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Purpose – To discuss, from the perspective of developing countries, recent proposals for reforming international standards for bank capital requirements.

Methodology/approach – After evaluating, from the viewpoint of developing countries, the effectiveness of capital requirements reforms and progress in implementing existing regulatory accords, the chapter discusses the procyclical effects of Basel regimes, and suggests a reform proposal.

Findings – Minimum bank capital requirements proposals in developing countries should be complemented by the adoption of an incremental, size-based leverage ratio.

Originality/value of chapter – This chapter contributes to enlarge the academic and policy debate related to bank capital regulation, with a particular focus on the situation of developing countries.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the consequences of the “safe harbor” provisions of the US Bankruptcy Code that were enacted from 1984 through 2005 and that protect certain financial contracts from standard bankruptcy procedures.

Qualitative methods are used to evaluate whether these provisions of the Bankruptcy Code were successful in their stated goal of reducing systemic risk in the financial system. A model of systemic risk is presented verbally in order to frame the discussion.

Recent evidence indicates that the “safe harbor” provisions, in fact, destabilized the financial system by encouraging collateralized interbank lending, discouraging careful analysis of the credit risk of counterparties and increasing the risk that creditors will run on a financial firm.

This paper indicates that the rewriting of the Bankruptcy Code to favor financial firms has had a profoundly destabilizing effect on the financial system. To put the financial system on more secure foundations, the author proposes that large complex financial institutions be prohibited from posting collateral on over the counter derivative transactions and that the repo‐related bankruptcy amendments passed in 2005 be repealed.

This paper proposes an original framework for understanding systemic risk which drives the results in the paper.

The housing finance market in Ghana is highly underdeveloped. This may be as a result of unfriendly or poor regulatory environment. This paper seeks to examine the regulatory environment and to determine its impact on the development of the formal housing finance market in the country.

The paper executes this by surveying the housing finance literature. It also carries out a review of the legal framework of the country's mortgage market.

It is found that inadequate foreclosure rights of lenders before December 2008 constrained the development of the formal housing finance market in Ghana. The research notes that the enactment of the Home Mortgage Finance Act, 2008 (Act 770) in December 2008 has created a conducive legal environment for collateralised lending in the country. This has improved the prospects of developing the housing finance market in the country.

It is noted that a credit bureau industry and mortgage refinancing mechanisms must be put in place if the Act 770, 2008 is to facilitate mortgage market development in the country. It recommends additional policy and institutional reforms.

The paper identifies the legal and institutional constraints on housing finance market development in Ghana.

Uses survey data to examine the nature of bank lending decisions at the local branch and regional office level. In doing so considers which firm and loan characteristics explicitly affect the nature of the lending contract. The results show the smallest firms, whose lending decisions are made at local branches, face slightly higher borrowing costs, yet this is offset by the reduced likelihood of collateral being requested. Further, suggests that the high degree of control aversion exhibited by such firms acts in a detrimental way by negating many of the obvious benefits of a localized banking relationship. On interest rate margins, presents clear evidence supporting credibility and legitimacy theories, with legal status and a lengthy track record reducing margins significantly. Regarding security levels, the results suggest that local branch banks have particularly short‐term lending horizons. The penalty in terms of collateral requirements on medium‐ to long‐term loans appear quite severe. This issue needs to be addressed to ensure that small firms in the UK receive the lower cost, longer‐term finance that would facilitate the structural growth of this sector.

The purpose of this paper is to propose reforms that would establish a credible framework of rules to constrain and guide emergency lending by the Federal Reserve and by fiscal authorities during a future financial crisis.

The authors propose a set of five overarching rules, informed by history, empirical evidence and theory, which would serve as the foundation on which detailed legislation should be constructed.

The authors find that the current framework governing emergency lending – including reforms to Federal Reserve lending enacted after the recent crisis – is inadequate and not credible, and that their proposed framework would constitute a credible balancing of costs and benefits.

Adequate assistance to financial institutions would be provided in systemic crises but would be limited in its form, and by the process that would govern its provision.

