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The authors analyze the association between the functional background of the compensation committee chair and CEO compensation. The analysis is motivated by the continuing debate about the reasonableness of executive pay patterns and the growing emphasis on the role of compensation committees.

The authors define three expert categories—accounting, finance, and generalist—and collect data on the compensation committee (CC) chairs of the S&P 500 firms from 2008 to 2018. The authors run an ordinary least square model and regress CEO total and cash compensation on the three expert categories.

The authors find that firms in which the CC chair has expertise in accounting, finance, and general business favor performance measures that are more aligned with accounting, finance, and general business, respectively. There is little evidence that CC chairs who are CEOs of other firms endorse more generous pay for the host CEO; the authors find some evidence that CC chairs tenure relative to the host CEO's is negatively associated with the level of the CEO's pay.

This study suggests that firms and regulators should consider the background of the compensation committee chair to understand the variations in top executive.

Companies desiring to link executive compensation to particular areas of strategy must also consider matching the functional background of the compensation committee chair with the target strategy areas. From regulatory standpoint, requiring compensation committees to operate independent of inside directors can reduce attempts by inside directors to skim the process, but a failure to also consider the impact of compensation committees' discretion over the pay-setting process can distort the executives' pay-performance relation.

This is the first study to examine the effects of the functional background of the compensation committee chair on CEO compensation.

This paper aims to investigate whether executive compensation, corporate social responsibility (CSR)-based incentives, environmental social and governance (ESG) performance and firm performance are the significant predictors of CSR committees, in addition to CEO, firm and corporate governance characteristics, from the tenet of stakeholder and managerial power theories.

Switzerland is an exemplary country from the perspective of corporate governance and executive compensation. This empirical study includes a panel data set of listed Swiss companies, so fixed-effect logistic regression has been used.

It has been found that the companies that offer CSR-based incentives and higher compensation to their CEOs and have better ESG performance are more likely to have CSR committees.

This empirical paper fills the gap in the literature, guides practitioners about the factors that influence the creation and efficiency of CSR committees, and inspires regulatory bodies to ponder on a mandatory CSR committee to form resilient and sustainable organizations worldwide.

COVID-19 has re-emphasized the prominence of sustainability and the stakeholder approach. Thus, this paper indicates that CSR committees require the adaption and implementation of a holistic sustainability policy that integrates both external and internal factors and thereby provides a whole process for sustainability issues.

The impact of CSR committees on corporate social performance (CSP) has already been investigated. However, the predictors of CSR committees have been less scrutinized in the literature.

This paper aims to synthesize the diverse literature on nomination and remuneration committees and provide avenues for future research.

This study provides a comprehensive literature review of theoretical and empirical studies published in reputable international journals indexed by Scopus.

The literature review reveals several aspects of the nomination and remuneration committee. These aspects have been classified into the definition of the nomination and remuneration committee, dimensions of the nomination and remuneration committee, measurement and research review results, reasons for conflict empirical findings, company dynamics and research on moderators, as well as recommending future research.

Our literature review shows that nomination and remuneration committees play a role in improving board performance and company performance, reducing agency conflicts and improving corporate governance to provide implications for companies, regulators and investors and pave the way for future research.

This paper identifies issues related to nomination and remuneration committees, their theoretical and practical implications and avenues for future research.

This paper aims to review empirical research on the relationship between institutional ownership (IO) and board governance (85 studies).

Based on agency and upper echelons theory, the heterogeneous monitoring function of specific types and the nature of institutional investors on board composition, compensation and chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics will be focused.

The author found that most studies have referred to archival studies, analyzed the impact of board governance on IO, focused on CEO characteristics, neglected IO heterogeneity and advanced regression models to address endogeneity concerns. In line with the theoretical framework, the relationship between total IO and board governance is heterogeneous. However, specific types such as foreign, dedicated and pressure-resistant institutions represent active monitoring tools and push for increased board governance.

The author provided useful recommendations for future research from a content and methodological perspective, e.g. the need for analyzing the impact of IO on sustainable board governance and other characteristics of top management team members, e.g. the chief financial officer.

As many regulatory bodies implemented regulations to promote shareholder rights and board governance, this literature review highlights the connections of both corporate governance mechanisms. Managers should conduct a careful and timely investor analysis and change the composition and compensation of the board of directors in line with institutional investors’ preferences.

This analysis makes useful contributions to prior research by focusing on IO and board governance, whereas the author structured the heterogeneous variables and results within the structured literature review. The authors guides researchers, regulatory bodies and business practice in this corporate governance topic.

The purpose of this study is threefold: to examine the impact of a remuneration committee (RC) on the level of chief executive officer (CEO) remuneration; whether firms with a RC, pay a premium to CEOs with different skill sets (general or specific); and whether a pay premium mitigates the potential for CEO turnover.

This study uses a sample of 5,305 firm-year observations on a data set drawn from companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange for the period 2007 to 2014. The authors use ordinary least squares as well as logit regression techniques to test the formulated hypotheses. Difference in difference and propensity score matching techniques were undertaken to address the endogeneity concerns.

The findings show that firms with a RC pay a higher total remuneration to CEOs compared to firms without a RC. Furthermore, firms with a RC, value and reward CEOs with general skills by paying a premium not offered to CEOs with industry-specific skills. Paying a premium, in turn, mitigates CEO turnover by strengthening the CEO’s commitment to the organisation.

