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The goal of this chapter is to analyse the decisions of the Croatian Competition Agency in the field of grocery retail mergers in the 2004–2009 period. In particular, various criteria used by the Competition Agency to evaluate grocery retail mergers are identified and discussed.

Using the comparative approach the author attempts to detect the relevant sources for certain solutions embraced by the Competition Agency by examining especially the relevant practice of the European Commission as well as relevant decisions adopted by some competition authorities in EU member states.

The grocery retail market in Croatia has seen a flurry of mergers since 2004 with the largest competitor spreading to various local markets. For the Croatian competition authority this merger wave has perhaps been the biggest challenge since its inception. In the face of growing market concentration, the authority saw fit to shift from initially providing green light to duly notified transactions to subsequently addressing serious competition concerns by ordering a number of remedies. The Croatian competition authority relied extensively on EU acquis when deciding on specific merger cases, especially as regards the relevant market definition.

The value of the chapter is reflected in the fact that this kind of comparative analysis of Croatian merger cases in the field of grocery retail mergers was not available before. It is especially in the light of the accession of Croatia to the EU, as foreseen on 1 July 2013, that this kind of study becomes useful both for domestic but also EU audience.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

One often thinks of competition as a mechanism whereby undertakings are forced to answer more efficiently the needs of clients. One may wonder whether that system could be used to organize the institutional environment. Competition already exists among states or regions, where it affects their capacity to attract investment or skilled workers. Could we go further and organise institutional competition among authorities within the same territory? Electronic communications provide a good case study, with the same competencies being attributed to regulators, competition authorities and judicial power.

Provides an institutional insight into competition policy making in the European Union (EU). Focuses primarily on the core EU institution, namely the European Commission, and specifically the Directorate General for Competition (DGIV) which has assumed the stature of an autonomous agency and manages the first truly supranational EU policy. As its authority has grown the EU competition rules have impacted on the activities of all businesses operating within the single market. In short, the Commission operates as the world’s leading regional anti‐trust enforcement agency and as such it may serve as the ideal prototype for a larger international accord as pressure mounts for the establishment of some form of global competition rules. Accounts for the origins of policy and the evolution of DGIV, analyses the EU institutional setting, provides an assessment of policy and accentuates the inevitability of competition policy reform in the late 1990s.

The purpose of this article is to discuss the long‐term impact of the current financial and economic crisis on competition in the European Union (EU) banking sector.

The article first discusses the long term role of competition in the banking sector, commenting on policy developments prior to the crisis. Then the impact of the crisis is discussed focusing on two main areas of policy state: aids and bank regulation and supervision. The article culminates with the conclusions.

The main findings about state aids are that the efforts of the Commission to ensure that aided companies would not use the government support to distort competition seem to be working. However, given that the full impact on competition of these aids may take years to be felt, the Commission should be prepared to take action where necessary to ensure that competition will be protected. The provision of state aids could not have been avoided due to the grave systemic risks associated with bank failures. In respect of regulation and supervision, the article concluded that there is a lot of work to be done in this area to ensure that mistakes that led to the crisis will not be repeated but also that there is need for the Commission to ensure that the reforms to the regulatory and supervisory architecture do not occur at the expense of competition.

The article contains proposals about policy adjustments, thus contributing to the ongoing debate about the role of competition policy in the efforts to address the impact of the crisis.

The regulation of electronic communications has been recently reformed in Europe. One striking feature of the review was to base most of the economic regulation – the so‐called significant market power regime – on antitrust principles. In particular, the regulated markets have to be defined according to competition law methodologies. This paper describes this approach and studies in detail the recently adopted Commission recommendation “on relevant markets susceptible to ex‐ante regulation”. The paper concludes with three policy recommendations. First, as regulation is more flexible and more complex, national regulators should co‐operate among themselves and national courts should only reform regulatory decisions in case of manifest error. Second, as regulation is not any more justified by the “original sin” of the previous monopolists, but by the inefficiency of antitrust to control market power, NRA should be cautious not to overly expand their intervention. Third, as ex ante market definitions are aligned on antirust principles, authorities should make sure that market definition is not a goal in itself but only a means to achieve the policy objectives of the sector‐specific regulation.

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has initiated policies and legal challenges that have shaped the evolution of competition in healthcare. This chapter discusses not only discusses the current matters in healthcare competition, but it also gives a history of past issues faced by the FTC and the approaches used to resolve them. These FTC actions range from challenges to hospital mergers to preventing “reverse payments” from patent holders to generic entrants in pharmaceuticals. Ultimately the healthcare industry faces many unique regulatory and competitive aspects that, while challenging, do not require special rules.

The paper discusses how the Commission is shaping a decentralisation policy in the antitrust field. The paper details the procedural architecture ‐ “degrees of priority”, “preconditions for decentralisation” and “Community interest” ‐ which gives the Commission sole discretion to decide whether an antitrust case is dealt with by Brussels or is referred to a Member State. It reveals that the decentralisation procedure has been set up by the Commission, with the blessing of the Community courts, but with little real consultation with the Member States. The paper points out that the decision whether to decentralise turns on a new, qualitative and Commission decided Community interest test. The paper emphasises that the Community interest test runs in parallel with ‐ and has a similar function to ‐ a number of decentralisation provisions which already exist. The final section of the paper contrasts Community interest as a decentralisation test with the rival, and pre‐existing, quantitative approach to decentralisation ‐ the Community dimension test ‐ contained in the EC Merger Control Regulation (MCR). It explains that both tests have strengths and weaknesses and that the recent reform of the MCR has not fully addressed these concerns in respect to Community dimension. The paper’s main conclusion is that the Commission’s appropriation of the ability to decide which Member States are competent to deal with decentralised antitrust cases has created the possibility of a fragmented or two‐speed Europe in competition regulation.

Competition law is key to the promotion of consumer welfare and consumer choice, efficiency maximization, market integration, market liberalization, and competitiveness. The review of the evolution of competition law enforcement in Greece shows that it has run in parallel with the path of the Greek economy toward liberalisation modernisation, development and growth. Upon this basis, competition law has contributed to increased levels of investment in the Greek economy, the development of new services and new corporate structures and accountability in Greece. In a fast changing world, in which market and societal development is increasingly interdependent across national borders, the question now turns on to whether competition law enforcement in Greece ought also to take into account public policy objectives, such as environmental protection and sustainability or industrial policy objectives. The competition law enforcement authorities and national Courts have made great progress in the last 20 years in keeping abreast with developments in respect of competition law compliance and enforcement and this has provided a better guarantee for a level playing field and fairer conditions of competition in the various product and services markets in Greece.