governance standards in the Sub Sahara Africa (SSA) region has shown mixed results. The analysis made in this paper is likely to inform researchers and policymakers about the type of change that leads to better corporate (and public) accountability outcomes.

The institutional change proposed in the paper is likely to advance the public interest by mitigating agency and information asymmetry problems and enhancing government accountability. The changes make the enterprises investable, save scarce jobs, enhance diversity and put the assets in RPAEs to better use.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper that uses the institutional pillars analytical framework to examine an SSA country's corporate (public) accountability problem. It demonstrates that accountability is a domestic and a (novel) traveling theory. The paper identifies the complexity of resolving the interlock between political institutions and business enterprises. It theorizes that it is impossible to instill modern corporate (public) accountability standards without changing regulatory, normative and cultural cognitive pillars of institutions. The paper contributes to the change management and public interest literature.