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This chapter tells the story of how the concept of Pareto efficiency was shipped from Lausanne to the modern US theory of competitive general equilibrium, focusing on the specific role of Maurice Allais. It identifies similarities in both epistemological approach and theoretical achievements realized first by Pareto, then by Allais, and finally by Debreu and Arrow and Hahn. It also shows that these similarities are not casual, since historical circumstances account for the influence of Pareto on Allais and later of Allais on Arrow and Debreu.

This paper applies a volume-price probability wave differential equation to propose a conceptual theory and has innovative behavioral interpretations of intraday dynamic market equilibrium price, in which traders' momentum, reversal and interactive behaviors play roles.

The authors select intraday cumulative trading volume distribution over price as revealed preferences. An equilibrium price is a price at which the corresponding cumulative trading volume achieves the maximum value. Based on the existence of the equilibrium in social finance, the authors propose a testable interacting traders' preference hypothesis without imposing the invariance criterion of rational choices. Interactively coherent preferences signify the choices subject to interactive invariance over price.

The authors find that interactive trading choices generate a constant frequency over price and intraday dynamic market equilibrium in a tug-of-war between momentum and reversal traders. The authors explain the market equilibrium through interactive, momentum and reversal traders. The intelligent interactive trading preferences are coherent and account for local dynamic market equilibrium, holistic dynamic market disequilibrium and the nonlinear and non-monotone V-shaped probability of selling over profit (BH curves).

The authors will understand investors' behaviors and dynamic markets through more empirical execution in the future, suggesting a unified theory available in social finance.

The authors can apply the subjects' intelligent behaviors to artificial intelligence (AI), deep learning and financial technology.

Understanding the behavior of interacting individuals or units will help social risk management beyond the frontiers of the financial market, such as governance in an organization, social violence in a country and COVID-19 pandemics worldwide.

It uncovers subjects' intelligent interactively trading behaviors.

The purpose of this study is to explore the coopetition relationships between platform owners and complementors in complementary product markets. Drawing on the coopetition theory, the authors examined the evolutionary trends of the coopetition relationships between platform owners and complementors and explore the main influence factors.

The authors used Lotka–Volterra model to analyze the coopetition relationship between platform owners and complementors, including the evolutionary trends as well as the results. Considering the feasibility of sample data collection, simulation is used to verify the effects of different factors on the evolution of coopetition relationships.

The results show that there are four possible results of the competition in the complementary products market. That comprises “winner-take-all for platform owners,” “winner-take-all for complementors,” “stable competitive coexistence” and “unstable competitive coexistence,” where “stable competitive coexistence” is the optimal evolutionary state. Moreover, the results of competitive evolution are determined by innovation subjects’ interaction parameters. However, the natural growth rate, the initial market benefits of the two innovators and the overall benefits of the complementary product markets influence the time to reach a steady state.

The study provides new insights into the entry of platform owners into complementary markets, and the findings highlight the fact that in complementary product markets, platform owners and complementors should seek “competitive coexistence” rather than “winner-takes-all.” Moreover, the authors also enrich the coopetition theory by revealing the core factors that influence the evolution of coopetition relationships, which further enhance the analysis of the evolutionary process of coopetition relationships.

Industry practice has shown that technology licensing has an important effect on the R&D cooperation between firms. Different licensing methods will significantly impact a supply chain member's cooperative and price R&D decisions. However, there is scant literature investigating the decision on technology licensing and its impact on a supply chain member's price and cooperative R&D decisions. To address this gap, the authors investigate the R&D cooperation and the technology licensing in a supply chain formed of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM), a contract manufacturer (CM), and a third-party manufacturer which will compete with the OEM when the technology licensing occurs.

The authors investigate two licensing patterns, royalty licensing, fixed fee licensing together with the no licensing, within the R&D cooperative supply chain by developing two three-stage and a two-stage Stackelberg models.

Compare to the no licensing strategy, technology licensing always benefits to the OEM and the society especially when the technology efficiency and the brand power of the third-party manufacturer are more significant; the royalty licensing benefits to the OEM more when the technology efficiency and the brand power of the third-party manufacturer are higher; the fixed fee licensing benefits to the OEM more when the technology efficiency and the brand power of the third-party manufacturer are lower.

The royalty licensing is more effective for mitigating price competition intensity and helping firms to maintain higher sales margins; the fixed fee licensing induces firms' lower sales margins but increases the firms' sales quantities; in most cases, the fixed fee licensing is optimal from the perspectives of consumer and society, however, the CM's investment intention to the R&D technology with the fixed fee licensing is lower.

So far, different licensing models under the R&D cooperation have not been investigated, and the authors propose two three-stage Stackelberg models with considering the competition caused by technology licensing under the R&D cooperation to deal with the cooperative R&D and technology licensing issues.

The purpose of this study is to explore the evolutionary path and stable strategy for the competitive dissemination between disinformation and knowledge on social media to provide effective solutions to curb the dissemination of disinformation and promote the spread of knowledge.

Based on the social capital (SC) theory, the benefit matrix is constructed and an evolutional game model is established in this paper. Through model solving and Matrix Laboratory (MATLAB) simulation, the factors that influence disinformation-believing users (DUs) and knowledge-believing users (KUs) to choose different strategies are analyzed.

The initial dissemination willingness, the disinformation infection probability, the knowledge infection probability and the knowledge penetration probability are proved to be crucial factors influencing the game equilibrium in the competitive dissemination process of disinformation and knowledge. Moreover, some countermeasures and recommendations for the governance of disinformation are proposed.

