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This paper analyzes the welfare implications of price regulation in competitive market structures. The analysis is performed in a general equilibrium framework where individuals are producers of the goods they consume. These produced goods in the economy are designated as good A, good B, and q, which represents quality per unit of A. The first half of the paper is devoted to the competitive equilibrium and the effects of price regulation on product quality. The second half of the paper analyzes the welfare effects of price regulation when the economy consists of both non‐identical and identical consumers. It is shown that regulation may be a Pareto superior move in the absence of a market and price for quality.

A serious problem in the pandemic days is that in this period many firms face difficulties with remaining on the market. It causes that the entrepreneurs do not undertake activities which could result in introducing innovations. In this context, the authors examine new mechanisms which lead competitive economy to the long-run equilibrium under the assumption that producers are change-averse.

The results have the form of theorems with rigorous proofs and provide the ideas on the way of developing the economic policy in respect of firms in the pandemic days.

As a result, the authors justify that in some cases it is worth leading an economic sector or a whole economy to the long-run equilibrium state.

The authors show that there exists a mechanism in the sense of Hurwicz which transforms the economy into an economic system being in the long-run equilibrium as well as the authors determine optimal mechanisms, under the criterion of distance minimization, in some subsets of the mechanisms designed.

In 1933 two books on competitive structure were published. One, extracted from a Harvard PhD filed six years earlier, dealt with the workings of the competitive process. Seeking not to supplant, but to supplement Marshall, this book by E. H. Chamberlin focused on an effort involving the use of a diagrammatic apparatus to highlight certain fundamental relationships between variables in the competitive process. It did not analyse real firms but nor did it attempt to pretend that such were irrelevant, and to concentrate on positions of competitive equilibrium only. It dealt with problems of arrival at equilibrium, false trading, and a whole variety of issues relevant to an actual competitive process. Supervised by Allyn Young, it drew on a wide range of references and showed evidence of the kind of thorough scholarly preparation which has always been characteristic of the best American PhDs.

This study aims to introduce an education sector which transforms a part of unskilled labour into new skilled labour, and then show how the level of output of educational service is determined in the short-run equilibrium along with the level of output of two production sectors. This study also introduces intertemporal dynamics into the model assuming that all factor endowments grow over time, and then show how a strong anti-immigration policy in the destination country affects the long-run equilibrium of the source country.

This study considers a three sector open economy model to analyse the long-run economic effects of the anti-immigration policy adopted in the destination country on the general equilibrium of the source country.

If the education sector in the source country is more skilled labour intensive than the advanced production sector, then this anti-immigration policy would raise the capital unskilled labour ratio, skilled labour–unskilled labour ratio and the balanced endogenous growth rate in the new long-run equilibrium but would lower the gross rate of creation of new skilled labour there.

The authors want to analyse the effect of anti-immigration policy adopted in the destination country on the long-run balanced growth rate in the source country. The dynamic growth effect of anti-immigration policy cannot be studied in a static short-run equilibrium model, the authors also introduce intertemporal dynamics into the model assuming that all factor endowments grow over time and then show how a strong anti-immigration policy in the destination country affects the long-run equilibrium of the source country.

In 1933, Edward H. Chamberlin published the Theory of Monopolistic Competition (1962). The work, based upon a dissertation submitted for a PhD degree in Harvard University in 1927 and awarded the David A. Wells prize for 1927–28, has since become a milestone in the development of economic thought. Its impact on industrial organisation theory, general equilibrium and welfare economics, international trade theory and, to a greater or lesser degree, all other branches of economic analysis, has been pervasive and enduring. The ideas set out in the book have been developed, expanded and refined in ways too numerous to be identified precisely, and the books and articles which take Chamberlin's contribution as a starting point arguably exceed in number those on any other single subject in the lexicon of economics.

The research in competitive facility location (CFL) is quite dynamic, both from a problem formulation and an algorithmic point of view. Research direction has changed immensely over the years to address various competitive challenges. This study aims to explore CFL literature to highlight these research trends, important issues and future research opportunities.

This study utilises the Scopus database to search for related CFL models and adopts a five-step systematic approach for the review process. The five steps involve (1) Article Identification and keyword selection, (2) Selection criteria, (3) Literature review, (4) Literature analysis and (5) Research studies.

