Search results

This paper aims to report on an empirical investigation of the fate of the balanced scorecard (BSC) approach in an organization.

Building on actor-network theory and using a qualitative case study approach, this study analyses how across time certain actors attempted to build a competing network in the organization to gain support for their underlying rationales for replacing the BSC with a budgeting system. Data were collected using interviews, observations and archival data from a Sri Lankan commercial bank.

This paper finds that despite the enthusiastic journey with all its potentials to be a sustainable accounting innovation, the attraction towards the BSC innovation by the organization appeared to be temporary because the BSC knowledge claims that were advanced by its promoters had not been widely accepted by those involved in the practice. Such a consequence of innovation diffusion appeared to be the result of the failure of the innovation promoters in coordinating the heterogeneous interests of various actors involved in the practice. This study concludes that the BSC failed to be sustained, amid varying ideologies and interests of powerful actors across time and opponent actors’ perceived deficiencies in its adapted design attributes.

Although the findings relate to a Sri Lankan case, they offer important insight into how parallel, competing networks advocating different control systems may exist in an organization, and that the sustainability of a specific system may depend upon the efforts and the relative power of the advocators of that system.

This paper sheds useful insights for practitioners on the effective implementation of accounting innovations and managing management control systems in organizations amid tensions associated with competing networks.

The outcomes enhance the knowledge of how multiple networks operating in an organization could compete with one another, with the result that one network may fall apart while another network gains prominence in the corporate landscape across time, amid varying interests of key actors, their actions and interessement devices used.

This paper seeks to understand kaizen in practice as it travels through time and space in the organisational setting.

A qualitative case study was carried out at a multinational company using mainly interviews for the data collection that were analysed from an actor-network theory (ANT) perspective.

This paper finds that the company deals with a series of paradoxes while managing the kaizen process. Efficiency and quality paradoxes are the basis for starting kaizen projects. Furthermore, intrinsic, and extrinsic motivation, emerge in these processes, and paradoxes relate to how spontaneous ideas emerge in a deliberated context of cost-saving objectives. The supply chain finance team coordinates kaizen projects with the collaboration of plant managers, promoting the paradox of autonomy and control. In addition, as kaizen mobilises and enrols the actors, some trials of strength emerge, showing actors who oppose the kaizen network and create competing networks that mutually exist in the firm.

This study presents valuable insights for professionals to successfully implement kaizen methodologies that take advantage of developing a network for problem-solving in organizations.

This study highlights the supply chain finance team's role in enrolling the actors within a network built by practitioners engaged in kaizen projects. Usually, engineers, quality, or manufacturing teams lead kaizen projects, and only occasionally, accounting and financial teams participate, including multidisciplinary teams.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between prior experience of organisations and their “co‐opetitive” behaviours in forming research networks when a R&D programme is launched in order to fund future research projects.

Drawing on both resource‐based writings and social embeddedness studies, the paper posits that two types of co‐opetition – namely the intra‐network and inter‐network co‐opetition – should be clearly distinguished in order to understand co‐opetitive behaviours of organisations. These two types of co‐opetition arise as a consequence of the different levels of firms' prior experience in forming successful co‐opetitive networks with their competitors.

A reverse U‐shape trade‐off between the two types of co‐opetition is hypothesised: the maximum level of intra‐network co‐opetition and the lowest of inter‐network co‐opetition are expected for low and highlevels of prior experience; the minimum level of intra‐network co‐opetition and the highest of inter‐network co‐opetition are expected for moderate levels of prior experience.

This paper sheds light on how co‐opetitive relationships emerge in R&D networks and under which circumstances competition prevails on cooperation.

Argues regulations should establish a geographically comprehensive lattice of competing, independently owned, network interconnection points from which telephony operators are required to provide zero‐price telephony call termination. Concludes that intrusive regulation of intercompany interconnection and access, such as mandatory co‐location, loop unbundling and line sharing, should be avoided or rapidly phased out.

Shows that some national governments’ policy to promote specific market structures have either proved ineffective (France) or increased entry barriers, likely to raise industry cost (Spain). Argues high‐speed cable modems are the way forward for the future. Concludes, in order to achieve long‐term efficiency, the regulator should promote a mix of infrastructure and service competition to enable viability in the long term.

Most, if not all, management control tools were formulated for firms employing an industrial value creation logic (i.e., Ford, McDonald’s, and Wal‐Mart). We argue that given the growth, both in number and importance, of firms employing a knowledge value creation logic (i.e., Accenture, Goldman Sachs, and Clifford Chance) and firms employing a network logic (i.e., Verizon, eBay, and Expedia) that these control tools should be revisited in light of this potentially critical contingency. This paper outlines the key characteristics of knowledge intensive firms and network service firms and then examines how these contingencies impact Simons’ (1995) Levers of Control and Kaplan and Norton’s (1996) Balanced Scorecard. We find that whilst each lever/perspective is still relevant for each value creation logic, the relative importance and thus intensity of use should vary between logics.

