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Much ink has been spilled in recent years over the controversial topic of conscientious objection in health care. In particular, commentators have proposed various ways with which we might distinguish legitimate conscience claims from those that are poorly reasoned or based on prejudice. The aim of this chapter is to argue in favor of the “reasonableness” approach to conscientious objection, viz., the view that we should develop an account of “reasonableness” and “reasonable disagreement” and use this as a way of distinguishing licit and illicit conscience claims. The author discusses Rawls’ account of “reasonableness” and “reasonable disagreement,” and consider how this might guide us in regulating conscientious objection in health care. The author analyzes the “public reason” account offered in Card (2007, 2014), and argue that we should modify Card’s account to include a consensus among regulators about what counts as “basic medical care.” The author suggests that Medical Conscientious Objection Review boards should consider whether conscience-based refusals are based on defensible ethical foundations.

Healthcare practitioners, according to legislations in most Western countries, may refuse to perform some medical activities that conflict with their moral and religious values. The Roman Catholic Church has declared in official documents that doctors should not perform or facilitate activities considered immoral such as abortion and euthanasia. The goal of this paper is to suggest new options for regulating conscientious objection of Roman Catholic healthcare practitioners.

Force Structure is an important aspect of the PMMM and helps define the nature of civil–military relations. It is in the realm of conscription that the dimension of force structure finds particular relevance in the Taiwan context. Moreover, while there have been military restructuring projects and programs that have made detailed changes one way or the other, the big picture remains: Taiwan’s is a conscript-based military. Therefore, it is this aspect of force structure wherein the importance of public perception lies, and the results of this research show that attitudes toward military conscription are impacted significantly by self-identification, with the vast majority wanting the ROC government to keep conscription, rather than moving forward with the All-Volunteer Force transformation. In terms of the attitudes toward conscientious objection, results show that the younger a respondent is, the more they support conscientious objection. Moreover, the more supportive a respondent is to women serving in the military, the more they support conscientious objection. Taken together, this would seem to indicate that citizens, especially young people, regard the matter of military service as a choice that should be made by the individual in question – either male or female. Given the fact of conscription, persons with a valid reason for conscientiously objecting should not be forced to serve, or punished if they refuse to do so. Thus it seems that people recognize a need for conscription, whether as a means to promote good citizenship habits among young men, or because of the China threat, but that opting out of such a system should be accommodated.

The purpose of this paper is to determine the appropriate legal balance and framework whereby issues of health care, patient access and rights of conscience can be best accommodated.

A review of existing case law, statutes and conscience clauses as applied to the philosophical debate surrounding conscience in health care.

Freedom of conscience is strongly anchored in British law and policy. Practice within the health care industry, however, has been slow and resistant to rights of conscience. Respecting the right of health care workers to exercise that right, benefits the health care industry at large, and patients themselves.

This debate, particularly since the so-called “Scottish mid-wives case” and the recent General Pharmaceutical Council consultation on religion and personal values, has come to the forefront of bio-ethical discourse in recent months. As such, this treatment provides a valuable legal tool to answering the various positions involved in the debate.

This study is aimed at assessing the ROC military using the PMMM according to the perceptions of the citizens of Taiwan. The patterns that can be detected in Taiwan’s military show that it paradoxically spans three distinct stages: the modern, late modern, and postmodern. Taiwan’s is a modern military in terms of perceived threat, force structure, major mission definition, and civilian employees. It can be regarded as more of a late-modern model in the dimensions of dominant military professional, public attitude, and women’s role. Lastly, it achieves a postmodern designation as regards the role of spouses, homosexuals, conscientious objection, and media relations. In all, this paints a picture of a fractured military culture: one between two worlds. This should not be surprising: to many in Taiwan, Taiwan itself is a fractured culture, seeking to define its identity, and find its place in the world, and in history. In the dimensions in which Taiwan rates as a modern military, we can see this is driven by external factors. The geopolitical scenario in which the nation finds itself, that is, under threat of invasion by a numerically and technologically superior foe, is very much a pre-Cold War scenario. It exhibits a late-modern model in the dimensions of public attitude and women’s role, and a postmodern model when it comes to the role of spouses, homosexuals, conscientious objection, and media relations – all factors that are related primarily to how the military interacts with the society it protects. Thus, we have a bifurcated profile. The ROC military must, as it does, focus on a modern-era threat perception, just as it must, as it does, focus on a postmodern-era approach to women and homosexuals in the military.

