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Faced with the financing problem of small-medium enterprises (SMEs), China has attempted to establish as many as third party's collateral institutions. The paper aims to study the design of collateral arrangements including collateral fee rates, risk sharing, collateral capital requirements, types of collateral institutions and recollateral institution, etc.

The paper extends the model of Holmstrom and Tirole to develop the analytic framework of the theory of financing collateral. From the perspective of contract design, the paper establishes a moral hazard model focusing on the minimum capital requirement of the borrower under the condition of risk neutral and limited liability, while considering the structure of lender-collateral institution-borrower.

According to the research, only under certain conditions can third party's collateral arrangements tackle the financing problems of SMEs. Diversification, anti-collateral and linked-transactions are three means to improve financing conditions, but the most important way is efficient monitoring by collateral institutions, especially when it has relative advantage over the lender. In order to improve financing conditions of SMEs, China should rely more on efficient monitoring by banks not on excess development of collateral institutions, meanwhile relax rigid collateral supervision policies. Collateral institutions should be industry-specific, association or transaction-related type.

First, from the perspective of contract design, the paper analyzes the comprehensive institutional arrangements of third party's collateral considering mutual relationships of component elements and develops the analytic framework of the theory of third party's collateral, especially points out necessary conditions of its efficient arrangements. Second, the paper studies various efficient financing mechanisms under the institutional arrangements of third party's collateral and focusing on the role of monitoring and monitors, and the paper also has important policy implications, i.e. the paper should develop specific collateral institutions and promote monitoring role of credit institutions.

The paper aims to investigate whether the Islamic banks (IBs) and the conventional banks (CBs) could be distinguished from one another on the basis of their capital structure, profitability and their respective determinants with using a multivariate statistical method for analysis of data.

The paper provides a comparative study based on a predictive model, the binary logistic regression, using a sample of 53 listed CBs and 45 listed IBs from the Middle East region for the period 2006-2014.

The binary logistic regression reveals that profitability and capital structure are good predictors that help to distinguish between the two categories of banks. Results suggest that higher are the net margin and capital ratio, higher is the probability that the bank is Islamic. For the return on assets, results show that lower is this value; higher is the likelihood that the bank is Islamic. Regarding their related determinants, the findings suggest first that banks with higher dividend payout policy, financing ratio, costs ratio and insolvency risk are more likely to be Islamic. Second, results suggest that banks with lower collaterals, size and credit risk are more likely to be Islamic.

The study contributes to the growing literature on corporate finance and Islamic banking. Analyzing the capital structure and profitability of the two categories of banks is important for investors, financial analysts and regulators. Understanding the differences contributes to understand how following Islamic finance principles and being under Sharīʿah governance could impact the bank profitability and financial decision, as well as investors behavior.

The study contributes to the scare literature dedicated to the use of the multivariate statistical methods for the analysis of data to compare the financial characteristics of IBs and CBs.

Collateral consequences (CCs) of criminal convictions such as disenfranchisement, occupational restrictions, exclusions from public housing, and loss of welfare benefits represent one of the salient yet hidden features of the contemporary American penal state. This chapter explores, from a comparative and historical perspective, the rise of the many indirect “regulatory” sanctions flowing from a conviction and discusses some of the unique challenges they pose for legal and policy reform. US jurisprudence and policies are contrasted with the more stringent approach adopted by European legal systems and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in safeguarding the often blurred line between criminal punishments and formally civil sanctions. The aim of this chapter is twofold: (1) to contribute to a better understanding of the overreliance of the US criminal justice systems on CCs as a device of social exclusion and control, and (2) to put forward constructive and viable reform proposals aimed at reinventing the role and operation of collateral restrictions flowing from criminal convictions.

Regulatory authorities in Myanmar are increasing banks’ independence in providing loans to facilitate better financial resource allocations. On the other hand, not only in the USA but also among European countries, policymakers are designing regulations that could reduce banks’ autonomies in risk management and decrease risk taking behaviour. These governments have made policy interventions in their banking sectors which could be identified as repressive policies. They are commonly justified as macro-prudential regulations rather than financial repression. However, the authors are yet to understand as to what extent regulations need to be tightened or loosened up to reach optimal risk-taking behaviour. Using Myanmar as an example where the extreme form of governmental interventions and prudential regulations exists, this paper aims to identify the effectiveness of such policies.

