Search results

This article combines two sources of data to shed light on the nature of transactional legal work. The first consists of stories about contracts that circulate among elite transactional lawyers. The stories portray lawyers as ineffective market actors who are uninterested in designing superior contracts, who follow rather than lead industry standards, and who depend on governments and other outside actors to spur innovation and correct mistakes. We juxtapose these stories against a dataset of sovereign bond contracts produced by these same lawyers. While the stories suggest that lawyers do not compete or design innovative contracts, their contracts suggest the contrary. The contracts, in fact, are consistent with a market narrative in which lawyers engage in substantial innovation despite constraints inherent in sovereign debt legal work. Why would lawyers favor stories that paint them in a negative light and deny them a potent role as market actors? We conclude with some conjectures as to why this might be so.

The social protests on the streets of indebted sovereigns in crises across the Eurozone have made debt restructuring an imperative. Further delay in achieving this expeditiously and equitably significantly exacerbates the social costs of crises from which current and future generations will struggle to recover. This article examines the feasibility of the drastic and widespread debt restructuring needed to resolve the problem in the face of existing private law sanctions that protect individual creditor rights. It relies on an analysis of US policy in the transition to a securitized market and of key sovereign debt cases to reveal the historical contingency of private law protections. It concludes by showing that the effectiveness of private law protections have always been constrained by the overriding imperative to achieve debt sustainability with negotiated and consensual workouts. This can be achieved in the Eurozone with statutory constraints on enforcement action pending the settlement of debt workouts as suggested in a recent proposal.

This chapter seeks to explain the effects of actions in investment treaty tribunals against states in the European Periphery. The chapter examines the case of Spain and the multiple actions brought against it due to changes in support structures for the production of solar electricity. The aim of this analysis is to test whether investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) can further the cause of environmental sustainability.

In its opening part the chapter employs a ‘socio-legal’ methodology, showing the links between legal frameworks and the evolution of social and political norms. The chapter then adopts a ‘law and economics’ approach in presenting recent developments seeking to tease out the dynamic between legal changes, economic effects, policy reactions and dispute resolution.

While there is significant uncertainty over the strength of the legal arguments of claimants, it seems possible that they will be successful in claiming compensation from the Spanish government. Nonetheless, a win for the investors is unlikely to reverse the Spanish policy of ending support for renewables due to fiscal constraints. The conclusion is that such actions have a negative impact in terms of promoting the spread of renewables and they inhibit recovery in crisis hit nations.

The chapter offers context on the use of ISDS against the background of the European crisis. This analysis has wider connotations for policy design as it feeds directly into concerns about multilateral agreements under negotiation, such as TTIP.

This is the first comprehensive academic study of the changes in Spanish regulatory frameworks regarding clean energy incentives. It is also the first comprehensive presentation of the actions brought against Spain as a result of these changes.

With the debt crisis that has been impacting many countries in the Global South since 2015, its spectacular acceleration following the collateral effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the ever-increasing weight of “new” creditors (China, Gulf countries, and private creditors), the old debate for the creation of an international sovereign debt restructuring mechanism under the aegis of the United Nations has resurfaced. Although such a mechanism could constitute a real advance compared to the current situation, it remains very hypothetical, both because of its limits and because of the complexity of the process to be undertaken in view of the adoption of an international treaty endorsing its creation. Above all, it ignores the sovereignty of states and the right to self-determination of peoples. Other solutions exist, which are less complicated, less expensive, and not at all less legitimate, among which the establishment of a moratorium with interest freeze and the creation of an audit committee with citizen participation aiming at canceling or repudiating the illegitimate debts with regard to international law and national legal provisions.

Following a successful debt-renegotiation process in the mid-2000s, Argentina consolidated a path of growth and debt relief. The outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2007–2009 and other domestic imbalances altered the economic scenario. In this context, the authorities tried to return to global financial markets, but legal conflict with vulture funds made that option unpalatable. In 2015, the triumph of a right-wing political coalition restored the dominance of neoliberal economic policies, including the return to debt and equity markets. The subsequent cycle of indebtedness and capital flight faced by Argentina not only unleashed a major crisis but also caused the return of the International Monetary Fund, which granted the largest lending arrangement to a single country in its history. The aims of this chapter are to analyze the winding cycle of debt reduction and overindebtedness experienced by Argentina between 2001 and 2022; to examine the set of structural factors as well as the role of certain domestic and foreign actors; and to consider the long-term effects of external indebtedness and some lessons that can be drawn for other countries in the Global South.

