Search results

Social entrepreneurs engage in collective action to adapt and solve social problems in complex environments. Through collective action, they mobilise and access resources to create positive social change in local communities. While previous studies explain the role of social identity in promoting cooperation, this paper aims to examine shared meaning as a predictor of collective action in social entrepreneurial ventures (SEVs). This study was conducted among founders of SEVs focusing on their engagement in collective action.

The study adopted a cross-sectional survey to achieve its objectives. The population comprised 558 SEVs registered with the Kampala Capital City Authority in Uganda. A sample size of 226 social ventures was determined using Krecjie and Morgan and participants were selected using the simple random sampling technique. The questionnaires were distributed by two research assistants, and 210 completed questionnaires were returned. Structural equation modelling was used to analyse survey data and test the study hypotheses.

The study findings show that shared meaning in the form of teamwork and group efficacy predict collective action in SEVs.

The results have implications for social entrepreneurship researchers, practitioners and policymakers. Firstly, creating social ties by belonging to different groups in the community creates common understanding among social entrepreneurs and other actors fostering cooperation to solve problems in the local community. Secondly, understanding each other’s perspective well enough facilitates a shared view of social problems for combined action.

SEVs should provide relevant information using the right channels in local communities to promote collaboration. Failure to use the right communication channels may prevent collective action. Managers in social ventures should allow for open information sharing between themselves and the partners that they work with to address social problems. This enables them to share both the good and bad feedback. It also enables the growth of teams and improves how they work. The teams should be developed with specific responsibilities so that everyone is clear on what they should do while addressing social problems.

The researchers argue that shared meaning develops when social entrepreneurs interact with the local community and other stakeholders prompting joint action to address social problems. This study extends knowledge on collective action using the activity domain theory.

Here I present a theory of collective action that emphasizes the role of status. I argue that collective action contributions earn individuals improved status by signaling their concern for the group's welfare relative to their own. Having received greater prestige for their contributions to group goals, individuals’ actual motivation to help the group is increased, leading to greater subsequent contributions to group efforts and greater feelings of group solidarity. This “virtuous cycle” of costly contributions to group efforts and enhanced standing in the group shows one way in which individuals’ prosocial behaviors are socially constructed, a consequence of individuals’ basic concern for what others think of them. I discuss a variety of issues related to the theory, including its scope of application, theoretical implications, relationship to alternative models of reputation and prosocial behavior, possible practical applications, and directions for future research.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of social capital with bonding and bridging distinction in promoting higher participation in collective action in participatory irrigation management.

A sample of 304 farmers was surveyed using a structured questionnaire. A focus group discussion was also carried out with randomly selected water users, leaders and irrigation officers. A confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modelling were used to test the hypothesised relationship of bonding and bridging social capital towards collective action.

The findings show that social capital has a significant direct effect on collective action and an indirect effect on joint irrigation management's perceived performance through collective action (mediator). It implies the need to complement the participatory irrigation management programme with an understanding of the social aspects for a higher farmer's participation over the shared resource.

The paper emphasises social capital's role in facilitating a real participatory engagement in shared resource management. Also, it is the first scholarly work linking social capital with bonding and bridging distinction towards collective action in a joint resource management context.

Previous research combining corporate political activity and collective action theory has focused solely on industry structure and its role in predicting group lobbying or PAC participation. The purpose of this paper is to use a different context—franchise systems—to apply Olsonian collective action theory to political activities.

Using a random-effects technique in STATA on an unbalanced panel data set, this paper empirically models the effects of franchise system size and degree of franchising on the level of lobbying intensity.

Since franchise systems are made up of differing unit ownership structure, the author first model if those systems that are fully franchised lobby less than those with franchisor unit ownership (supported). Next, since collective action theory predicts that more participants in a space will lead to less collective action, the author predict that franchise systems with larger unit counts will lobby less than those with smaller counts (not supported). Finally, the author test the interaction of these two effects as systems that are fully franchised and of higher unit totals should have an even greater negative relationship with political activity (supported).

This paper uses both a novel data set and a novel context to study collective action. Previous research has utilized an industry structure context to model the level of lobbying and collective action, while the current research uses an analogous logic, but in the context of franchise systems.

We develop elements of Network Exchange and Expectation States Theories to explain the relationship between power and status. While power and status are highly correlated, demonstrating that power can be used to attain high status has proven difficult, perhaps because negative reactions to power use limit power users’ influence. We propose three ways to reduce negative reactions to power use. One of them, philanthropy, suggests a solution to the “free-rider” problem in collective action. If philanthropic contributions increase status, then contributing to a public good may also. Thus, status attainment may be an incentive motivating public goods contributions.