Previous research argues that customer switching costs play an important role in the firm’s ability to retain customers and achieve competitive advantage. Research also indicates that in the increasingly networked environment, switching costs are changing in important ways. Despite switching costs’ recognized role in contributing to competitive advantage and its increasingly strategic characteristics in the expanding networked environment, we find a lack of coherence and completeness in the conceptual tools and models developed to understand its role and help effectively to manage the phenomenon. In this paper we attempt to address these needs by expanding and refining the conceptualization of customer switching costs and developing a more useful and comprehensive framework for managers.

Studies on inter-firm relationships have recently shifted their attention from dyadic networks to more globally driven network structures. This condition occurs because embeddedness in global network structures may improve firm innovation and performance. In addition, the improvement of firm innovativeness and performance seems higher when globally networked firms both compete and cooperate between and among them. In this paper, we categorize the simultaneous interplay of cooperation and competition in the global arena as global network coopetition (GNC). Under GNC, multinational enterprises act jointly with their global partners-rivals to improve performance, at the same time by sharing complementary resources (cooperation side) and by undertaking independent actions to enhance their own performance (competition side). This paper aims to expand existing research on network and global coopetition by shedding light on the effects of coopetition between and among firms belonging to global network structures on value capture and innovation performance.

Using a sample of 100 firms belonging to 14 industries organized in 47 global networks of different sizes, the authors conducted a longitudinal empirical study over the period 2000-2014 covering 1,098 observations, 1,717 interfirm relationships and 78 inter-networks linkages. A multiple regression model on panel data with random effects was conducted on the sample of 1,098 observations related to the global automotive industry to test the research hypotheses.

Findings show that GNC enhances firm performance and innovation outcomes. In addition to GNC, structural characteristics such as network size, network position and network diversity have significant positive or negative effects on innovation and performance outcomes of firms belonging to these global network structures.

Our research offers a contribution to the literature dealing with global networked structures’ effects on firm innovation performance. In fact, it effectively complements prior work on outcomes of coopetition between firms embedded in complex network structures. It also advances research in the area by introducing the notion of GNC as a network by which firms can enhance their innovation performance and, therefore, their global innovation performance. This study has some limitations. First, we acknowledge that it is focused only on 14 global coopetitive networks. It could be promising to extend the scope to integrate other networks. Second, our measures of firm actions as based on a content analysis of news reports related to firms. It would be important to complement this data collection by conducting a qualitative analysis (interviews). Atlast, it could be promising to include the study of customer needs in the new product development process.

Our study also offers some insights into the management of coopetition. In fact, by taking into account the existence of a context in which global coopetition networks play a role, managers may be better positioned to effectively deal with the paradox of being a partner of their direct rivals to improve their firms’ innovativeness and, consequently, achieve good performance, on the one hand, and to maintain relationships within several networks by taking into account their structural properties such as centrality and diversity, on the other hand.

We contribute to extant network coopetition literature in two ways. First, we introduce the notion of GNC to detect coopetition occurrence in global network structures. GNC refers to a context where actors in various networks belonging to different industries and geographies cooperate in a one (or more) innovative project/s, while simultaneously keeping on competing within and between their networks. Second, we contribute to network coopetition by analyzing specific GNC effects on firm innovation performance. In so doing, we can provide a deeper analytical understanding of GNC performance effects on firms operating in global network contexts.

This chapter summarizes the interdependence of network effects, compatibility standards and intellectual property rights (IPR) in the global economy. This interdependence is analyzed at the product market level and at the research and development level. The questions to be examined are: how IPR influence the provision of goods exhibiting network effects; the impact of network effects on the creation, dissemination and protection of intellectual property and of goods with strong intellectual property content; and strategic issues faced by firms and governments in goods that exhibit network effects. We answer these questions by studying how network effects influence the value of IPR and how in turn IPR may influence the size of networks. We highlight the central importance of IPR protection of interface standards for market outcomes, and how different types of IPR generate market power through interface standards. We review similarities of network effects in product markets and research networks as well as impediments to their expansion. We finally discuss alternative outcomes of standardization policies, institutional choices and strategic coordination efforts by firms. We emphasize how the answers to these questions are distinct in an international context.

The purpose of this paper is to set out the history and content of the European Commission's Recommendation on the regulation of next generation access networks, published in September 2010. The aim is to assess the Recommendation in terms of its likely impact on harmonisation and certainty of regulation within the European Union and on investment and competition.

The approach adopted is to review the European Commission's Recommendation from the standpoint of regulatory economics.

The publication in September 2010 of the Recommendation on the regulation of next generation access networks completed a process which had begun two years and two drafts previously. The paper sets out the background to the decision to prepare a Recommendation for national regulators supervising the installation of fibre based networks, where the fibre might go either to the premises (FTTP) or to the street cabinet (FTTC). It also describes the development of the Recommendation from the first draft in September 2008 to the final draft in September 2010. It concludes that the delay in issuing the Recommendation created an interval in which national regulators pursued their own diverse policies, to the detriment of harmonisation. In terms of investment and competition, the successive drafts appear to have diminished pressure on competitors to build their own infrastructures, with consequential effects on the likely form of competition. Finally, a degree of regulatory uncertainty has been created in member states where the regulator has pursued in its market reviews of fibre access products remedies which are at odds with the Recommendation.

This is an early appraisal of a European Commission Recommendation which is likely to have a significant impact on European communications policy and regulation.