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This paper aims to establish a theoretical framework that can comprehensively explain the executive compensation in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) within the context of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

The author develops a theoretical framework for executive compensation in SOEs from the perspective of Marxist economics and points out that the executives in SOEs are engaged in management labor, and their compensation should adhere to the principle of distribution according to labor contribution.

Based on this theory, the author posits that the continuous upward trend of executive compensation in SOEs, is consistent with the trend of SOEs' ongoing expansion, which reflects a continuous improvement of SOE executives' management labor in both quality and quantity.

It is necessary to start with Marxist economic theory and scientifically study the issue of SOE executive compensation, adhere to the principle of distribution according to work in the context of a socialist market economy and implement the specific guideline of the Party Central Committee; only in this way can the long-term healthy development of SOEs be promoted continuously.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the empirical relationship between gray directors (non-executive non-independent directors) and executive compensation among companies listed in India’s National Stock Exchange (NSE). The paper also examines the possible interplay of relationships between controlling shareholder duality (controlling shareholder being the CEO), ownership category and executive compensation.

A sample of 438 firms listed in the NSE of India was studied using data spanning five financial years, 2012–2013 to 2016–2017.

Empirical evidence suggests that there is a positive association between the proportion of gray directors on the board and executive compensation. The sensitivity of executive compensation to gray directors is found to be higher among family controlled firms. This research has also found that CEOs who belong to controlling shareholder groups received higher pay than professional CEOs. The authors conjecture that these results suggest cronyism and may contribute to lower levels of corporate governance practices in the country.

The hybrid board structure, which India has adopted with the desire to bring the best of Anglo Saxon and Japanese board philosophies, has paradoxically led to self-serving boards. Exploration of alternative thinking to bring about changes in the regulatory framework is, therefore, necessary.

Serious problems are identified with the philosophy behind board composition mandated by Listing Requirements for Indian firms with empirical evidence showing how the existing rules generate cronyism and unfairness to minority shareholders.

Based on stakeholder, agency and institutional theory, this study aims to examine the role of institutional ownership in the relationship between environmental, social and governance practices and CEO compensation.

Utilizing a fixed-effect panel regression analysis, this research utilized a panel data approach, analyzing data spanning from 2014 to 2021, focusing on US companies listed on the S&P500 stock market index. The dataset encompassed 219 companies, leading to a total of 1,533 observations.

The analysis identified that environmental scores significantly impact CEO equity-linked compensation, unlike social and governance scores. Additionally, it was found that institutional ownership acts as a moderating factor in the relationship between the environmental score and CEO equity-linked compensation, as well as the association between the social score and CEO equity-linked compensation. Interestingly, the direction of these moderating effects varied between the two relationships, suggesting a nuanced role of institutional ownership.

This research makes a unique contribution to the field of corporate governance by exploring the relatively understudied area of institutional ownership's influence on the ESG practices–CEO compensation nexus.

Taking cues from the fact that there remains a dearth in the establishment of theoretical and empirical relationship between executive compensation and corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance of the firms, this study attempts to explore the non-linear relationship between the said variables.

The study utilizes a strongly balanced panel data set of 179 non-financial National Stock Exchange (NSE) 500 listed firms for the study period of 2015–2020. The study further employs both static as well as Arellano-Bond dynamic panel model under generalized method of moments (GMM) framework to establish the relationship between executive compensation and CSR performance of the sampled firms.

The study acknowledges an inverted U-shaped relationship between executive compensation and environmental, social and governance (ESG) score of the firms. According to the robust estimator, an increase in the level of executive compensation is said to affect CSR performance positively until it surpasses a threshold level of 18.7 percent.

One of the major takeaways that the study provides for the corporate policymakers is that the level of compensation can only motivate the executives to take up socially responsible work up to a certain level surpassing which the executives becomes resistant towards any benefits provided by the CSR performance and get inclined towards economical performances of the firm. At the later stage, the economical expansionary investment benefits overweigh the personal career benefit gained by the executives from the CSR performances of the firm.

The nonlinearity relationship between executive compensation and CSR performance and the threshold level providing the two-fold effect of compensation on the CSR performance of the firms attempted by this study is a rare attempt in an emerging economy like India.

The purpose of this paper is to use tenets of the complexity theory in order to study the effect of various determinants of firm’s performance, such as CEO’s compensation and age, for the case of 72 insurance companies.

The authors identify the asymmetries in the data set by creating quantiles and using contrarian analysis. Instead of ignoring this information and use a main effects approach, all the available information in the data set is taken into account. For this purpose, the authors use qualitative comparative analysis to find alternative equifinal routes toward high firm performance.

Five configurations are found which lead to high performance. Every one of the five configurations is found to be sufficient but not necessary for high firm performance.

The research findings contribute to a better understanding of the determinants of firm’s performance taking into account the asymmetries in the data set. The authors identify alternative paths toward high firm performance, which could be vital information for the decision maker inside a firm.

This study aims to pinpoint gaps in the literature on corporate governance and remuneration by producing a comprehensive bibliometric review for the period 1990–2020.

Bibliometric analysis is the quantitative study of the bibliographic material in a specific research field. It allows an analyst to classify that material by paper, journal, author, indexation, institution or country, among other possibilities. This study reviews a total of 298 Web of Science–indexed journal articles on corporate governance and top-management remuneration schemes.

The authors find five distinct research strands: (1) firm performance and remuneration of top management, (2) the remuneration and independence of boards of directors and the efficiency of boards of directors as a governance system, (3) outside-director remuneration and the efficiency of outside directors as a monitoring system, (4) director remuneration and the corporate governance of companies and (5) the role of ownership structure and top managers' compensation schemes as corporate-governance tools. The authors identify gaps in the literature and avenues for future research for each of these strands.

