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To review the reported compliance levels of third round mutual evaluations with a view to determining any change or differences in compliance levels for Financial Action Task Force (FATF) member countries following the updating of FATF's Forty Recommendations in 2003 and the introduction of the Nine Special Recommendations relating to the financing of terrorism.

A comparison of pre‐ and post‐2003 compliance with the FATF's Forty Recommendations and Nine Special Recommendations is made using both self‐assessment and mutual assessment data.

There are significant differences in compliance levels pre and post 2003. Since, the FATF updated their Forty Recommendations in 2003 compliance with those Recommendations has declined. With regard to the Nine Special Recommendations which have not changed since their introduction there is a significant difference between self‐assessment compliance levels in 2003 and compliance determined using independent mutual evaluations, casting doubt on the value of self assessment.

In using an analytical approach it has been necessary to put numerical values on compliance levels used by the FATF. Given that these are very broad, substituting a single value for each compliance level will provide only a crude measure of compliance for comparisons to be made. The results should therefore be used as a guide to the ranking and compliance of countries rather than some exact measurement of compliance.

The value of self assessment by FATF members should be re‐evaluated.

Publication of the third round of FATF mutual evaluations provides an opportunity, not previously available, to analyse the compliance levels amongst FATF members.

To gauge the extent to which the global financial system is anti‐money laundering (AML)/countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) prepared by analysing and comparing the AML/CFT systems of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) members with countries belonging to regional AML organisations.

Mutual evaluation data of 16 FATF members and 21 non‐FATF countries is analysed and compared using Kruskal‐Wallis and paired‐t tests to determine similarities and differences across the two groups of countries.

AML/CFT systems of FATF members and non‐FATF countries are poor. The lack of compliance with global AML/CFT standards leaves so many holes in these countries' regulatory, financial, and legal systems that money laundering with or without any relationship to the financing of terrorism, would be relatively easy to achieve.

In using an analytical approach it has been necessary to put numerical values on compliance levels used by the FATF. Given that these are very broad, substituting a single value for each compliance level will provide only a crude measure of compliance for comparisons to be made. The results should therefore be used as a guide to the ranking and compliance of countries rather than some exact measurement of compliance.

There will need to be follow‐up visits to this round of mutual evaluations to evaluate country responses to their poor assessments.

Publication of mutual evaluations by the FATF and a number of regional bodies has enabled a comparison of AML/CFT systems from countries around the world. Lack of data has not enabled this to be done before.

This study aims to examine the impact of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis (GFC) on Australian firms' compliance with IFRS 36/AASB 136 for goodwill impairment testing. It also examines the factors associated with the cross-sectional variations in the compliance levels.

Based on a survey of disclosure notes in companies' annual reports, firm-level compliance scores were developed and further analysed applying quantitative statistical methods.

The findings suggest that firms' compliance has increased during the GFC compared to the PCP. There was no significant intra-period change in the compliance levels during the PCP. Firms belonging to goodwill intensive industries show greater compliance levels than firms in other industries. Audit quality is also a significant determinant of firms' compliance with IFRS for goodwill impairment testing. Goodwill intensity is a significant determinant of firms' compliance level during the GFC but not during the PCP. Firm size is associated with the compliance levels when the industry effects are not controlled for. When the industry effects are controlled for, the effect of size on firms' compliance levels disappears. Profitability is also associated with firms' compliance with IFRS for goodwill impairment testing. However, firms' leverage ratio is not significantly associated with compliance levels.

This is the first known study to examine the issue of compliance with IFRS for goodwill impairment testing in the context of the GFC and the PCP.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how well countries comply with global anti-money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regulations.

With the help of an AML/CFT compliance index composed by the author, this study is able to numerically quantify countries’ AML/CFT compliance levels. Countries were selected based on their membership with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), precisely members who have gone through at least one round mutual evaluation and have duly submitted a report to the task force. The AML/CFT index was composed by assigning numeric values to the individual country ratings across all 49 FATF recommendations contained in their mutual evaluation reports (MER).

Some notable findings include the yearly global level of AML/CFT compliance between the period 2004 and 2016, as well as compliance levels across continents for the same period. Compliance levels for the seven components of the FATF recommendations were also reported to help assess which set of recommendations countries comply with the most and why they do. It was also found that countries’ lack of compliance was as a result of high cost of compliance with FATF recommendations.

The main limitation of this study was a lack of high-frequency AML data of countries, especially less-developed countries.

The uniqueness of this paper lies in the fact that the AML/CFT compliance index constructed and used in the study is the first of its kind.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the level of compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS 7) by listed companies in Bahrain Bourse (BB).

First, the authors design disclosure compliance checklist of ten requirements of IFRS 7. Second, a score of 3 is assigned if high level of compliance, 2 is assigned if medium level of compliance, 1 is assigned if low level of compliance. The sample of the study comprises of (21) companies listed in BB for year 2013.

The main findings are, the level of compliance varied by industry and the highest level of compliance reported for the investment sector whereas the lowest for the insurance industry. This result indicates that all listed companies are complying with IFRS 7 in terms of the standard disclosure requirements.

In this paper attempt has been made to support the argument of previous studies. The paper attempts to test and answer the research question; does the financial sector in Bahrain comply with IFRS 7? These results could lead to high level of awareness about the financial instruments. Adoption of the IFRS 7 could lead to high level of compliance and play a significant role in attracting global investors’ interest to the local markets, especially in a developing country like Bahrain.

