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This paper proposes to describe a model and the results of a simulation exercise used to compare welfare outcomes for four governance regimes that might be employed for wireless services: two spectrum ownership regimes and two open commons regimes. Aims also to examine practical implications for policy makers.

A formal economic model was constructed and computational techniques were employed to explore the welfare consequences of alternative applications of policy instruments.

For the model examined, the market does as well as can be expected from government in setting interference tolerance for both types of regimes. However, commons regimes always generate excessive entry. While the theoretical optimum achievable by government in an ownership regime exceeds predicted welfare for a commons regime, for most model specifications the difference is not too large and an ownership regime can easily under‐perform a commons regime if imperfectly‐informed policy makers set policy variables incorrectly.

The necessity of using computational methods limits the generality of the findings.

The modeling approach and analysis identify critical tradeoffs that must be addressed by policy makers in designing spectrum governance institutions.

This analytical approach makes possible hitherto impossible, side‐by‐side performance comparisons for alternative governance regimes. The framework can be extended and generalized to other policy issues.

This paper seeks to examine current trends in spectrum management and implications for developing countries.

The paper summarizes the findings of an extensive review of recent literature on spectrum management. It addresses three questions: What is the case for spectrum management reform? What is the current debate on spectrum management all about? Why does this matter to developing countries?

Traditional spectrum management practice has led to technical and economic inefficiencies as well as obstacles to technological innovation. Two alternative approaches are being tried, one driven by the market (spectrum property rights) and another driven by technology innovation (commons). Practical solutions are evolving that combine some features of both. Although these changes are mainly taking place in high‐income countries, they are deeply relevant to developing countries as well.

Improving traditional administration of the spectrum in many developing countries would yield significant benefits, but governments may wish to consider moving straight into property rights or commons approaches. Countries at an early stage of building up spectrum management capacity may benefit from adopting new solutions from the start. These may be especially well suited for low‐ and middle‐income countries.

The paper offers a concise overview of major current trends in spectrum management, against which the responses of developing countries can be examined. The paper is extensively annotated and includes a selection of references, many of which are accessible online.

An aspect of spectrum reform receiving increasing attention is the introduction of secondary markets for spectrum in order to enable more flexibility to reassign unused and underused spectrum to users that will use it more efficiently. This paper proposes to focus on the policy issues relating to the development of well‐functioning secondary markets for spectrum.

The paper reviews developments in the debate over secondary markets for spectrum. It draws together key elements from the academic literature, various government and government‐commissioned reports, and the practical experience of the few countries that have already introduced spectrum trading. There is considerable focus on concerns and potential costs relating to the introduction of spectrum trading and liberalisation. This has a constructive aim – to draw attention to the need to address such concerns in order to facilitate the development of spectrum trading.

While there is a persuasive case for spectrum trading, countries have been slow to introduce it because of a number of concerns. This paper identifies these concerns and the regulatory framework/policies needed to address them.

The paper distils the policy issues in the debate over spectrum trading and identifies the role that regulators will need to play in the introduction, facilitation and regulation of secondary markets for spectrum.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse some of the spectrum management policy implications of an evolving set of wireless technologies. Specially, deployment of heterogeneous networks (HetNets) as part of the rollout of long-term evolution networks and their expected use as the heart of next-generation services raises the question as to whether such networks should lead to any spectrum management policy changes.

The paper describes the use and variety of HetNets when using licensed and unlicensed or commons spectrum.

The paper demonstrates that there is little need to change current spectrum licensing regimes to deal with these networks in a licensed spectrum. However, it also shows that the deployment of HetNets other than WiFi in an unlicensed spectrum creates an information asymmetry, which means that spectrum regulators will find assessment of spectrum demand more difficult. The paper also highlights the problem facing spectrum regulators when there is a potential for interference to unlicensed services which are widely deployed but have no right to protection from interference.

Spectrum regulators will need to understand the extent to which an unlicensed spectrum is being used by mobile network operators to deliver wireless broadband services. This understanding is needed to be able to address potential interference with other services using an unlicensed spectrum and to be able to forecast spectrum demand.

The development of technologies that are designed to be used by existing mobile network operators for the delivery of wireless broadband services using an unlicensed spectrum creates novel regulatory challenges. This paper reviews some of these.