The authors’ findings have implications for board diversity (e.g. gender diversity), remuneration policy for top-level managers and governance issues (independent directors, separation of ownership with control). This study is the only one to summarize the key topics on which top research has been focused and can be broadly used for corporate governance management perspective.

This paper provides an overview of how the literature on corporate governance and remuneration has developed and a synopsis of the most influential and most productive authors, countries and journal sources. It creates an opportunity for other researchers to focus on this area. This study will also serve as a foundation for future meta-analyses.

Corporate governance principles are living a positive momentum in light of the megatrends reshaping the world. An effective company based on sound governance principles can prevent issues and corporate scandals as the company ensures greater transparency and accountability. Accordingly, this paper aims to investigate the relationship between shareholder-oriented corporate governance mechanisms, value and performances in the real estate sector.

This paper investigates the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms, performance and value in a sample of 111 USA real estate firms. After collecting data from 2014 to 2018, this paper tests the research hypothesis using the linear fixed-effect model.

The results demonstrate a positive impact of shareholder-oriented corporate governance mechanisms on performance and value. In particular, firms with no chief executive officer (CEO) duality and staggered board mechanisms and recognizing excess variable compensation to the firms' executive have a significantly higher Tobin's Q, return on assets (ROA) and price-to-book performance.

The implications are twofold: on the one hand, this motivates shareholders to establish new corporate control mechanisms to maximize value, attract more capital and improve operating performance. On the other hand, this allows investors to direct the investors' resources toward real estate firms with effective corporate governance mechanisms that may return higher performance and value.

Focusing on the real estate industry, where governance is expected to have a lower impact due to solid regulation, especially in real estate investment trusts (REITs), the research allows the formulation of industry-specific inferences that may be generalized for the general market.

This study aims to examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the capital structure of Latin American firms.

The sample included companies from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. The authors collected data from 201 non-financial companies between 2009 and 2018, totalizing 1,716 firm-year observations. The data were analyzed using descriptive statistics and linear regression models with panel data.

The main results indicated that chief executive officer duality, legal protection system and corporate social responsibility voluntary disclosure impact the firm's total debt ratio, corresponding to a positive effect for the first two variables and a negative for the last.

This study advances in two main ways. Firstly, due to the broad approach in which the authors addressed corporate governance, involving board composition, ownership structure, minority shareholders legal protection system and information disclosure. Secondly, by presenting empirical evidence about the effects of corporate governance on capital structure from an extensive sample of Latin American firms, the authors expect to contribute to the international debate on the capital structure due to the unique characteristics of Latin America in this regard.

This paper aims to present an analysis of the role of financial incentives, moral hazard and conflicts of interests leading up to the 2008 financial crisis.

The study’s analysis has identified common structural flaws throughout the securitization food chain. These structural flaws include inappropriate incentives, the absence of punishment, moral hazard and conflicts of interest. This research sees the full impact of these structural flaws when considering their co-occurrence throughout the financial system. The authors address systemic defects in the securitization food chain and examine the inter-relationships among homeowners, mortgage originators, investment banks and investors. The authors also address the role of exogenous factors, including the SEC, AIG, the credit rating agencies, Congress, business academia and the business media.

The study argues that the lack of criminal prosecutions of key financial executives has been a key factor in creating moral hazard. Eight years after the Great Recession ended in the USA, the financial services industry continues to suffer from a crisis of trust with society.

An overwhelming majority of Americans, 89 per cent, believe that the federal government does a poor job of regulating the financial services industry (Puzzanghera, 2014). A study argues that the current corporate lobbying framework undermines societal expectations of political equality and consent (Alzola, 2013). The authors believe the Singapore model may be a useful starting point to restructure regulatory agencies so that they are more responsive to societal concerns and less responsive to special interests. Finally, the widespread perception is that the financial services sector, in particular, is ethically challenged (Ferguson, 2012); perhaps there would be some benefit from the implementation of ethical climate monitoring in firms that have been subject to deferred prosecution agreements for serious ethical violations (Arnaud, 2010).

The authors believe the paper makes a truly original contribution. They provide new insights via their analysis of the role of financial incentives, moral hazard and conflicts of interests leading up to the 2008 financial crisis.

This paper aims to verify whether the integration of sustainability in executive compensation positively affects firms’ non-financial performance and whether corporate governance characteristics enhance the relationship between sustainability compensation and firms’ non-financial performance and to expand the domain of the impact of sustainability on non-financial performance.

This analysis is based on a sample of companies listed on the Milan Italian Stock Exchange from the Financial Times Milan Stock Exchange Index over the 2016–2020 period. Regression analysis was used by using data retrieved from the Refinitiv Eikon database and the sample firms’ remuneration reports.

The findings of this paper show that embedding sustainability in executive compensation positively affects firms’ non-financial performance. The results of this paper also reveal that specific corporate governance features can improve the impact of sustainability on non-financial performance.

This analysis is limited to Italian firms included in the Financial Times Milan Stock Exchange Index; however, the findings are highly significant.

The findings provide regulators with useful insights for considering the integration of sustainability goals into executive remuneration. Another implication is that policymakers should require – at least – listed firms to fulfil specific corporate governance structural requirements. Finally, the findings can provide investors and financial analysts with a greater awareness of the role played by executive remuneration in the long-term value-creation process.

This paper contributes to addressing the relationship among sustainability, remuneration and non-financial disclosure, drawing on the stakeholder–agency theoretical framework and focusing on Italian firms. This issue has received limited attention with controversial results in the literature.