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When developing a new product, a buying firm solicits revenue sharing bids from two competing suppliers. Bidding behaviors of suppliers do not always align with predictions from rational agent models due to task uncertainty and bounded rationality, which could result in non-optimal supplier offers and ultimately hurt buying firm interests. This paper aims to discuss the aforementioned issues.

The authors built an analytical model that considers the impact of supplier technological risk, buyer–supplier coordination cost and supplier loss aversion on the optimal bid of the supplier. Next, using limited information processing capacity as a theoretic lens, the authors explore antecedents to the size of a focal supplier's bidding error, the absolute difference between the actual bid and the optimal bid. The authors used quantitative lab experimental data to test the hypotheses.

(1) Bounded rational bidders often fail to differentiate between relevant and irrelevant competitive information when placing bids, (2) loss aversion of a bidder significantly affects not only levels of bids, particularly for bidders with competitive disadvantages, but also sizes of the bidding error and (3) competitive information that has clearer performance implications are more influential in reducing sizes of bidding errors.

The results provide a comprehensive view of the bidding behaviors of a bounded rational supplier in an innovation outsourcing context with competition. With the results, managers now have a better understanding of behavioral influencers behind non-optimal supplier bids in an innovation outsourcing context.

Traditional purchasing best practices primarily follow a commercial logic and may not necessarily be applicable for social enterprises (SEs) supplier selection. This study examines how SEs focused on poverty alleviation select suppliers amidst competing institutional logics to achieve both social impact and economic performance.

A grounded theory methodology is applied to guide semi-structured interviews with 18 fair trade verified SEs. Constant comparison methods aided in determining the point of data saturation was reached.

The results of this study indicate that SEs select marginalized suppliers based on implicit criteria that is initially based on social-welfare logic and then through a blend of commercial and social-welfare logic based on company structure.

This study is the first to reveal that SEs addressing social issues do not follow the traditional criteria for supplier selection but have their own unique selection criteria when selecting suppliers.

Rather than focussing on dyadic distributor–supplier relationships, this study aims to examine whether the difference in transaction-specific investments (TSIs) between rival suppliers in a supplier–distributor–supplier triad influences whether distributors expropriate or maintain their supplier’s TSIs.

Drawing on triadic data from 276 questionnaires that address both the supplier–distributor relationship and the rival supplier–distributor relationship, a moderated regression analysis is used to test the hypotheses.

Five out of six hypotheses are supported by the empirical test. The results show that the supplier’s TSIs increase the distributor’s opportunistic behaviour and reduce cooperation when the distributor perceives that the supplier’s TSIs are lower than those of a rival supplier. In contrast, when the distributor perceives that the supplier’s TSIs are higher than those of a competitor, the supplier’s TSIs do not improve cooperation and can shift the link between the supplier’s TSIs and the distributor’s opportunism from being positive to negative.

The findings have implications for the top managers of supplier firms embedded in distribution networks. This study suggests that the competitor’s TSIs can be regarded as an indicator of the supplier’s relationship with the distributor. By keeping an eye on their competitors’ TSIs, the top managers of suppliers can predict the likelihood of distributors’ opportunistic and cooperative behaviour and make efforts to improve their position by adjusting their own firm’s TSIs. Furthermore, this information can help suppliers decide on their investment strategies and maintain stable and healthy relationships.

This study 1) examines the effect of TSIs using a triadic framework and triadic data and demonstrates that how a distributor responds to a supplier’s TSIs, with either opportunism or cooperation, depends on the relative level of those TSIs in focal and competitive relationships; and 2) reveals the expropriation effects and restraint effects of TSIs by drawing on prospect theory. This finding indicates the dynamics of TSIs in a triadic relationship.

Based on the idea of part standardisation and product differentiation in lean management, this paper answers the question when integrate firms should choose market foreclosure to maximise profits by studying a two-tier supply chain, which contains three types of firms: suppliers, manufacturers and integrated firms. Moreover, the effect of the substitutability between final products and the competition among firms in the supply chain would be investigated from the perspective of dynamic analysis.

Considering the decision order of integrated firms and manufacturers in the downstream of the supply chain, the authors build three competition models. In each model, integrated firms compete with manufacturers in Bertrand–Nash fashion. And, suppliers compete with each other in Cournot fashion, so do integrated firms and manufacturers. The authors further discuss how the competitive relationship between firms affect the equilibrium result.

Numerical analysis reveals that under other conditions unchanged, the increased competition between downstream firms leads to the rise in the willingness of selling parts for integrated firms, while the increase in the number of suppliers has the opposite effect. In addition, due to the market change before and after the vertical merger, it may lead to the transition from profitable to unprofitable for the vertical merger.