New technologies challenge the traditional view that the radio spectrum must be tightly controlled and the new orthodoxy that a market‐based approach is the most efficient way to manage the spectrum. This article aims to make the case for collective use of the spectrum.

The paper draws on a range of literature, both technical and economic, as well as the authors' opinions to describe the economic context, market and other models for spectrum allocation, technological advances in signal processing, and the way forward for assessing future spectrum management policy, with particular reference to Europe.

Technical advances, from research in the commercial domain and from release of military research, combined with the increasingly important economic need to facilitate innovation in new radio technologies, demand a debate on a new approach to spectrum management policy.

The paper brings together the economic and technical arguments in favour of collective use of the radio spectrum and will be of value to academics, business and policy makers.

To provide an evaluation of an EU spectrum policy proposal aimed at furthering the goals of the i2010 Information Society initiative.

This paper revisits the methodology premised on neoclassical principles devised by Ronald Coase. An evaluation of EU spectrum reform based on the work of J.R. Commons is proposed.

The approach by Coase fails to take into account the need for institutional reform of the spectrum management process. The approach of J.R. Commons identifies areas that will have to be addressed if the proposals for EU spectrum reform are to be met.

The methodology advanced by J.R. Commons provides a more complete account of interdependent variables associated with spectrum management and is likely to lead to workable solutions to this complex policy problem. However, it is less theoretically coherent than Coase's model.

Recommendations for reform and problem areas are suggested that consider both market and extra‐market valuation of the spectrum resource.

This paper addresses this issue and provides an alternative model based on institutional economic analysis using the methodology given by J.R. Commons.

This paper seeks to give an account of how unlicensed radio services moved from being a by‐product of the ISM bands to a deliberate spectrum allocation, with clearly defined goals and objectives that could be achieved only by not subjecting the spectrum to licensing or auctions.

The paper describes the aforementioned issue in detail.

The paper has found that unlicensed radio services moved from being a by‐product of the ISM bands to a deliberate spectrum allocation, with clearly defined goals and objectives that could be achieved only by not subjecting the spectrum to licensing or auctions.

The paper presents an account of how unlicensed radio services moved from being a by‐product of the ISM bands to a deliberate spectrum allocation, with clearly defined goals and objectives that could be achieved only by not subjecting the spectrum to licensing or auctions.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief history on the Part 15 rules.

The approach takes the form of a systematic overview of spectrum policy applied to rules governing unlicensed devices since 1938.

Much of the policy debate in the last decade has been couched in terms of how spectrum rights are defined. The jurisprudence underlying the Part 15 rules is that unlicensed spectrum is not spectrum at all. Rather, the rules concentrate on the effective power and modulation characteristic of the radio devices themselves. Perhaps this is the next great idea for all spectrum policy: spectrum does not really exist. It is merely an idea – a concept – a way of describing and organizing the physical world in people's minds and actions. Spectrum is a legal and engineering construct to control for an immutable fundamental physical property.

Research limitations encompass typical limitations of a case study of a historical event.

The paper informs ongoing efforts to update and modernize spectrum policy.

The paper provides a retrospective view of spectrum policy.

The aim of this paper is to consider whether it is possible to identify the future spectrum bands most suitable for the Internet of Things (IoT) from the operating factors of a novel set of radio services for a very wide range of applications, as an aid to policy makers now facing decisions in this area.

The approach uses characteristics of spectrum bands against the applications’ requirements to focus on specific major traits that can be matched.

The main choice factors for spectrum are the practical application needs and the network cost model, and these are fairly useful as matching parameters. It is forecast that multiple bands will be needed and that these should be of a licence-exempt form to seed the unfettered innovation of IoT technologies and pre-empt the formation of significant market power by concerned interests.

The way in which spectrum is allocated today will need to be reconsidered, in the light of evolving IoT requirements, which will have increasing economic and social impacts. Policy recommendations for IoT spectrum demands are outlined, and key policy options to ensure a dynamic and trustworthy development of the IoT are put forward. For instance, regulatory barriers globally will need to be removed.

Current interests in the technical requirements of the IoT have not yet given a suitable analysis of the potential spectrum uses, because too often, it is assumed that previous models of spectrum allocation will continue in the future, without consideration of the economic pressures and social context.