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In view of the current climate change emergency and the growing importance of the climate-related accountability of companies, this paper aims to advance a comprehensive understanding of the determinants of carbon-related chief executive officer (CEO) compensation.

Building on the agency-theoretical perspective on executive compensation and existing work in the fields of management, corporate governance, cultural studies, and behavioral science, this paper derives a multilevel framework of the determinants of carbon-related CEO compensation.

This paper maps the determinants of carbon-related CEO compensation at the societal, organizational, group, and individual levels of analysis. It also provides research propositions on the determinants that can support and challenge the implementation of this instrument of environmental corporate governance.

In the past literature, the determinants of carbon-related CEO compensation have remained largely unexplored. This paper contributes to the academic discussion on environmental corporate governance by showcasing the role of interlinkages among the determinants of carbon-related CEO compensation and the possible countervailing impacts. In view of the complex interdisciplinary nature of climate change impact, this paper encourages businesses practitioners and regulators to intensify their climate change mitigation efforts and delineates the levers at their disposal.

This paper seeks to examine the differences between executives and investors in the perception of determinant factors in executive compensation.

From a survey instrument comprised of archival executive compensation determinant items, a factor analysis is performed to examine the construct determinant perceptions unique to executives and non‐executive investors.

The authors find differences in factors between executives and non‐executive investors in a manner expected by agency theory. Non‐executive investors place greater weight on factors related to performance and less weight on human capital factors, while executive investors place greater weight on human capital factors in determining executive compensation.

This study is limited in that the sample may not be representative of the population of chief executive officers or shareholders in the USA.

Differing factors suggest that there is a misalignment of measures desired to be the foundation of executive compensation. The differing measures used to potentially motivate agents (executives) by principals (investors) results in an agency cost.

The authors have documented a difference between executives and investors in factors desired to determine executive compensation.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of CEO compensation for sample of the US firms. It emphasizes the presence of executive compensation persistence and the importance of CEO power besides performance while setting CEO pay.

The empirical analysis is conducted on a large sample of US firms during the period 2006–2016. It is based on the generalized method of moments (GMM) models to assess the impact of numerous factors on CEO compensation.

The main findings reveal that firm performance proxied by accounting-based proxies, as well as market-based proxies, plays a significant role in explaining variations in levels of executive compensation. Moreover, there is a significant persistence in executive compensation among the US sample firms. The authors also document that poor governance conditions (managerial power hypothesis) lead to high compensation levels offered to CEO.

At the end, without a doubt, the analysis has some limitations that prompt the authors to consider future research directions. One future research avenue that can help better explain the effect of firm performance on the CEO compensation is to study this issue using an international sample to determine whether country-level characteristics (e.g. creditor rights, shareholder rights and the enforcement climate) can influence this relationship. Furthermore, it can be worthwhile to deepen the analysis of CEO power and its impact on CEO compensation. It will be interesting to emphasize how the CEO power interacts with the other governance characteristics and some CEO attributes as CEO gender.

The paper's findings have implications for practitioners, policymakers and regulatory authorities. First, the findings inform regulators that performance is not the only determinant of CEO pay level. This may warrant increased firm disclosure of the details of the pay structure. Second, the study offers insights to policymakers and members of boards of directors interested in enhancing the design of executive compensation and internal corporate governance, to better align managerial incentives to shareholder interests. Firms should strengthen the board independence and properly constitute the board committees (compensation, risk, nomination…).

This paper presents a comprehensive overview of the CEO compensation determinants. It supplements the classic pay-for-performance sensitivity predictions with insights gained from the dynamics of wage setting theory and managerial power theory. The authors develop a composite index to measure the CEO power in order to test the impact of CEO attributes on CEO pay. Additionally, it verifies whether the determinants of CEO pay depend on firm age and size.

