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Cognitive moral development, often referred to as moral reasoning, stems from the field of cognitive developmental psychology and moral psychology. Early work done by Jean Piaget studying the cognitive abilities of children to make moral judgments as they grow and mature created the foundation for the later work of Lawrence Kohlberg and James Rest in studying the moral reasoning abilities of adults. Thus, moral reasoning refers to the cognitive process of how a person reasons about ethical situations. This chapter will present the evolution of the use and validity of cognitive moral development/moral reasoning in determining how individuals resolve ethical or moral dilemmas. Further, more recent models and potential measurement of moral reasoning and ethical decision-making including our intuition and emotions will be discussed and suggestions regarding directions for developing methods to measure such cognitive and emotional (or intuitive) means by which individuals make difficult moral choices will be discussed.

Lawrence Kohlberg's (1969) concept of cognitive moral development (CMD) has been one of the most investigated constructs in the field of social psychology, with over one thousand studies reported investigating this construct in only two decades of research. However, what is the relationship of this theoretical construct to actual decision making and behavior? Blasi (1980, p. 4) opined for the criticality of moral judgement research to both ethical decision making and ethical inquiry, stating that “without judgement, an action, no matter how beneficial, would not be moral.” Relating Kohlberg's model to business decision making and behavior has been central to the building of theoretical frameworks of the ethical decision making process engaged in by individuals. The models of this process proposed by Trevino and Youngblood (1990), Trevino (1986), Bommer, Gratto, Gravender, and Tuttle (1987), Ferrell and Gresham (1985), Ferrell, Gresham, and Fraedrich (1989), Swinyard, DeLong, and Cheng (1989), and Jones (1991) all contained cognitive moral development as a factor in their respective models of ethical decision making.

The widespread usage of artificial intelligence (AI) is prompting a number of ethical issues, including those involving concerns for fairness, surveillance, transparency, neutrality and human rights. The purpose of this manuscript is to explore possibility of developing cognitive morality in AI systems.

This is explorative research. The manuscript investigates the likelihood of cognitive moral development in AI systems as well as potential pathways for such development. Concurrently, it proposes a novel idea for the characterization and development of ethically conscious and artificially intelligent robotic machines.

This manuscript explores the possibility of categorizing AI machines according to the level of cognitive morality they embody, and while doing so, it makes use of Lawrence Kohlberg's study related to cognitive moral development in humans. The manuscript further suggests that by providing appropriate inputs to AI machines in accordance with the proposed concept, humans may assist in the development of an ideal AI creature that would be morally more responsible and act as moral agents, capable of meeting the demands of morality.

This manuscript has some restrictions because it focuses exclusively on Kohlberg's perspective. This theory is not flawless. Carol Gilligan, one of Kohlberg's former doctoral students, said that Kohlberg's proposal was unfair and sexist because it didn't take into account the views and experiences of women. Even if one follows the law, they may still be engaging in immoral behaviour, as Kohlberg argues, because laws and social norms are not perfect. This study makes it easier for future research in the field to look at how the ideas of people like Joao Freire and Carl Rogers can be used in AI systems.

It is an original research that derives inspiration from the cognitive moral development theory of American Professor named Lawrence Kohlberg. The authors present a fresh way of thinking about how to classify AI systems, which should make it easier to give robots cognitive morality.

To succeed in today’s dynamic and unpredictable business world, businesses are increasingly required to gain the trust of and inform the society in which they operate about the social and environmental consequences of their actions. Corporations’ claims regarding the responsibility and ethicality of their actions, however, have been shown to be contradictory to some degree. We define corporations’ deceitful implementation of their corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies as pseudo-CSR. We argue that it is the moral characteristics of individuals, i.e. employees, managers and other decision-makers who ignore the CSR policies, which produce pseudo-CSR.

This is a conceptual paper.

The authors conceptualize the gap between true CSR and pseudo-CSR on a cognitive individual level as “moral laxity,” resulting from organization-induced lack of effort concerning individual moral development through ethical discourse, ethical sensemaking and subjectification processes. The absence of these processes prohibits individuals in organizations from constructing ethical identities to inhibit pseudo-CSR activities.

This paper contributes to the literature on CSR by augmenting corporate-level responsibility with the hitherto mostly neglected, yet significant, role of the individual in bridging this gap.

Our paper discusses the need for continued focus on ethical leadership and the importance and benefits of ethical leadership development. We propose integrating ethical leadership development, that uses cognitive development theory, into the Center for Creative Leadership’s Assess, Challenge, and Support (ACS) leader development model to help address the continued failures of ethical leader development. Our extended framework includes values and morals as a component of the model, and ethical organizational culture as its backdrop, thereby incorporating an examination of ethical leadership into each component of the ACS model. We conclude with practical implications and suggestions for future research.