The paper presents a comprehensive review of CFL modelling efforts from 1981 to 2021 to provide a depth study of the research evolution in this area. The published articles are classified based on multiple characteristics, including the type of problem, type of competition, game-theoretical approaches, customer behaviour, decision space, type of demand, number of facilities, capacity and budget limitations. The review also highlights the popular problem areas and dedicated research in the respective domain. In addition, a second classification is also provided based on solution methods adopted to solve various CFL models and real-world case studies.

The paper covers 40 years of CFL literature from the perspective of the problem area, CFL characteristics and the solution approach. Additionally, it introduces characteristics such as capacity limit and budget constraint for the first time for classification purposes.

While this paper concentrates on a set of pricing relations for a co‐operative enterprise under market conditions, the institutional‐instrumentalist approach to the study of cooperatives can be found to be elaborated in the literature. The emphasis in this article is on producer co‐operatives, which are also the types that have drawn considerable interest among labour economists and social economists in recent times, and have been exemplified in the Mondragon type co‐operatives as well as in the theory of profit and loss sharing in the Islamic economic literature.

Provides an empirically based discussion of the uncertainties faced by typical manufacturing firms and how they attempt to accommodate that uncertainty through increased manufacturing flexibility. Suggests a dynamic equilibrium model which helps to illustrate the trade‐offs and interrelationships between the manufacturing flexibility inherent in a firm′s processes and infrastructure, the uncertainties faced by the firm, and the way in which the firm′s processes and infrastructures are buffered with inventory, lead time, and capacity. In addition, suggests a set of auditing checklists which build on earlier work by Skinner. This process helps the firm to identify its relative position in terms of the dynamic equilibrium model and also to identify long‐term objectives for improving its competitiveness within the marketplace.

The paper includes characterizing Ramsey policy in a cash-in-advance monetary model, under flexible and sticky prices, and with different fiscal instruments.

The paper analytically and numerically characterizes the dynamic properties of Ramsey allocations. The author computes dynamics by solving second-order approximations to the Ramsey planner’s policy functions around a non-stochastic Ramsey steady state.

The Friedman rule is not mainly optimal in a cash-in-advance model with distorting taxes. The Ramsey-optimal policy with both taxes on income and consumption calls for a high inflation rate that is extremely volatile, despite the fact that changing prices is costly.

The optimality of zero nominal interest rate under flexible prices in monetary models is not mainly the case and quite depends on the preferences. The optimality of a zero inflation rate under sticky prices also very much depends on the assumed set of fiscal instruments.

The non-optimality of the Friedman rule under flexible prices is quite new. Moreover, studying the optimal fiscal and monetary policy in a New Keynesian model with a rich set of fiscal instruments is also quite original.

In recent years, with the rapid development of the Internet and e-commerce, the online retail business has grown rapidly. E-commerce platforms can track different click data to understand consumer behavior and demand preferences, so as to make better demand forecasts, and strategically share this information with upstream suppliers. When the platform charges a certain fee for the shared data, the suppliers face the question of whether to purchase demand information. This article aims to analyze the influence of price competition and advertising competition on the suppliers' decisions to purchase information and the online platform for data pricing.

By using static game with incomplete information, this paper explores information-sharing strategies of an online platform with two competitive brand suppliers. The authors use Nash game to analyze the suppliers' purchasing information decision and then obtain the optimal information price of the online platform with information-sharing contract.

This paper shows that demand information sharing benefits both the platform and the suppliers. Without information contracts, the online platform is willing to share demand information with at least one supplier. Especially, when the consumer's sensitivity to advertising is larger and the commission fee charged by the online platform is small, the online platforms will share information with only one supplier. Based on the game outcomes between the suppliers, two pricing strategies for information are proposed under which at least one supplier purchases information. If the consumers are less (more) sensitive to advertising competition, pricing strategy of the online platform induces both suppliers (only one supplier) to purchase information.

At present, most of the information-sharing articles are based on the traditional purchase and sale mode. Based on the background of e-commerce, this paper examines the online platform's information-sharing strategies, which has certain innovation. In addition, the results show that the information-sharing strategy of the online platform is affected by both the price and advertising competitiveness, which provides a new expansion and supplement for the information-sharing literature.