This paper relies on a case study of the Myanmar’s Banking Sector. The paper adopts of the synthesis of institutional theory and Oliver’s strategic response to identify how banks respond to repressive financial policies. The empirical evidence is collected through conducting 16 interviews including banks’ general managers, deputy chairmen and loan officers. Afterwards, the authors analysed the data using categorical thematic analysis with the assistance of NVIVO.

First of all, the extent to which repressive financial measures enforced on banks differ depending on their political affiliations and ownership structures. Second, though repressive policies were enforced on banks to curb risk taking behaviour among banks and maintain financial stability, Myanmar banks themselves had inherent nature of risk aversion towards lending. Third, in Myanmar, financial repression does not always mean banks need to compromise their efficiency in profit maximisation to achieve legitimacy from the regulatory authorities. If the formal constraints were not in line with economic actors’ internal objectives, a different set of rules of the game were formed.

This paper provides new evidences for the controversial subject on financial repression and liberalisation through analysing micro level data of banks’ lending practice rather than using aggregate macro-level data. Bank-level information provides banks’ concerns, challenges and their loan assessment process while operating under repressive financial policies. This study is also unique in the sense that it is contributing to the limited academic literature on Myanmar’s financial system. It represents the last surviving case of repressed financial system and the presence governmental interventions and prudential regulations. Hence, it was used as an example to identify the effectiveness of such policies.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the existence and determinants of the credit gap in the cinnamon value chain development in Northwestern Vietnam.

A multi-stage sampling of 548 cinnamon households and a Heckman Selection Model were applied to examine their credit access constraints. In-depth interviews with cooperatives, enterprises, banks and relevant government agencies were further conducted to explain the credit gap.

In the total 52.74 percent of households that received credit, 24.56 percent of them received an insufficient amount of credit as registered. In addition, 35.77 percent of total households are credit rationed. Although all enterprises and cooperatives had been successful in applying for credit as long as they have collateral, none of them received the full credit amount requested. The credit amount received satisfied 80.64, 43.03 and 44.28 percent of the demand by households, cooperatives and enterprises, respectively. The lack of valuable collateral assets is the most important factor explaining this credit gap. Moreover, membership in a farmer-based union or ownership of a bank account increases the probability of access to credit. Educated household heads with a larger farm size and the Kinh ethnic majority are positively associated with a larger amount of credit. Households with conventional cinnamon farming, more dependents and union non-membership are more likely to be credit rationed.

A reform on collateral management, facilitating access to bank accounts, capacity building for local farmer-based unions, organic certification, granting land use rights and facilitating a platform to share reliable information between relevant actors are needed to bridge the credit gap.

This paper analyses the determinants of credit access constraints by key actors in a medicinal plant value chain that was insufficiently discussed by previous studies in the field.

The purpose of this article is to determine the optimal use of collateral in order to maximize the borrower's wealth by reducing the interest rate payments. This analysis is to shed light on the fundamental question whether good or bad borrowers pledge more collateral.

The analysis bases on a simple firm value model similar to Merton's but with the additional feature that the borrower can bring in collateral. This article not only presents the case with perfect information between borrowers and lenders but also regards the consequences arising from asymmetric information.

A bad borrower, who is characterized by higher bankruptcy costs, riskier projects, and a lower contribution to the project value, typically pledges more collateral than a good borrower. These relationships base on the existence of perfect information between borrowers and lenders. If asymmetric information in terms of the project's riskiness or the contribution of the borrower to the project is present, these relationships invert and good borrowers tend to pledge more collateral. As a result, the allocation of information between a borrower and a lender is crucial for the optimal choice of collateral.

This research underlines the potential for firms to add firm value by pledging collateral because collateral reduces interest rates and therefore results in more attractive terms of the loan. On the other hand, further empirical research can be done to verify our theoretical finding that under perfect information bad borrowers pledge more collateral, while under asymmetric information primarily good borrowers use collateral.