The study helps us to understand the critical role played by the RC in the remuneration of CEOs. The findings show that RCs act as an effective governance mechanism to deal with issues of executive remuneration and to retain skilled CEOs. Additionally, CEOs who acquire and develop general managerial skills will be able to extract higher pay from improved bargaining power. The findings will be of relevance to shareholders, regulators and company management who have an interest in executive pay and performance.

This study aims to examine whether the presence of advisory directors affects firm discretionary accruals (DACC), a widely used proxy for financial reporting quality. The authors argue that the advisory director weakens the board monitoring role and impairs the firm financial reporting quality by increasing DACC.

The sample consists of listed firms on the Australian Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2015 using 7,649 firm-year observations. The authors perform descriptive statistics, regression and propensity score matching analyses to examine the research hypothesis.

The research evidence that firms with a higher presence of advisory directors have more DACC, indicating poor financial reporting quality. Furthermore, the authors categorize the DACC and find that the firm has higher income-increasing DACC in the presence of higher advisory directors. The findings are robust concerning endogeneity issues.

The research evidence that firms with a higher presence of advisory directors have more DACC, indicating poor financial reporting quality. Furthermore, the authors categorize the DACC and find that the firm has higher income-increasing DACC in the presence of higher advisory directors. The findings are robust concerning endogeneity issues.

The research contributes valuable insights for regulators and policymakers seeking to comprehend the implications of firms using more advisory directors. Additionally, the authors recognize the potential significance of the findings for the institution of directors, as they can provide a nuanced understanding of the specific roles played by advisory directors in organizational dynamics.

While the extensive body of literature on corporate governance and financial reporting quality has been well-established, a noticeable void exists in academic research delving into the relationship between advisory directors and DACC management. This study seeks to fill this gap, making a distinctive and original contribution to the existing literature on corporate governance.

In light of the key role attributed to the board of directors as a monitoring tool to constrain earnings management practices, this study aims to examine the effect of some board attributes on accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management in the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) context, whose institutional, economic and legal environment is markedly different from that of most organization for economic cooperation and development countries.

The authors selected a sample of 161 nonfinancial companies from nine MENA countries between 2014 and 2021 (corresponding to an unbalanced data panel of 486 observations). The authors used the generalized least squares regression test to examine the relationship between board attributes and earnings management.

The authors found that three board attributes (size, independence and gender diversity) have no effect on both types of earnings management practices, while CEO duality has no effect on accrual-based earnings management but has a significant and negative effect on real earnings management. Overall, the results suggest that most board attributes do not play a crucial role in reducing earnings management.

The results provide valuable insights into the universal role of corporate governance mechanisms and raise questions about the role of the board of directors in improving reporting quality in the MENA context.

Regulators should adapt corporate governance mechanisms to the characteristics of the institutional context in which they are inserted.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to examine the effect of various board characteristics on both types of earnings management practices in the MENA context. It also provides the first empirical evidence of the relationship between board gender diversity and earnings management in the MENA region.

Nwaeze and Kalelkar (2023) examine the association between the functional background of the compensation committee chair (CC chair) and CEO compensation using S&P 500 firms from 2008 to 2018. They find that the CC chair's functional background is positively associated with the adoption of performance measures that are more aligned with such background. This discussion starts with Nwaeze and Kalelkar's (2023) incremental contribution, and offers suggestions on two areas for improvement. First, the authors could provide a more focused discussion of the conceptual framework. Second, the authors could improve their empirical design and interpretation of results. Avenues for future research are also suggested.

This discussion suggests methods and model specifications that may strengthen the research design, facilitate the interpretation of results, and provide additional insights.

The discussed paper could improve the reliability and rigor of the empirical tests and the conclusions by providing more contextual and granular information on firms' actual CEO compensation arrangements, using more careful testing procedures, and enhancing clarity in the writing.

Researchers could be interested in alternative perspectives and richer analyses of non-agency model based determinants of CEO compensation.

T Education is a leading educational science and technology enterprise in China with technology-driven, talent intimacy and quality leadership as the core development objectives. Since its inception, it has been committed to creating better learning experience for children. As the predecessor of T-education, X-education was founded in Beijing in 2003. At first, it mainly provided after-school math counseling for school-age children. Over the past 10 years, its business has been expanding, covering almost every aspect of school-age education. This case studies accounting issues and business ethics challenges that firms may face when they transform from a single (traditional education) line of business to a multiple channel business.

Based on stakeholder, agency and institutional theory, this study aims to examine the role of institutional ownership in the relationship between environmental, social and governance practices and CEO compensation.

Utilizing a fixed-effect panel regression analysis, this research utilized a panel data approach, analyzing data spanning from 2014 to 2021, focusing on US companies listed on the S&P500 stock market index. The dataset encompassed 219 companies, leading to a total of 1,533 observations.

The analysis identified that environmental scores significantly impact CEO equity-linked compensation, unlike social and governance scores. Additionally, it was found that institutional ownership acts as a moderating factor in the relationship between the environmental score and CEO equity-linked compensation, as well as the association between the social score and CEO equity-linked compensation. Interestingly, the direction of these moderating effects varied between the two relationships, suggesting a nuanced role of institutional ownership.

This research makes a unique contribution to the field of corporate governance by exploring the relatively understudied area of institutional ownership's influence on the ESG practices–CEO compensation nexus.