In order to succeed in an action under the Equal Pay Act 1970, should the woman and the man be employed by the same employer on like work at the same time or would the woman still be covered by the Act if she were employed on like work in succession to the man? This is the question which had to be solved in Macarthys Ltd v. Smith. Unfortunately it was not. Their Lordships interpreted the relevant section in different ways and since Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome was also subject to different interpretations, the case has been referred to the European Court of Justice.

Slovenian society was historically very ambivalent towards the military. In former Yugoslavia (1945–1991) many people understood the military as the socialising agent, the organisation that would help their sons to grow up, and as provider of social assistance in cases of natural catastrophes. The role of defence of the homeland was perceived as legitimate task of the military, but the expectation of foreign military threat was gradually decreasing, especially in 1980s. The prioritisation of national security function of the military has been changed into expectations of more civilianised and liberal armed forces. The Yugoslav policy of active participation in non-alignment movement helped people to believe that they live in a neutral country without foreign enemies. The perception of low military threat in public and on the other side very tough and enemies-searching former Yugoslav military elites caused tensions between Slovenian civil society and Yugoslav military elites. The associations of civil society asked for recognition of conscientious objection, which was not permitted in former Yugoslav military until mid-eighties. Even then, the status of conscientious objectors was given to religious believers only, and they had to serve the military duty within the military, without arms. The citizens’ movements asked for use of mother tongue for conscripts in the army, while the military pushed forward one of the Yugoslav official languages, the Serbian one. In 1991, Slovenian decision to gain independence, caused an armed conflict with former Yugoslav army in June–July 1991, and in 1992, Slovenia was a internationally recognised sovereign state.

Slovenian society was historically very ambivalent towards the military. In former Yugoslavia many people understood the military as the socialising agent, the organisation that would help their sons to grow up, and as provider of help in cases of natural catastrophes. The role of defence of the homeland was perceived as a legitimate task of the military, but the expectation of a foreign military threat was gradually decreasing. The Yugoslav policy of active participation in the non-alignment movement helped people to believe that they lived in a neutral country, in a country without foreign enemies. The perception of a low military threat in the public clashed with the very tough enemy-searching of the former Yugoslav military. This caused tensions between Slovenian civil society and Yugoslav military elites. The associations of civil society asked for recognition of conscientious objection, which was not permitted in former Yugoslavia until the mid-1980s. Even then, the status of conscientious objectors was given to religious believers only, and they had to serve within the military without arms. In 1991, the Slovenian public verified its decades-old hypothesis that there is no enemy outside the country, but the biggest enemy is its own military. The war in Slovenia, although the decision to form an independent state was encouraged by Serb nationalism and the totalitarian perception of the Yugoslav Federation, was clearly a war between the Slovenian people, military, and police against the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army and not against other nations or republics of former Yugoslavia.

This chapter attempts to explore the convergence and divergence on perceptions of security issues by military professionals and civilians and then to portray its implications for civil–military relations in South Korea.

Since the 1990s, South Korea has experienced the development of political democracy and the improvement of the relationship between South Korea and North Korea. Although South Korea suffered from serious economic crisis in the late 1990s, it soon restored its economic basis to the earlier level. However, the country has become to encounter ideological cleavage and cultural diversity among people. Traditional views on national security and international relations, which were based on national consensus in the past, have been replaced by a new conception of diversification, heterogeneity, and even sharp opposition. Thus, we examine the consensus or dissension between military and civilian sectors on various issues related to national security, the role of the armed forces, and South–North relations.

This chapter reports that there are similarities on some issues (e.g., security situation assessment, attitudes toward neighbor countries, and trust in the military), while substantial differences are found on others (e.g., threats to national security, Korea–US relations, and threats from North Korea) between the military and the civilian society. These findings suggest that overall the views of military professionals are not so different from civilians on security issues in Korea even though divergences emerge on some other issues. This chapter concludes by stating that civilian society and the military are “different, but not separate.” This statement renders implications for civil–military relations in South Korea.