This paper provides an insight from the reality of the financial market in Bahrain as a result of answering this question; does the financial sector in Bahrain comply with IFRS 7?

Regulators can adjust penalties to compensate for incomplete monitoring of regulated parties that are subject to legal rules, but compensating penalty adjustments often are unavailable when regulated parties are subject to legal standards. Incomplete monitoring consequently invites greater noncompliance under standards than under rules. This chapter develops a model that quantifies some of the specific tradeoffs that regulators face in designing standards regimes under incomplete monitoring. The model also considers the extent to which suboptimal compliance due to incomplete monitoring is likely to result in deadweight loss in different settings.

The authors explore the level and determinants of compliance with Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institution’s (AAOIFI) financial and governance standards by Islamic banks (IBs).

The sample consists of 43 IBs across eight countries. The authors use ordinary least squares regression analyses to examine the impact of bank-specific characteristics and corporate governance (CG) mechanisms concerned with Board of Directors (BOD) and Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) on the levels of compliance with AAOIFI standards.

The paper finds that the average compliance level based on AAOIFI standards concerning the SSB is 68 per cent; corporate social responsibility (CSR) is 27 per cent; and presentation of financial statements (FSs) is 73 per cent. The aggregate disclosure based on the three indices is 56 per cent. The analysis also shows that size, existing Sharia-auditing department, age and CG of SSB are the main determinants of compliance levels.

The determinants of compliance with AAOIFI standards for IBs around the world have not been explored before, and therefore, this paper is the first of its kind to this issue.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of the characteristics of two corporate governance mechanisms, namely, board of directors and audit committee (hereafter AC), on the level of compliance with International Financial Reporting Standard [hereafter International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)] 7 “Financial instruments: Disclosures” (hereafter FID).

Using a self-constructed checklist of 128 items, this research measures the compliance with IFRS 7 of 63 Canadian financial institutions listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange during a period of three years (2014-2016). Fixed effect panel regressions have been used to capture the individual effect present in authors’ data.

Empirical results show that the mean compliance level with IFRS 7 requirements is about 77 per cent and identify various areas of non-compliance. This level of compliance has a positive linkage with the board size and independence. Similarly, the AC independence and financial accounting expertise are shown to positively affect authors’ dependent variable. Nevertheless, CEO/chairman duality, AC size and meeting frequency are not significantly correlated with the level of compliance with IFRS 7.

This study expands prior compliance literature in the Canadian setting by examining the determinants of compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosures. Also, and to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is among the first studies that have investigated the effect of corporate governance characteristics (hereafter CGC) on compliance with all IFRS 7 requirements in general.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the compliance level of Islamic banks with disclosure accounting standards in some Middle East and North African countries, and most importantly to analyse the factors associated with compliance.

This study uses a self-constructed checklist of 203 items to measure the compliance of 38 Islamic banks with disclosure accounting standards during the 2011-2013 period. A multivariate regression analysis is used to determine significant factors influencing the extent of this compliance.

The results show a wide variation in compliance levels among the disclosure accounting standards and reveal that compliance is positively related to the listing status, the existence of an audit committee, the bank’s age and the country of domicile.

This study analyses the compliance level with only disclosure accounting standards. It remains to future research to examine compliance with all Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions’ Financial Accounting Standards (AAOIFI FAS). Moreover, the explanatory power of the model remains modest. This connotes the existence of omitted variables that could be explored in future research.

The research contributes to the international financial accounting literature about the banking industry. The results are relevant for researchers, accounting professionals, stakeholders, standard-setters and regulatory bodies that are concerned with Islamic banks’ disclosures.

Although AAOIFI was established since 1991, very few empirical studies about compliance with the FAS have been undertaken. To the authors’ knowledge, there are no studies that investigated the determinants of compliance level with AAOIFI FAS. Then, this study concentrates on disclosure accounting standards (FAS 1 and FAS 5) with a high risk of non-compliance.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of specific Islamic banks’ (IBs) corporate governance (CG) mechanisms on compliance with the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions’ (AAOIFI) governance standards (GSs) disclosure requirements.

Using an unweighted governance compliance index, the authors measure the extent of IBs’ compliance with 7 AAOIFI GSs’ disclosure requirements over the period 2009–2015 (372 bank-year observations). In addition, a multivariate regression analysis was used to test the four hypotheses.

This study’s results report substantial non-compliance (the mean of compliance level with AAOIFI’s GSs over the covered years for the entire sampled IBs is 52.1%). The findings reveal that the Shariah Supervisory Board’s (SSB) remuneration, SSB’s members with only industry expertise, SSB’s members with the combined industry expertise and accounting and financial expertise, the existence of internal Shariah Auditing Department and the level of investment accounts holders’ funds are positively associated with the level of compliance with AAOIFI’s GSs.

The existing studies focusing on the determinants of compliance with AAOIFI’s standards are in the early research stage, as to the best of the authors’ knowledge, there is a paucity of empirical research testing this issue. The authors extend these studies by examining all the AAOIFI’s GSs and focusing on the specific IBs’ CG mechanisms. Furthermore, a major contribution of this study is the examination of the relationship between some SSB’s characteristics and compliance level. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first research that has examined the effect of the SSB’s remuneration and expertise on compliance level.