Amidst the turbulent tides of geopolitical uncertainty and pandemic-induced economic disruptions, the information technology industry grapples with alarming attrition and aggravating talent gaps, spurring a surge in demand for specialized digital proficiencies. Leveraging this imperative, firms seek to attract and retain top-tier talent through generous compensation packages. This study introduces a holistic, integrated theoretical framework integrating machine learning models to develop a compensation model, interrogating the multifaceted factors that shape pay determination.

Drawing upon a stratified sample of 2488 observations, this study determines whether compensation can be accurately predicted via constructs derived from the integrated theoretical framework, employing various cutting-edge machine learning models. This study culminates in discovering a random forest model, exhibiting 99.6% accuracy and 0.08° mean absolute error, following a series of comprehensive robustness checks.

The empirical findings of this study have revealed critical determinants of compensation, including but not limited to experience level, educational background, and specialized skill-set. The research also elucidates that gender does not play a role in pay disparity, while company size and type hold no consequential sway over individual compensation determination.

The research underscores the importance of equitable compensation to foster technological innovation and encourage the retention of top talent, emphasizing the significance of human capital. Furthermore, the model presented in this study empowers individuals to negotiate their compensation more effectively and supports enterprises in crafting targeted compensation strategies, thereby facilitating sustainable economic growth and helping to attain various Sustainable Development Goals.

The cardinal contribution of this research lies in the inception of an inclusive theoretical framework that persuasively explicates the intricacies of a machine learning-driven remuneration model, ennobled by the synthesis of diverse management theories to capture the complexity of compensation determination. However, the generalizability of the findings to other sectors is constrained as this study is exclusively limited to the IT sector.

The theory of financial management suggests that the objective of the firm is to maximise shareholder wealth. The valuation of the firm is its net operational cash flows discounted at the stock market's average required rate of return. A firm's risk class determines the rate of return required by investors. The operating objective for management is to maximise the difference between operational receipts and operational expenditures plus investment, whilst minimising risk. However, the separation of ownership by shareholders and control by professional managers enables directors to pursue objectives other than maximisation of shareholder wealth. Directors might attempt to maximise sales revenue, maximise growth in assets or employees, maximise value added or even their own well‐being. They may choose to pursue multiple objectives as described in corporate planning systems. Multiple objectives may include social goals as well as goals relating to marketing, production, personnel and finance. It has been suggested that levels of directors' remuneration might be associated with the extent to which directors achieve corporate objectives. Several research projects have tried to identify the major determinants of directors' remuneration. Some of these are summarised below.

The authors examine the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and abnormal executive compensation. The authors hypothesize that socially responsible firms are more likely to pay their executives at a level that is in line with economic determinants.

Using the expected compensation model developed by Core et al. (2008), the authors test our hypothesis using a large sample of US public companies.

The authors find that CSR performance is negatively associated with how much executive compensation deviates from the expected level. The authors further examine whether CSR performance is associated with excess compensation or inadequate compensation and find that socially responsible firms are less likely to pay their executives either excessively or inadequately.

This study provides evidence on the association between CSR performance and abnormal executive compensation, especially how CSR is associated with inadequate compensation, an area that has been largely overlooked by the literature.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the determinants of workers’ compensation insurance prices in Portugal.

Multiple regression analysis was used to study the insurance price determinants. The independent variables considered are: payroll, number of employees, and incidence rate. In addition, three categorical variables were used: region, classification of economic activities, and enterprise size. A cross-firm panel data sample from the SABI database of 1,435 firms was considered, over a time horizon from 2010 to 2012. Furthermore, the sample split criterion was the enterprise size.

As expected, the results suggest that payroll and number of employees are related with workers’ compensation insurance prices. Furthermore, incidence rate, region, type of economic activities, and enterprise size have a positive and significant influence on premiums.

More panel data are needed to allow a greater focus on the impacts of GDP fluctuations and sectoral consolidation on insurance pricing. Further research could also include the impact of capital/reserving cycles, which can be driven both by economic shocks and the competition cycle. It is well known that insurers tend to reduce reserving standards when under pressure, and this can result in inadequate pricing.

