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This paper explores through Schumacher's perspective on ‘the proper use of land’: the reasons for, and the means and consequences of, monitoring soil condition in managing agricultural landscapes sustainably. This particular perspective illustrates its argument with soil monitoring initiatives operating at various scales within the global agricultural context. Schumacher's land management goals are health, beauty and permanence, yet productivity is the goal most land managers focus on. The chosen indicators for soil monitoring need to reflect these goals. Hence, the indicators of choice for monitoring soil condition are attributes that can be: easily measured, improve soil productivity or protect the soil. Often attributes that have intrinsic ‘beauty’ (value), maintain ‘health’ (function) in ecosystems and are difficult to measure are ignored as soil condition indicators. The usefulness of information gained through monitoring soil condition is to make decisions that will be relevant for varied audiences and at different points in the decision-making process.

For organizations to be effective, their employees need to rely upon each other even when they do not trust each other. One tool managers can use to promote trust-like behavior is monitoring. In this chapter, we report results from a laboratory study that describes the relationship between monitoring and trust behavior. We randomly and anonymously paired participants (n=210) with the same partner, and had them make 15 rounds of trust game decisions. We find predictable main effects (e.g. frequent monitoring increases trust behavior) as well as interesting strategic behavior. Specifically, we find that anticipated monitoring schemes (i.e. when participants know before they make a decision that they either will or will not be monitored) significantly increase trust behavior in monitored rounds, but decrease trust behavior overall. Participants in our study also reacted to information they learned about their counterpart differently as a function of whether or not monitoring was anticipated. Participants were less trusting when they observed trustworthy behavior in an anticipated monitoring period, than when they observed trustworthy behavior in an unanticipated monitoring period. In many cases, participants in our study systematically anticipated their counterpart's untrustworthy behavior. We discuss implication of these results for models of trust and offer managerial prescriptions.

Can market-based regulation based on consumer pressure and ‘independent monitoring’ serve as the basis for transnational corporation regulation? In an increasingly integrated global economy, many scholars and policy makers fear that mobile capital may force a ‘race to the bottom’; can independent non-governmental organizations and ethical consumers provide a counterweight to cost-cutting pressures? This paper compares three of the best known examples of transnational monitoring – the Sullivan Principles in South Africa, the Rugmark social labeling program in India, and the Commission for the Verification of Codes of Conduct's monitoring experiences in the apparel industry of Guatemala – to consider some common features of transnational monitoring.

Traditional agency theory assumes monitoring is good for the principal, but we investigate an unintended effect: diminishment of the agent’s preference for honesty. We hypothesize greater dishonest behavior in a monitored environment than in a non-monitored environment, when the agent has the opportunity to cheat outside the scope of monitoring. Relevant theories to explain such behavior are behavioral agency theory, where trust and reciprocity are thought to alter contractual outcomes, and the fraud-triangle theory, where the ability to rationalize deviant acts affects behavior. We utilize participants who have been acclimated to either a monitored or an unmonitored condition in an immediately preceding experiment and seamlessly continue that treatment. Within each of these conditions, participants perform a simple task with a performance-based monetary reward. Half self-report and can safely cheat, while the other half are verified; the difference between verified and self-reported scores is a proxy for dishonest reporting. As hypothesized, unmonitored individuals reciprocate with honest behavior, while monitored individuals tend toward dishonest behavior when the opportunity arises. Implications for fraud prevention are discussed.

This chapter examines the effect of mutual monitoring and the personality trait of need for achievement on subordinates’ budgetary-slack creation in a team-based environment. Experimental results show that the creation of budgetary slack is lower when mutual monitoring is present than when it is absent. The results also show that a two-way interaction between mutual monitoring and the personality trait of need for achievement affects subordinates’ budgetary-slack creation.

The authors investigate the joint effects of two environmental variables, performance-based pay (PBP) and performance monitoring (PM), on behavioral dishonesty in a setting where the controls subsequently are absent. In a laboratory study using 88 participants in a 2×2 experimental design, simulating a work environment, the authors manipulate the presence of PBP and PM. Once the participants are accustomed to their assigned work environment and have completed contractual tasks unrelated to the dishonesty experiment, the authors allow them to privately roll dice to determine the size of a bonus gift card. Dishonesty levels are inferred from differences between treatment groups in the prizes claimed. The authors find an interaction effect, where inferred dishonesty in the performance-based-pay group is higher than the fixed-pay group when there is no PM, but lower when there is PM. Although theory and existing literature did not lead us to hypothesize these exact results, they offer important insights into a complex relationship. By jointly examining the effects of worker contracts and workplace monitoring on dishonesty, this research extends the understanding of the potential consequences of formal controls. As the workplace grows more complex, employers increasingly rely on information provided by frontline employees and managers. Thus, unintended effects of managerial controls on honesty are an important topic in the business literature.

This study proposes targeted modernization of the Department of Defense (DoD's) Joint Forces Ammunition Logistics information system by implementing the optimized innovative information technology open architecture design and integrating Radio Frequency Identification Device data technologies and real-time optimization and control mechanisms as the critical technology components of the solution. The innovative information technology, which pursues the focused logistics, will be deployed in 36 months at the estimated cost of $568 million in constant dollars. We estimate that the Systems, Applications, Products (SAP)-based enterprise integration solution that the Army currently pursues will cost another $1.5 billion through the year 2014; however, it is unlikely to deliver the intended technical capabilities.

We present a model of organizational monitoring that integrates organizational justice and information privacy. Specifically, we adopt the position that the formation of invasiveness and unfairness attitudes is a goal-driven process. We employ cybernetic control theory and identity theory to describe how monitoring systems affect one's ability to maintain a positive self-concept. Monitoring provides a particularly powerful cue that directs attention to self-awareness. People draw on fairness and privacy relevant cues inherent in monitoring systems and embedded in monitoring environments (e.g., justice climate) to evaluate their identities. Discrepancies between actual and desired personal and social identities create distress, motivating employees to engage in behavioral self-regulation to counteract potentially threatening monitoring systems. Organizational threats to personal identity goals lead to increased invasiveness attitudes and a commitment to protect and enhance the self. Threats to social identity lead to increased unfairness attitudes and lowered commitment to one's organization. Implications for theory and research on monitoring, justice, and privacy are discussed along with practical implications.

Purpose – The chapter reports a laboratory emissions trading experiment with imperfect enforcement that introduces environmental framing as a treatment variable.

Methodology – The research uses the methodology of laboratory experimental economics. In the current design, subjects self-reported their “emissions” at the end of each trading period and were inspected probabilistically and fined when they underreported.

Findings – Transaction volume and compliance rates were significantly lower in the environmentally framed condition, compared to the more standard neutrally framed control.

Practical implications – The latter result suggests that environmental framing reduced subjects' incentives to honestly report “pollution” to the experimental “regulator.” As experimenters employ more “framed field experiments” outside the lab, it may be important to evaluate such pure framing effects in the lab if a main research goal is to compare lab and field experiment outcomes.

Originality/value – Experimental economics research rarely manipulates environmental framing as a treatment variable. The substantial impact of framing on subject behavior documented in this study highlights its importance, particularly in the presence of moral concerns such as honest reporting.