Innovation – the process of transforming research ideas into marketable products and services – requires the collaboration of multiple actors across a variety of interactive situations. Increasingly, innovation is recognized as an important driver of economic growth and human development. Understanding the contexts within which these actors – including researchers, university administrators, entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, private corporations, and public officials – solve recurrent and often complex problems of collective action is therefore of interest to analysts and policymakers. This task begins with the broader theoretical understanding, emphasized by Austrian economists, of the economy as an intricate, interactive, and interconnected system. In complement, the applications to practical policy analysis, developed by Vincent Ostrom and Elinor Ostrom and their colleagues at the Bloomington School, emphasize the role of crafting rules and designing policies to solve recurrent problems of collective action.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of four components of social capital on farmers’ participative behaviour in collective actions for constructing and operating small-scale groundwater irrigation systems on the Guanzhong Plain, Shaanxi Province, China.

The four components (social networks, social trust, social reciprocity and social participation) were derived by employing exploratory factor analysis. Logistic model was used to estimate the influence of these components on farmers’ participative behaviour. Information was obtained from a field survey covering six counties in 2011 of Shaanxi Province, China.

The findings indicate that considering different components of social capital allows for a better understanding of farmers’ participative behaviour. The authors find that higher levels of social trust and social participation lead to a higher propensity for collective action, while social reciprocity reduces the probability of participation. Other socio-economic factors and farming characteristics such as education levels, cultivated area, cropping patterns and grain subsidies also have a significant impact.

The findings suggest creating favourable conditions for communication and information exchanges between households, which enhance their trust of each other, and encourage farmers to participate in collective affairs. Moreover, supportive rules are necessary for the future development of collective action. The results of this study also have implications for national irrigation plans for small-scale irrigation facilities in other developing countries.

A consideration of the different components of social capital allows for a more precise understanding of farmers’ participative behaviour.

Hong Kong is a wealthy part of China, home to some of the tallest buildings, on some of the most expensive real estate in the world. Yet the living and working conditions of its residents are a cause for concern following a spate of fires and falling debris from poorly maintained blocks of residential and commercial flats, which have resulted in multiple fatalities. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Government has set up a number of initiatives to examine fire and building repairs, after the result of its own survey of 27,000 private buildings found the majority to be unsafe with respect to fire safety. Looks at the role of government in reducing the social cost of the real estate management system. Based on a theory of collective action between flat owners, using a transaction cost approach, identifies the formal laws and informal social culture in the management system of high rise property. Develops a framework to show how government intervention would alter the high transaction costs of collective action and reduce social costs.

This paper aims to show that zakat solves the collective action problem by changing the framework of giving. An additional purpose of this paper is an attempt to fill a critical gap in the Islamic economics literature. This gap concerns the nature and role of zakat in effectively delivering aid to those in need while mitigating the potential for free riding. There is also a general gap in the current literature on Islamic economics that the issues of zakat and charity have not received the same attention as the focus remained mostly on money, banking and the issues of interest and usury. The paper is also an attempt to provide a refocus.

This paper attempts to build an argument to show how zakat can function as a unique solution to the free-rider problem in voluntary charity. The author’s argument is based on a precise theoretical framework, namely the “free-rider problem,” and how zakat can function as a unique solution to this problem. The author also uses game theory to show how reputation can lead to cooperation in a repeated game. The author uses an example from Pakistan to show how reputation can be a disciplinarian of zakat collection organizations.

Zakat solves both the free-rider problem in ordinary charity and the coordination problem between members in a large group. The free-rider problem is solved by changing the very framework of giving and the coordination problem between Muslims around the globe disappears because the rates and details of levying zakat are centrally created based on divine revelation.

This paper presents an important topic as it addresses one of the most popular giving practices in Muslim societies, called zakat. It also provides a framework in examining the meaning and function of zakat in Muslim societies.

The purpose of this paper is to study how individuals assess responsibility during an uncontrollable event requiring collective action, using crises affecting service workers as contexts. Specifically, the authors examine what parties consumers hold responsible for ensuring service worker welfare following an uncontrollable event and determine what factors make customers more open to accepting responsibility for ensuring worker welfare themselves.

The authors surveyed a nationally representative sample of US consumers regarding their attitudes toward protecting service workers during COVID-19 and used regression analysis to identify factors that predict attributions of responsibility to customers. The authors also conducted an experiment (using a new crisis context) to determine whether certain key factors impact customer perceptions of their own responsibility for helping employees during an uncontrollable event.

The survey results show US consumers hold firms most responsible for worker welfare, followed by customers and, finally, government. When examining factors that drive attributions of responsibility for customers, perceptions of how sincere firms are in their efforts to help employees predict higher responsibility attributions, and experimental results confirm that higher perceived firm sincerity increases consumers’ own sense of responsibility toward workers.

This research identifies factors that affect consumer support for efforts to help service employees and collective action problems more generally.

This research highlights an under-studied crisis context – uncontrollable events that require collective action – and shows how consumers make assessments about their own responsibility (in addition to the responsibility of the service firm) in these contexts.