This paper introduces a new motive for the use of collateral and explains – in contrast to many other theoretical models – why bad borrowers tend to pledge more collateral.

In 2022, US financial regulators proposed to mandate a single central clearing mechanism for treasury bonds and repo transactions to stabilize financial markets. The systemic risks inherent in repo markets were first highlighted by the global financial crisis and, as a response, global financial authorities such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and Bank for International Settlements (BIS) have advocated for the introduction of a central counterparty (CCP). This study examines the structural characteristics of Korean repo markets and proposes the introduction of CCPs as a way to mitigate systemic risk. To this end, the author analyzes the structural differences between US and European repo markets and estimates the potential consequences of introducing CCP clearing in local repo markets. In general, CCPs offer two benefits: they can reduce required capital through netting in multilateral transactions, and they can mitigate the effects of risk transfer by isolating counterparty risk during periods of turbulence. In Korea, the latter effect is expected to play a pivotal role in mitigating potential risks.

In the USA, sex offender policy research has focussed on demographic characteristics of registrants, recidivism rates of registrants, accuracy and completeness of listed information, and the collateral consequences experienced by registrants. This growing body of research demonstrates the need to explore offender perceptions of sex offender registration and notification (SORN) laws. The purpose of this paper is to assess whether registration related variables influenced sex offenders’ opinions about the registry, compliance with the registry, self-worth, and deterrence perceptions.

This paper utilized a sample of 286 male registered sex offenders (RSO) in Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin. Four multivariate regression models were run to examine registration related variables impact on sex offender opinions of the registry, registry compliance, feelings of self-worth, and perceptions of deterrence.

The multivariate regression results suggest registration related variables have a significant impact on RSO opinion of the registry, compliance with the registry, and opinions of self. Specifically, the number of collateral consequences that one experienced, police contacts that RSOs had, and being recognized as a sex offender were significantly related to the dependent variables in the regression models.

This study adds to the body of research that indicates sex offenders experience a myriad of consequences that are outside the scope of the registered sex offender laws. Policy implications and societal consequences of these findings are discussed, as well as a future research agenda.

This paper takes Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2021 as research samples to investigate the influence of supplier concentration on debt maturity structure and its mechanism. It further analyzes whether the relationship between the two is different in the case of different monetary policies, collateral assets, and total debt. The research conclusion is of practical significance for enterprises to construct a balanced debt maturity structure and prevent financial risks.

This paper adopts the empirical research method. The data came from the CSMAR database, which eliminated ST and *ST and companies with missing data, resulting in a sample of 20,328. Stata16 was used for statistical analysis.

There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between supplier concentration and debt maturity structure, and market position and trade credit play an intermediary role. In the case of tight monetary policy, fewer collateral assets, and higher total debt, the inverse U-shaped relationship is more significant.

This paper examines the relationship between supplier concentration and debt maturity structure from a non-linear perspective for the first time, providing theoretical support for enterprises to form a reasonable debt structure, and deepening the theoretical cognition of the relationship between supplier concentration and corporate debt maturity structure.

The aim of the paper is to analyse female and male loan officers' (LOs) risk aversion as they assess different types of small- and medium-sized enterprises' (SMEs) loan applications.

The data were gathered from a sample of 75 Swedish LOs, using the repertory grid technique and related questions. The data were analysed statistically.

The findings demonstrate that female LOs focus more on collateral (used as a proxy for risk aversion) in their evaluations of first-time loan applications than male LOs. However, the findings also suggest that there are no significant differences between the two groups as far as risk aversion when they evaluate additional loan applications. The other variables controlled for (age, tenure, insight, education, and location) did not significantly affect the LOs' risk aversion.

The study might have benefited from the use of complementary data collection approaches. Access to actual assessment and decision-making procedures could have increased the understanding of female and male LOs' attitudes toward risk.

The findings suggest that by the use of female-male LO teams, banks may achieve more balanced assessments of SMEs' loan applications.

To the authors' knowledge, the literature has not explicitly addressed risk aversion among female and male LOs with respect to different types of bank loans. Moreover, the authors investigated risk aversion in the context of standardised assessments procedures used to reduce exposure to credit risk.