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The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides:

Since 1970 the British industrial relations system has been injected with an unprecedented volume of law relating to employment. We have had the Equal Pay Act, 1970 and Sex Discrimination Act, 1975 which have spawned an Equal Opportunities Commission; the Industrial Relations Act, 1971 was passed and subsequently repealed by the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974 (TULRA); the provisions of this latter act have been further buttressed by the Employment Protection Act, 1975 (EPA); dealing with a very much neglected area of industrial relations we have had the Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974; finally the Bullock Commission which was set up to inquire into the way worker directors could increase employee participation in industrial affairs reported to the Minister in February, 1977. The government have promised legislation on ‘industrial democracy’ sometime in 1977 or 1978.

The purpose of this Editorial is to outline the main functions of the UK industrial relations state agencies – the Certification Officer, the Central Arbitration Committee and The Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service.

The Editorial outlines the main functions of the UK industrial relations state agencies, explaining their history and roles.

The Editorial reveals detailed information about the main functions of the UK industrial relations state agencies.

The Editorial offers insights into the work of UK industrial relations state agencies.

Examines the history of the Commission on Industrial Relations (CIR) 1969‐74 ‐ its origins, organization and policies ‐ and then evaluates its contribution as an agent of reform in the context of the perceived problems of the 1960s and 1970s. Considers whether there are any lessons to be learnt for the future given the possibility of a Labour Government, developments in Europe and the 1995 TUC policy document Your Voice at Work. Despite the drastic changes in industrial relations and in the economic, political and social environment, the answer is in the affirmative. In particular, the importance of a new third‐party agency having an independent governing body like the CIR and not a representative body like the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS); in its workflow not being controlled by government; and in its decisions on recognition being legally enforceable.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the genesis, operation, and effects of a dispute resolution body known as the National Implementation Body (NIB). The NIB was established by employers, unions, and the State in Ireland and was active between 2000 and 2009. It recorded significant success in resolving major disputes. A distinctive feature of the NIB was its networked character: the body involved key employer and union leaders and senior public servants, who exerted informal pressure on the parties in dispute to reach a settlement either within the NIB process itself or in the State’s mainstream dispute resolution agencies.

The research draws on case studies of disputes and interviews with key members of the NIB.

The findings reveal how the NIB mobilized networks to resolve a series of major disputes that threatened to derail national pay agreements or cause significant economic disruption.

The chapter examines the operation of networked dispute resolution in detail and considers the wider implications of networked dispute resolution in both Continental European and other Anglo-American countries.

These are the sort of things one reads in the newspapers every day. The headlines reflect the problems of maintaining industrial peace. It is well recognised that industrial disputes have grown more serious during the last decade. We have no intention of trying to allocate blame. Our objective is to offer some suggestions on how industrial disputes can be resolved more efficiently and effectively than at present.

In attempting an examination of the contractual and normative concepts of the collective agreement, some ideas are tentatively put forward in the pages which follow hoping that they will stimulate the reader's mind and open areas for further discussion.

The general opinion in Britain at present is that the unions are not facing significant changes in management attitudes towards the institution of unionism. This view has been devised from surveys of relatively large‐sized plants in the manufacturing sector, an area of traditionally high levels of unionisation. It is argued that researchers in the UK may be looking in the wrong place or for the wrong signs in drawing this conclusion. Researchers may have been looking for substantial changes in management‐union relations rather than less obvious changes in terms of the power of existing institutions or of sustained opposition to new recognition agreements. Material relating to voluntary conciliation claims for recognition between 1976 and 1985 is examined, which shows a halving in the number of claims. Three recent studies in new towns all point to the high percentage of non‐union firms. A fall in union density can occur due to external contingencies, even in the absence of explicit management strategies of opposition to union organisation.