Currently most research interest lies in the disinformation dissemination model but ignores the interaction between disinformation and knowledge in the diffusion process. This study reveals the dynamic mechanism of social media users disseminating disinformation and knowledge and is expected to promote the formation of cleaner cyberspace.

This paper gives a model of collusion formation and a method of measuring the degree of it among the traders/bidders in the agricultural commodity markets in India. The important assumption is that the bidding is repetitive with a set of common bidders. The theory has been derived based on the behavior of the wholesale market of agricultural commodities in India. The paper is based on full information in the collusion formation. The paper first derives the theoretical structure of the bidders' behavior and thereafter derives a measure of collusion formation with the help of real-life data.

The paper used the standard theory of optimization and the theory of auction and probability statistics.

This is a complete information model of cartel formation. The bidding is repetitive and continues forever in discrete time. Hence bidders behavior is observable. Using the proposed method, if the APMC measures for each market and publishes on a periodic basis, say weekly basis, then it will be easier to break the collusion in the market where relative collision is present. For example, if a farmer has three options to sell in three different markets, then the published data would help them to select the market where the degree of collusion is relatively lower. Moreover, the undesirable loss can be avoided based on the right choice of market. As a result, transaction costs will be optima.

The paper first derives the theoretical structure of the bidders' behavior and thereafter derives a measure of collusion formation with the help of real-life data.

This paper aims to examine the optimal sourcing strategies and pricing decisions of competing toy manufacturers and to discuss how manufacturers’ decisions are impacted by competition.

The authors consider a single-period model to characterise the competition between two competing toy manufacturers. Both of them are free to choose between virgin material and recycled material. The authors consider two types of consumers: sensitive consumers who are concerned about product safety and prefer the toy made of virgin material and insensitive consumers who do not care what material is used in the toy. The competing manufacturers play a Cournot competition.

The results reveal a special case of a win-win situation for both the manufacturer and the consumer. In addition, an increasing number of sensitive consumers does not always raise the price of virgin-material toys.

The authors derive the manufacturer’s equilibrium sourcing strategies, corresponding market-clearing prices and profits obtained.

The paper investigates how toy manufacturers’ optimal sourcing strategies are impacted by competition, considering market segments.

Our result of this paper aims to indicate that the beta pricing formula could be applied in a long-term model setting as well.

In this paper, we show that the capital asset pricing model can be derived from a three-period general equilibrium model.

We show that our extended model yields a Pareto efficient outcome.

The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) model can be used for pricing long-lived assets.

Long-term modelling and sustainability can be modelled in our setting.

Our results were only known for two periods. The extension to 3 periods opens up a large scope of applicational possibilities in asset pricing, behavioural analysis and long-term efficiency.

In demand-driven markets, customer value, sometimes called perceived use value or consumer surplus, is defined by the customer rather than the firm. The value a firm can appropriate, its profits, is driven by the customer’s willingness to pay for the value they receive, adjusted by costs. This paper introduces a conceptual framework that helps understand value creation and appropriation in demand-driven markets and shows how to influence them through strategic decision-making.

This paper uses an axiomatic approach combined with an extended analytical formulation of the jobs-to-be-done framework to contextualise demand-driven markets. It mathematically derives implications for managerial decision-making concerning selecting customer segments, optimising customer value creation and maximising firm value appropriation in a competitive environment.

Rooting strategic decision-making in the jobs-to-be-done framework allows distinguishing between what customers want to achieve (goal), what product attributes need to be satisfied (opportunity space/constraints) and what value creation criteria related to features are important (utility function). This paper shows that starting from a job-to-be-done, the problem of identifying which customer segments to serve, what product to offer and what price to charge, can be formulated as an optimisation problem that simultaneously (rather than sequentially) solves for the three decision variables, customer segments, product features and price, by maximising the value that a firm can appropriate, subject to maximising customer value creation and constrained by the competitive environment.

Applying the derived results to simultaneously deciding which customer segments to target, what product features to offer and what price to charge, given a set of competing products, allows managers to increase their chances of winning the competitive game.

This paper shows that starting from a job-to-be-done and simultaneously focusing on customers, product features, price and competitors enhances firm profitability. Strategic decision-making is formulated as an optimisation problem based on an axiomatic approach contextualising demand-driven markets.

Effective agricultural product price regulation policies depend on market integration and the degree of symmetry in the transmission of agricultural product price signals. This study analyzes the transmission and asymmetry of the price series between the Ouagadougou consumer market and assembly markets considering three primary cereal products in Burkina Faso.

This study applies the nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL) econometric model, which is an asymmetric extension of the ARDL cointegration model. The price series examined covers the period extending from January 2005 to December 2020.

Our analysis provides novel insights regarding short- and long-term asymmetric effects in the transmission of price signals between assembly markets and the consumer market. We also determine that the effects of negative shocks are more persistent than those of positive shocks in several markets.

For markets that exhibit symmetrical responses of assembly market prices to consumer market prices, the results could reflect the continuous efforts of market players, particularly the government, to eliminate market failures and ensure the long-term efficiency of cereal markets. To this end, an agricultural market information system can have a crucial role in easing information access for all market players.

This study provides new evidence regarding the nature of the transmission and asymmetry of price information on primary cereal products in the largest markets in Burkina Faso. Applying the NARDL model makes it possible to simultaneously estimate short- and long-term asymmetry.