This paper provides a theoretical analysis and managerial implication for integrated firms' market foreclosure decision. From the perspective of dynamic analysis, this paper demonstrates the result of vertical mergers and provides an explanation for the failure of vertical mergers.

This study aims to examine the strategic implications and managerial outcomes of the concurrent use of cooperation and competition in vertical channel relationships.

This study employs a structured questionnaire to gather data regarding vertical channel relationships in China.

Whereas the academic literature has emphasized cooperation between channel members because of the interdependence between them, in reality, retailers may accept competition as just another part of doing business with suppliers.

The outcome variables used may not be comprehensive. In particular, the authors choose the flexibility of channel resources to stand for private benefits and joint benefits to represent common benefits, and though these variables certainly represent the intended benefits of the ambidextrous strategy, it remains to be seen whether other benefits may emerge for the exchange parties in vertical relationships.

Using an ambidextrous strategy does not damage relationship quality, though it certainly does not enhance it. This view is based on the notion that an ambidextrous strategy at least does not harm either common or private benefits. Therefore, exchange parties using the ambidextrous strategy should not experience a relationship that is worse than that which results when they use cooperation or competition alone. The results of the current study indicate that this view reflects reality more accurately.

The value of the current study centers on the application of a conceptual framework regarding ambidextrous strategy to vertical channel relationships in a developing economy.

Untimely delivery of goods and services, especially in a post-COVID landscape, is a critical harbinger of end-to-end fulfillment. Existing literature in supplier delivery modeling is focused on penalizing suppliers for late deliveries built into a contractual transaction, which eventually erodes trust. As such, a holistic modeling technique focused on long-term relationship building is missing. This study aims to design a supplier evaluation model that analytically equates supplier delivery performance to cost realization while replicating a core attribute of successful supply chains – alignment, leading to long-term supplier relationships.

The supplier evaluation model designed in this paper uses delivery deviation as a unit of measure as opposed to delivery duration to enhance consistency with enterprise resource planning protocols. A one-sided modified Taguchi-type quality loss function (QLF) models delivery lateness to construct a multinomial probability penalty cost function for untimely delivery. Prescriptive analytics using simulation and optimization of the proposed mathematical model supports buyer–supplier alignment.

The supplier evaluation model designed herein not only optimizes likelihood parameters for early and late deliveries for competing suppliers to enhance total landed cost comparisons for on-shore, near-shore and off-shore suppliers but also allows for the creation of an efficient frontier toward supply base optimization.

At a time of systemic disruptions such as the COVID pandemic, global supply chains are at risk of business continuity. Supplier evaluation models need to focus on long-term relationship modeling as opposed to short-term contractual penalty-based modeling to enhance business continuity. The model offered in this paper is grounded in alignment – a cornerstone of successful supply chain integration, and offers an interesting departure from traditional modeling techniques in this genre.

The results from this analytical approach offer flexibility to a supply manager toward building redundancies in the supply chain using an efficient frontier within the supply landscape, which also helps to manage disruption and maintain end-to-end fulfillment.

The model offered in this paper is grounded in alignment – a cornerstone of successful supply chain integration, and offers an interesting departure from traditional modeling techniques in this genre. The authors offer a rational solution by creating an evaluation model that uses penalty cost modeling as an internal quality measure to rate suppliers and uses the outcome as a yardstick for negotiations instead of imposing penalties within contracts.

Supplier–supplier coopetition is vital to buyer innovation in reality. However, it has not received enough attention in prior research. Integrating the ability-motivation-opportunity framework of organizational learning perspective and the awareness-motivation-capability framework of competitive dynamics theory, this paper investigates the effect of supplier–supplier coopetition within supplier network on buyer innovation, as well as the contingent role of the relational attributes -- duration and tie strength dispersion of buyer–suppliers relationship at the supplier network level.

Testing this model on the secondary data of supply networks formed by 204 US listed buyer firms in SIC code 28, 35, 36 during 2008–2019, the authors utilize a fixed-effect regression model to investigate the relationship between supplier–supplier coopetition and the focal buyer's innovation.

The authors provide support for the positive influence of supplier–supplier cooperation on buyer innovation and an inverted U-shaped relationship between supplier–supplier competition and the focal buyer's innovation. The buyer–suppliers tie strength dispersion amplified the above two effects, and supplier–supplier cooperation mitigates the effect of supplier–supplier competition on the focal buyer's innovation.

Extending the traditional dyadic view to a network-level view via linking the supplier–supplier dyad and the buyer–suppliers dyad, this paper contributes to a better understanding of supplier–supplier coopetition and its impact on buyer innovation with learning and competitive tension as the underlying explanations, and validates the contingent role of buyer–suppliers relational attributes.