This framework would serve as a basis for establishing effective rules that would be credible, and that would properly balance the moral-hazard costs of emergency lending against the gains from avoiding systemic collapse of the financial system.

This chapter empirically investigates how banks evaluate the creditworthiness of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Following SME loan underwriting literature that distinguishes among different lending technologies, we test whether the typical SME bank loan is underwritten primarily based on just a single technology. We find that although financial statement lending is the most commonly used and serves as a kind of basic technology, it tends not to be used to the exclusion of other technologies. These findings imply that, at least in Japan, SME lending practice may be inconsistent with academic research on how banks underwrite loans elsewhere.

This chapter analyses the operational framework for monetary policy implementation in some central European countries that have recently joined the European Union (EU).¹ For the sake of simplicity, they will be referred to as “non-euro area countries” in the rest of the chapter (although such a classification also includes Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom) which are not analysed here. The analysis is based on public information collected for 2001; since then, the operational framework of these central banks has not changed substantially. Most of the recent changes in the operational framework have taken place in the Eurosystem (or euro area, as it is also commonly known). For this reason, more recent euro area data is reported for 2003 and 2004, and a detailed analysis is made wherever appropriate. The study therefore presents an uptodate comparison of operational frameworks across the countries. The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 examines the characteristics of the minimum reserve system in the euro area. Section 3 examines open market operations, Section 4 examines the standing facilities and Section 5 looks at counterparties. Finally, chapter 6 describes at eligible collateral.

This paper aims to clarify the relationship between wealth and trustworthiness with the goal of understanding why micro‐lending institutions grant loans to poor individuals countering well‐known models of credit markets and credit rationing, such as those proposed by Stiglitz and Weiss. Micro‐credit markets appear to be based on two conjectures: the poor are trustworthy, and their willingness to pay for credit is relatively high.

The paper simulates trust‐based lending in an experimental setting to determine whether the conjecture that the poor are trustworthy is plausible. By conducting the experiments in the USA, a wealthy developed country, and China, a developing country where formal micro‐finance institutions have not established a visible presence, it is possible to test the conjecture and draw cross‐cultural comparisons.

The paper finds that while the absolute level of family income had no significant effect on repayment behavior, US borrowers that perceived themselves as having a family income that was relatively lower than other US households repaid at higher rates. Therefore, evidence was found that trustworthiness might be a function of perceived relative wealth or social status rather than the absolute level of wealth or income.

The research results may be difficult to generalize because of the experimental approach and use of students as participants.

The paper includes implications for the administration of micro‐credit loans in China and other developing nations.

This paper experimentally tests a conjecture which appears to be the foundation of micro‐credit markets.

Most households in Sub-Saharan African cannot afford adequate housing. Most often, their pension benefits are also meagre, usually resulting from low contribution levels and mismanagement. Coupled with low life expectancies, most would not live to enjoy the benefits of pensions, thus validating the need to utilize their hitherto deferred pension benefits for immediate housing investment and consumption.

Quantitative research methodology via the present value technique was used in valuing pension benefits to demonstrate the potential of pension schemes as savings mobilization mechanisms for long-term pension-backed housing financing in Ghana.

Policy wise, the paper provides some evidence to support proposals for the development of pension-backed housing finance systems in Ghana with lessons for Sub-Saharan Africa. The authors demonstrate that the Tier 2 defined contribution mandatory occupational pension scheme could serve the purpose of a savings mobilization mechanism for long-term housing financing. The authors observe that by increasing the Tier 2 contribution rate to 30 per cent, the majority of the sample, mainly of the middle-income class, could accumulate between US$11,000 and US$17,000 over their working life. At the same rate, between US$5,783 and US$9,550 could have been raised as savings between 2010 (when implementation began) and 2014. This could form a substantial equity contribution in a mortgage investment and or borrowed on a housing microfinance basis.

The paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the need to develop alternate savings mechanisms and collateral assets using pension assets, other than property, for mortgage financing. The proposals made are aimed at influencing policy by way of advocating for the use of latent pension equity to improve the housing conditions of members while they are alive, and also to suggest pension-backed housing financing as an alternative investment option. A comprehensive study would be required to settle issues of scalability, pricing and model design.