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This chapter focuses on policy intervention that has grown in popularity in the UK since the financial crisis of 2008. The focus is on inclusive growth and more specifically, community wealth building. The concept has been picked up by institutions and think tanks at multiple scales from the OECD to local government. We aim to address the tensions in community wealth building and in particular how local authorities in the UK are adjusting their procurements strategies to increase the tendering capabilities of SMEs in their political geography.

We introduce a UK-based study utilising an ESRC-funded case study, desktop research and semi-structured interviews to investigate how well the region of Greater Manchester (GM) ecosystem was equipped to prepare small firms to learn how to compete for public contracts with evidence applicable to other large-scale tenders.

Overall, at the time of writing business support across GM does not create the value proposition of enabling small firms to be capable at tendering and thus undermines community wealth building (CWB) efforts. The advice on offer is sparse; it offers partial or no advice about different capabilities and is often limited to simple guidance stating procurement rules and compliance demands. Information is often abstract and technical support is also fragmented, making it unlikely that small firms will find resources. Advice fails to engage with evidence on how small firms learn and to provide a learning process. In particular, support to raise absorptive capacity and strategic commitment to tendering, build basic tender readiness and develop and refresh tendering capability is not evident. Training, coaching and peer learning are largely absent.

UK appears to be an experimental ground for CWB with dedicated think tanks and several examples such as the ‘Preston Model’. GM is a suitably sized and comparable region to offer transferable knowledge and indicators to support regions to innovate. We offer a ‘Dashboard of Priorities’ to enhance business support to SMEs so they can win at tendering, thus strengthening CWB policy and impact. Furthermore, we are adding clarity to a fuzzy definition of CWB and define inclusive procurement. We assist global policymakers to answer the fundamental question; are we doing all that we can with these significant resources to create an economy which truly benefits the people? By examining the ideas of community wealth building and inclusive procurement from a local authority and SME perspective, we can extrapolate finings for international comparison and offer an in-depth look at how the execution of this policy can be strengthened to deliver maximum benefit to their communities. The implication is to focus attention on how institutions (public or private), by way of better execution, can enhance the economic resilience of their own local ecosystems/places.

This chapter is intended to provide the reader with information and insights on the transition or transformation from socialism to a market economy in what are generally termed the transition economies. This includes countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), sometimes referred to as the Former Soviet Union (FSU), the South East European (SEE) countries, sometimes referred to as the Balkans and the major socialist economy of Asia, China. The chapter covers the critical years of reform for most of these countries, from 1990 to 2000. Some transition economies started reforming earlier, such as China which has continued state-owned enterprise (SOE) reforms to the present time. Other transition countries, primarily the SEE economies, lagged due to the conflict which raged throughout most of the region and the period of isolation which followed, particularly for Serbia. China and Serbia are sui generis for a number of reasons. They will be referenced as examples in this chapter, but they will not form part of the core statistical and data analysis.

An important aspect of good governance is a well-managed government procurement system. This has a direct impact on the extent and quality of a country's infrastructure and the effectiveness of its public services. Two key principles underpin a well-managed procurement system: value for money from the goods, services, and public works, which are procured, and fair access to procurement opportunities. Arguably, competition and transparency in the procurement process are necessary conditions for both. Yet despite this, most of the states of Southeast Asia have been reluctant to create an openly competitive and transparent government procurement system. This has been in part reflected in the fact that none them have become signatories to the WTO's Government Procurement Agreement of 1994 with the notable exception of Singapore. This Agreement seeks to promote international access to the government procurement market in goods, services, and public works by mandating open competition and transparent procedures.

Russia's size – both in terms of population and geography, spanning 11 time zones, 89 oblasts (states or regions) and autonomous republics and its privatization program, encompassing some 100,000 small-scale enterprises, 25,000 medium to large firms, and 300 or so of its largest firms, made its privatization program the largest sale/transfer of assets conducted among the transition economies, with the possible exception of China. Comparisons by many of the program's critics, and there are many, to Poland, Hungary, or the Czech republic are invidious, especially the latter two countries whose populations are similar to just that of greater Moscow.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the procurement of public–private partnerships (PPPs) through unsolicited proposals (USPs). This chapter compares the policy framework and economic data of USPs in Brazil and Chile and provides some economic insights based on this analysis. In line with the existing literature, empirical evidence shows that non-proponents rarely win the tender for a project based on a USP. Differently from the existing literature, data analysis suggests that USPs may result on successful projects only in very specific conditions. USPs may work better in sectors where the government has developed higher in-house expertise to manage infrastructure projects. Also, USPs are more fit to projects that are clearly economically viable ex ante. However, even in these cases, USPs might generate a higher transaction cost to the government and less competitive tenders in comparison to solicited proposals. The analysis focuses on countries that have a very rich experience in USPs. Nonetheless, given the different legal and regulatory environments around the globe, it is difficult to provide a one-size fits-all USP policy. This chapter aims to provide some insights into how to manage a USP in order to improve the public policy framework of this procurement tool. This chapter contributes to the literature as it provides an economic analysis of the conditions in which the USP mechanism could result in a successful project.

In theory, the method employed to transfer ownership from public to private hands is a secondary concern. But when the legal-institutional environment is weak, the method of sale matters greatly. The experiences of the transition economies have taught us that different forms of sales methods produce very different types of owners, who vary greatly in their commitment to, and ability to carry out restructuring (meaning the changes required to allow the firm to survive in a competitive market setting). The method of privatization is thus an important factor in determining¹ an efficient allocation of ownership rights.

This chapter examines the way corruption in the public procurement of goods, services, and public works has been commonplace in Southeast Asian states over many years (with the exception of Singapore), and considers the measures taken to combat such practices. It also examines why so often those efforts have not been fully effective. Three reasons are given to explain these failings. These are the following: (a) elite capture of the procurement process by influential politicians, business leaders and senior bureaucrats; (b) the informal bureaucracy in the procuring agencies which allowed corrupt practices to be followed; and (c) lack of political will to enforce measures to combat corruption