In recent years, with the rapid development of the Internet and e-commerce, the online retail business has grown rapidly. E-commerce platforms can track different click data to understand consumer behavior and demand preferences, so as to make better demand forecasts, and strategically share this information with upstream suppliers. When the platform charges a certain fee for the shared data, the suppliers face the question of whether to purchase demand information. This article aims to analyze the influence of price competition and advertising competition on the suppliers' decisions to purchase information and the online platform for data pricing.

By using static game with incomplete information, this paper explores information-sharing strategies of an online platform with two competitive brand suppliers. The authors use Nash game to analyze the suppliers' purchasing information decision and then obtain the optimal information price of the online platform with information-sharing contract.

This paper shows that demand information sharing benefits both the platform and the suppliers. Without information contracts, the online platform is willing to share demand information with at least one supplier. Especially, when the consumer's sensitivity to advertising is larger and the commission fee charged by the online platform is small, the online platforms will share information with only one supplier. Based on the game outcomes between the suppliers, two pricing strategies for information are proposed under which at least one supplier purchases information. If the consumers are less (more) sensitive to advertising competition, pricing strategy of the online platform induces both suppliers (only one supplier) to purchase information.

At present, most of the information-sharing articles are based on the traditional purchase and sale mode. Based on the background of e-commerce, this paper examines the online platform's information-sharing strategies, which has certain innovation. In addition, the results show that the information-sharing strategy of the online platform is affected by both the price and advertising competitiveness, which provides a new expansion and supplement for the information-sharing literature.

Fairness concerns in the supply chain management have recently caught much attention in the OM research community. The combined effect of fairness and competition on supply chain coordination and the interplay between them, however, have yet to be thoroughly examined.

The authors study a multiplayer supply chain with one supplier and two competing retailers with fairness concerns by a three-player Stackelberg game model. This theoretical study provides equilibrium solutions under different ranges of fairness and competition combinations. Besides theoretical analysis, the authors also conduct standard economic experiments and estimate structural parameters using experimental data.

The authors find that a simple wholesale price can coordinate the whole supply chain with certain conditions of fairness and competition. Moreover, although fairness concerns always decrease the wholesale price and increase retailers' profit share, downstream competition weakens such effects and decreases downstream players' market share. The experiments confirm the existence of fairness concerns and the interaction of competition and fairness, as shown in the theoretical analysis.

A more comprehensive model with both distributional and peer-induced fairness considered could generate better insights in the interactive impact of competition and fairness. Moreover, the authors followed the previous channel competition literature and modeled the demand with linear demand function which makes the game decisions trackable in closed form solution. A more general demand function could result in different solutions and thus new insights.

The authors’ work provides a comprehensive theoretical study of the interaction between fairness concerns and competition and clarifies the in-depth connection between the effects of competition and fairness concerns in the literature.

The purpose of the paper is to explore the benefits of online reverse auctions for both buyers and suppliers in contrast to the negative implications for procurement process. This paper also aims to provide a framework for managers determining if participation in online reverse auctions is appropriate for their business.

Information was gathered from numerous sources including surveys from both buyers and suppliers in a multitude of industries in order to create a comprehensive analysis of benefits and shortcomings of online reverse auctions. Additional research could be pursued by conducting a detailed cost analysis of buyers who have adopted online reverse auctions. A thorough analysis of unit cost and total cost changes amongst various industries could provide benchmark data for companies contemplating entering the reverse auction arena.

The research analysis finds a strong temptation for buyers to participate in online reverse auctions: price reductions. However, buyers should approach online reverse auctions with caution as total cost savings can be misleading and participation may result in damaged relationships with suppliers. This can be seen in the results portrayed in the buyer and supplier industry survey which shows that buyers are more keen to participate in online reverse auctions in order to gain advantage of the lower prices and global potential of suppliers, whereas some buyers are keen on making a strong relationship with existing suppliers through direct contact.

Buyers' determination to use online reverse auctions relies on product specifications, supplier relationships, the current supply and demand environment, indirect costs, and several other factors which will vary for each product and for each buyer. Therefore, an all‐encompassing decision model cannot be presented to accommodate each scenario. However it can be seen that the industrial survey to the buyers and the suppliers has been an effective tool in bridging the gap between the decision model and the factors that vary between each buyer.

This paper provides managers a framework for determining if online reverse auctions are appropriate for their business. In practice, additional company specific information can be applied to the decision making model.

This paper includes a comprehensive decision framework specifically for buyers as well as an abbreviated decision model for suppliers.