The process of workers’ compensation insurance price formation is disentangled. The results suggest that the workers’ compensation insurance premiums behave as expected, especially under periods of economic strain. Therefore, workers’ compensation rate regulation should take this evidence into account, specifically through the establishment of minimum rates, which will protect the insurer, the employer, and the employees alike.

The paper is part of a considerable literature on insurance pricing in workers’ compensation, most of which has centred on private markets in the USA. This paper is the first empirical work that employs private market data for Portugal.

The challenge facing human resource/compensation professionals in the people‐intensive, high‐technology industry, will be the development of a model and strategy intended to respond to the specific needs of unique professionals engaged in high growth organisations. This article examines the complex purposes of compensation, including the eight factors contributing to the determination of compensation levels, while considering constraints and contingencies. Job‐based evaluation and person‐based systems will be examined together with individual and group incentive plans as they impact upon growth cycles of high‐tech firms. The innovative nature of high‐technology organisations can be directly linked to compensation strategies for management. These high growth firms utilise a most unique compensation approach which is fundamentally different from normative organisations. They: (1) use annual incentives, but emphasise the longer term; (2) emphasise stock rather than long‐term cash plans; (3) use stock options where the manager benefits only if stock prices increase; (4) use a much larger proportion of stock than typical firms provide; and (5) encourage much wider use of stock among a broad employee group. Compensation occupies as significant a niche as articulate strategies and leading edge innovativeness, for high‐technology organisations.

The purpose of this paper is to examine if the structure and design of CEO compensation has any effect on firm innovation. It further investigates the effectiveness of each component of portfolio of compensation incentives in encouraging innovation.

This study uses systems of simultaneous equations to model the interdependence between compensation incentives and measures of firm innovation.

Results indicate that the pay‐performance sensitivity of the CEO portfolio of compensation incentives is positively related to investment in R&D expenditures, number of patents and citations. Options in general are more effective than stocks. However, within the options portfolio, recently awarded and unvested options are more effective than previously awarded and vested options. Restricted stock is more effective than unrestricted stock.

Measuring innovation output is difficult as innovation could take different forms, including business model innovation, which does not appear in the patent data.

Stock options encourage investment in value‐increasing innovations and should remain a significant part of managerial compensation. If the firm awards stock, it should only award restricted stock.

This study uses comprehensive measures of compensation incentives and firm innovation. It views incentives as a portfolio of stock and options and uses incentives in their entirety. It examines the effectiveness of each component of the portfolio in encouraging innovation. It measures innovation as investment into the innovation process (R&D expenditures) and the resulting success of that investment (patents and citations).

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of firm-specific (i.e. firm size, profitability, leverage, dividend, growth opportunities, management quality and firm age) and country-specific (i.e., gross domestic product [GDP] growth) variables on compensation/remuneration offered to chief executive officers (CEOs) working in different industries of Pakistan.

Panel data techniques, namely, pooled ordinary least squares, fixed effects and random effects methods are used to estimate the results. Moreover, Hausman test is used to choose which estimation method, either fixed effects or random effects, is better to explain the results.

Firm size, profitability, leverage, growth opportunities and age are some important firm-specific factors that have mixed (i.e. positive/negative) impact on CEO compensation in different industries. Variations in results are due to industry dynamics. However, it is important to mention that three key variables, namely, dividend, management quality and GDP growth have shown consistent positive impact on CEO compensation in most of the industries. In sum, results show that firm-specific and country-specific variables have material effects on CEO compensation. Moreover, results are found consistent with the predictions of agency theory and human capital theory.

The authors are sure that findings of this study provide some support to the board of directors to determine the pay slice for CEOs. Moreover, findings provide support to the regulatory authorities in formulating mechanisms to determine the compensation package for CEOs working in different industries and to improve the Code of Corporate Governance.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no empirical study in Pakistan has yet estimated the effects of firm-specific and country-specific variables on compensation offered to CEOs working in different industries. Thus, industry-wise analysis provides some new insights to the decision-makers and lays some foundation upon which a more detail analysis could be based.