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Examines the respective concepts of collateral warranties and latent defects insurance, and the strengths and weaknesses of each arrangement. Discusses the objective or protecting owner and occupier, the collateral warranty matrix, building‐specific advantages of LDI, and recent events in the LDI market. Concludes that the inherent uncertainties in collateral warranties are likely to result in increased appreciation and demand for latent defects insurance.

The construction industry has been subject to substantial criticism for its short-term “hit-and-run” relationships which are focussed on win-lose situations. Despite the wide recognition of these problems the industry persistently resists the radical demanded of it. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is twofold. First, to investigate why this might be the case by reviewing the governance problem confronting clients and decision makers in construction procurement, as conceptualised in transaction cost economics (TCE). Second, to critically analyse and question the efficiency and effectiveness of various safeguarding approaches, which are taken for granted and commonly practiced in construction, from a lean perspective.

The analysis of this paper is based on an in-depth critical review of 76 construction procurement and contractual-related articles, ranging from 1994 to 2016, using theories of Lean construction and TCE as an analytical lens.

Findings reveal that clients and decision makers often tend to safeguard their project-specific assets, against opportunism and exploitation, through the deployment of formal contractual arrangements and governance structures. These arrangements and structures typically dominate the management of the project delivery often to the detriment of the project itself; but because there is a belief that interests are safeguarded, clients and decision makers feel they have taken the best course of action. This goes a long way to explaining the coherence of the current construction model.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first to demonstrate the usefulness of using principles of Lean construction in association with TCE when analysing construction-procurement-related issues. In particular, the use of a “lean” lens helps to expose the impact of procurement governance arrangements on process flow. The study also provides a potential research agenda that can lead to the development of prescriptive conceptual frameworks for causal analysis of institutionalised waste in construction.

The paper attempts to expose to clients and decision makers the amount of waste (and unnecessary cost) they embed by adhering to prevailing unfit-for-purpose contractual governance approaches. It also helps decision makers to consider alternative procurement arrangements and organisational techniques that could be of value and support collaborative ways of working.

The study contributes to the overall understanding of waste in construction by providing insight into various imperfect procurement and contractual arrangements, which are taken for granted and impede efficiency and improvement efforts in construction. The findings presented provide a theoretical anchor and rationale for developing alternative approaches to the design and delivery of capital projects.

Considers the effects of latent building defects and the contractual rights that exist when a defect is found, depending on the age of the building. Examines the various insurance options available – commercial property insurance, public liability insurance, and legal liability policies – as well as the latest developments in latent defect insurance and how this can be arranged. Concludes that building defects will continue to arise and that already available latent defects insurance may become a legislated necessity.

Gives an account of the phenomenon of increased use of collateral warranties within the property industry as a means of affording a recourse against building producers. Outlines the legal situation which has led to concentration on the device of collateral warranties. Explains the legal nature of such warranties. Considers some of the issues and difficulties which have been identified since their use has increased.

In Table IV. are given the averages of the three samples of each cow's milk given morning and evening. The average fat for the three samples of the milk of cow A is 3.92; cow B, 3.26; and cow C, 3.24, and if these were all mixed together the average fat would be 3.45 for the morning milk. The average fat of the three samples taken from the cows A, B, and C in the afternoon is—A, 5.08; B, 3.08; and C, 3.54; and the average of the three milks is 3.85. In the same table are shown the first two samples of each cow's milk mixed together both morning and evening. By referring to Tables II. and III. under cow A it will be seen that the milk fat of the first and second samples is 2.30 and 3.67, and these added together are shown on Table IV. under cow A, and similarly with cow B and cow C night and morning. It will also be seen that the milk fat in the morning milk of cow A is 3.21; cow B, 2.49; and cow C, 2.15, and if these were mixed together the average fat would be 2.61. The average fat of two samples of milk taken from cow A in the afternoon is 4.50; cow B, 2.67; cow C, 2.12, and if mixed together the average fat is 3.08. It is interesting to note that if cow B was milked for six minutes in the morning, and the milk sold, the sample would be .51 deficient in fat, and the dairyman could honestly say that the milk was sold as it came from the cow. There is also a deficiency in the fat of the milk of cow C in the morning, and cows B and C in the afternoon.

Construction project delivery is hinged on the performance of the contractor and subcontractors. In many private construction projects in the UK, there are trust issues between the subcontractor and contractor, especially when there are no collateral warranties to protect the rights of the subcontractors. The purpose of this study is to investigate and identify the causations of distrust between subcontractors and contractors and proffered panaceas.

Qualitative open-ended questions were used. Twenty respondents, mainly supervisors, tradesmen, subcontractors and main contractors in the UK, were interviewed. The thematic analysis approach was used to identify the dominant themes.

The interview findings were presented descriptively, and the frequency approach identified more occurring themes from the interviewees’ responses. The six themes contributing to distrust between subcontractor and contractor are financial pressures, partnering approach, payment and trust, nature of trust, internal influence and unfair payment.

The findings of this study revealed that many subcontractors have limited knowledge of the clauses in contracts they are entering into. Thus, in addition to obtaining collateral warranties, subcontractors must carefully understand their contractual obligations and payment arrangements before agreeing to be part of a construction project.

Although this study aimed to shed light on the distrust between subcontractors and contractors in private UK construction projects, improvements in contract administration, subcontractors continued professional development and improved valuation processes can reduce distrust between subcontractors and contractors.

The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides:

Compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals published by MCB University Press: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

Index by subjects, compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.