This paper aims to investigate the role of cognitive moral development (CMD) in tax compliance decision. In particular, the study compares tax compliance degree in two different tax systems: synergistic and antagonistic tax climates.

Build on the CMD theory, this study uses a paper and pencil laboratory experiment that involved 157 participants to test the hypotheses.

CMD has significant contribution to the tax compliance decision, especially for taxpayers at both the pre-conventional and conventional level. Taxpayers who have achieved post-conventional level, however, do not shift their compliance degree even when the tax climate changed. The present results support the CMD theory.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the present study is the first to investigate the role of CMDin tax compliance decision by comparing two different tax systems: synergistic and antagonistic tax climates. This study has theoretical and practical contributions. From theoretical perspective, the findings provide evidence that CMD influence tax compliance decision-making processes. In the practical terms, this research may provide a deep insight on the important of government and tax authorities to improve the taxpayers’ moral cognitive, e.g. through any activities which aims to boost them to the level of post-conventional.

Behavioral ethics research in the field of management is burgeoning. While many advancements have been made, applying an organizational neuroscience approach to this area of research has the possibility of creating significant new theoretical, empirical, and practical contributions. We overview the major areas of behavioral ethics research concerning moral cognition and conation, and then we concentrate on existing neuroscience applications to moral cognition (moral awareness, moral judgment/reasoning, effects of moral emotions on moral reasoning, and ethical ideology). We also demonstrate the usefulness of neuroscience applications to organizational behavioral ethics research by summarizing a recent study on the neuroscience of ethical leadership. We close by recommending future research that applies neuroscience to topics such as moral development, group ethical judgments and group moral approbation, and moral conation (e.g., moral courage and moral identity). Our overall purpose is to encourage future neuroscience research on organizational behavioral ethics to supplement and/or complement existing psychological approaches.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of length of service and ethical ideologies on cognitive moral development (CMD) and ethical behavioral intentions among public sector tax auditors in Brazil.

The research data were collected via survey questionnaires from a sample of 625 auditors who work for the Brazilian tax authority. Participants voluntarily complete an online instrument which included three scenarios with context-specific moral dilemmas, questions about the specific scenarios and an ethics position questionnaire. Multinomial logistic and ordinary least squares regressions were used to analyze the data.

The findings reveal that public sector tax auditors with shorter length of service are more likely to be at higher stages of moral development; relativistic ideology among public sector auditors is positively associated with more lenient ethical behavioral intention; idealistic ideology among public sector auditors is positively associated with stricter ethical behavioral intention; public sector auditors classified as absolutists are stricter in their ethical behavioral intentions; and public sector auditors classified as absolutists with length of service between 5 and 15 years are more likely to be at higher stages of moral development when compared to public sector tax auditors with longer length of service.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the study is one of the first studies that attempt to understand the effects of length of service and ethical ideology on CMD and ethical behavioral intention among public sector auditors. Additionally, it examines these issues in the context of Latin America.

This article aims to analyze and discuss the role of moral development in treatment of behavior problems and, further, to describe differences and similarities between two different methods – milieu therapy (MT) and cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) – in terms of addressing criminogenic needs and promoting moral development.

By performing a literature review, the study shows that even though there are both pros and cons using MT and CBT in institutional care, relationships strong enough to restructure a young person's moral reasoning require time, and involves not only the young person's parents and social network members, but also a genuine therapeutic alliance with clinical staff at the institution.

These are central factors articulated in both CBT and MT, but are more explicitly expressed in MT. The results presented in this article highlight some important practical implications: in order to redevelop moral self and societal values, an overly narrow focus on criminogenic needs might exclude other components or processes of treatment and behavioral change. Together with a treatment program that views close staff‐resident interactions as of secondary importance, this could impair the possibility to obtain positive and long‐lasting treatment results.

In practice, moral development itself should be considered as an overall treatment goal, integrated into the daily life at the institution, 24 hours a day. Finally, the possibility to work with moral development in institutional settings is discussed.

In this chapter, we propose and discuss a framework to organise some of the individual difference constructs which have appeared consistently in the business ethics literature. Although many constructs have appeared in both conceptual and empirical work in the major business ethics journals, there has been little effort to categorise such constructs in accord with recognised frameworks. In our work, we rely on the industrial/organisational psychology literature to provide a starting point for categorising individual differences. Using the business ethics literature, we then develop a framework composed of three broad categories: cognitive skills, moral volition and personal values. We then provide examples within each category of the framework, and map these examples onto subcategories under each of the major categories. Finally, we organise the complete framework into a comprehensive table and we discuss several implications that may inform future research.