This introduction unpacks the key question that informs the articles in this special issue. How does a social sphere inform regulation and, more specifically, how can the regulatory capacity of a social sphere be harnessed, as an alternative or significant complementary force to state regulation and reliance on the self-regulatory capacity of markets? This question is salient and topical also in light of the search for new regulatory strategies and perspectives in the aftermath of the 2007 financial and subsequent EU sovereign debt crises, which have led to a major realignment of economy and society in a number of countries.

This introduction argues that economic sociology is a crucial reference point for understanding more about the social practices that constitute business behavior. It enables to explore the scope and significance of often interlinked social and legal norms for regulating various transnational risks that economic activity can give rise to. The introduction therefore locates the quest for understanding more about the regulatory capacity of a social sphere in debates that draw on Karl Polanyi’s analysis of the embedding, disembedding, and re-embedding of economic activity into social norms. The introduction highlights one of the key themes developed in this special issue, the idea of society within economy which questions an assumed conceptual distinction between economy and society.

This introduction concludes by specifying how the accounts of risk regulation developed in this special issue chart a path that is different from recent explorations of the role of a social sphere in regulation, which were conducted under the banner of “the sociological citizen,” “regulatory sociability,” and “collaborative governance.”

In the domestic credit market creditor and debtor rights are clearly defined. In contrast, sovereign debt repayment is largely contingent on the debtor government’s willingness to repay as enforcement of contracts at the international level is limited. In this chapter we explore different sources of sovereign debt crises as opportunistic and myopic behavior by debtor nations, over-consumption of imported goods, credit temptation by lenders eager to allocate savings surpluses, and unexpected consequences of initially seen appropriate policies. We explore how these factors have played out in the Euro-debt crisis and outline a framework for creditor responsibility to complement debtor self-restraint.

During the banking crisis of October 2008, Iceland became the first developed country in decades to seek the assistance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Iceland’s IMF programme provided a measure of stability at a time of intense turbulence. The IMF’s credibility was helpful during this period of collapse not just of the banks but also of the public trust towards almost all Icelandic institutions. Importantly, the IMF implicitly supported Iceland’s policy of letting institutional creditors of the banks rather than Icelandic taxpayers bear the costs of their collapse; this provided credibility for the policy and limited repercussions. In a reversal of previous IMF policy, capital controls were imposed. The controls helped stabilise the exchange rate, and inflation subsided. The controls also helped recovery after the crisis by shielding the economy from international financial shocks. The direct fiscal cost of the Icelandic crisis was very high, but the considerable and painful fiscal tightening that was a part of the programme was needed to avoid a sovereign debt crisis. This helped in regaining trust from international markets. Mistakes were made in the design and implementation of the IMF programme, but overall, we judge that its contribution was positive. The programme provided one of the elements for restoring trust in Iceland when it was most needed, both domestically and internationally, during the depth of the crisis in 2009–2010.

Austerity in Greece has produced the ostensibly counterproductive effect of throwing the country into a deeper depression and rendering it more difficult to repay its debts. I address this apparent paradox by examining both the integration of Greece into the European Monetary Union and post-crisis austerity measures with a particular focus on the Greek credit system. I do so by employing a historical materialist framework focusing on Marx’s concept of ‘fictitious capital’, capital not backed by a commodity transaction, but by a claim on future value. I argue that, while the crisis is overdetermined, one hitherto unexplored dimension is the rapid expansion of the Greek credit system in the 1990s and 2000s. More specifically, Greek banks expanded to neighbouring countries, and borrowing by households and firmed spiked dramatically after Greece adopted the Euro, but a number of domestic political-economic factors acted as drags to this process. In this context, I argue that the crisis has served as an opportunity to impose a radically accelerated restructuring of the Greek economy in line with the ideal neoliberal utopia. This can be understood as one of the three responses to a crisis of fictitious capital: internal devaluation, asset devaluation or upward. However, the success of this project is far from guaranteed, so far the austerity project pursued by the troika has failed to replace the old Greek balance of social forces that have dominated the post-junta political economy of Greece.