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Previous literature provides mixed evidence about the effectiveness of a code of ethics in limiting managerial opportunism. While some studies find that code of ethics is merely window-dressing, others find that they do influence managers' behavior. The present study investigates whether the quality of a code of ethics decreases the cost of equity by limiting managerial opportunism.

In order to test the hypothesis, the authors perform an empirical analysis on a sample of US companies in the 2004–2012 period. The results are robust to a battery of robustness analyses that the authors performed in order to take care of endogeneity.

Empirical results indicate that a higher quality code of ethics is associated with a lower cost of equity. In other words, firms with a more comprehensive code of ethics and better-designed implementation procedures limit managerial opportunism and pay a lower cost of equity because they are perceived by investors to be less risky.

The authors contribute to the literature in two ways. First, by looking at the market reaction to the code of ethics, thus capturing all its indirect possible benefits and second, by measuring not only the existence but also the quality of a code of ethics. Based on the results, policymakers may choose to further promote codes of ethics as an effective corporate governance mechanism.

This study aims to explore the controllability of risk culture, identify and categorize risk culture controls used in firms and explore how industry and ownership structure affect the use of different risk culture controls.

This explorative study is based on 32 semi-structured interviews with 37 participants who are heads of risk management or top managers in German firms from different industries with different ownership structures.

Interviewees perceive risk culture to be largely controllable. The authors identify a wide spectrum of risk culture controls, ranging from leadership and motivational controls to risk competence controls; in each category, the authors find value-, symbol- and clan-based controls. Leadership controls were most extensively discussed by the interviewees. The use of risk culture controls varied based on industry and ownership structure.

Due to the explorative character of the approach, the authors cannot claim representativeness for the results. The study is limited to one point in time and to a German sample. The findings imply that companies should select risk culture controls according to their own context and that implementation requires support by the top and middle management.

The authors respond to the call for more organizational studies on risk management that consider cultural paradigms (Arena et al., 2010; Mikes, 2011; Power, 2009). The study systematically identifies risk culture controls used in corporate practice and categorizes them. It provides tentative evidence of the relevance of context-specific factors for the use of risk culture controls.

This paper aims to empirically investigate the relationship between the level of compliance with the German Corporate Governance Code’s (GCGC) recommendations and the implied cost of equity capital (ICC). German listed companies are required by law to annually disclose their compliance with the recommendations of the GCGC. Whether the GCGC achieves its aim to promote the trust of stakeholders in the management and supervision is still an open question.

ICC is regressed on a score that captures compliance with the GCGC and several control variables. The dataset covers the period of 2003-2012 with declarations of compliance from 447 companies. ICC is chosen as an outcome variable, as it captures general investment risk as well as risk arising from asymmetric information and mistrust of investors in management.

The results of the empirical analysis demonstrate that a higher level of GCGC compliance is associated with lower ICC.

It is expected that the results of this study will strengthen acceptance of the GCGC and empirically support the work of the government commission that is responsible for it. It has not been analyzed yet whether the firms cite good reasons why they do not adhere to certain items.

This empirical analysis is the first to provide statistically reliable evidence on how compliance with the GCGC affects ICC and whether the work of the government commission reflects good corporate governance as perceived by capital markets.

The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) on the performance of the listed companies in Malaysia.

Panel data estimation techniques were used to run the regression in this study, following Baltagi (1995). The authors have selected 116 listed companies to Bursa Malaysia during the period 1996-2014, to study the effect of corporate governance on firm performance. Listed companies in Malaysia are mandatory to comply with MCCG rules and regulations.

It was found that there was a significant improvement in the performance of listed companies after Malaysian Government’s implementation of MCCG (2000) which means that MCCG matters for firm performance in Malaysia. It was also found that there was no significance difference in the overall impact of implementation of MCCG on performance level between government-linked companies (GLCs) and private companies (PCs).

The authors have selected only 116 listed companies to Bursa Malaysia during the period 1996-2014, to study the effect of corporate governance on firm performance. The selection of the data was based on the availability of data in Thomson data stream.

The findings had contributed to the understanding that the MCCG has improved significantly the performance of listed companies in Malaysia.

This study examines the value implications of oil price uncertainty for investors in diversified firms using a sample of 922 USA firms from 2001 to 2019.

Our study employs a panel dataset to examine the value implications of oil price uncertainty for diversified firm investors. We consider several alternative specifications to account for unobserved factors and measurement errors that could potentially bias our results. In particular, we use alternative measures of the excess value of diversified firms and oil price uncertainty, additional control variables, fixed-effects models, the Oster test, impact threshold for confounding variable (ITCV) analysis, two-stage least square instrumental variable (2SLS-IV) analysis and the system-GMM model.

We find that the excess value of diversified firms, relative to a benchmark portfolio of single-segment firms, increases with high oil price uncertainty. The impact of oil price uncertainty is asymmetric, as corporate diversification is value-increasing for diversified firm investors only when the volatility is due to positive oil price changes and amidst supply-driven oil price shocks. The excess value increases irrespective of diversified firms’ financial constraints and oil usage. Diversified firms become conservative in their internal capital allocations with high oil price uncertainty. Such conservatism is value-increasing for diversified firm investors, as it supports higher performance in response to oil price uncertainty.

Our study has three important implications: first, they are relevant to investors in understanding the portfolio value implications of oil price uncertainty. Second, they are helpful for firm managers while comprehending the value-relevant implications of internal capital allocations. Finally, our findings are policy relevant in the context of the future of diversified firms in developed markets.

Our study explores friction costs in terms of competition and market structure, considering factors such as market share, industry leverage levels, industry hedging levels, number of peers, and the geographic concentration that influences reinsurance purchase in the Property and Casualty insurance industry in China. Financial factors that influence the hedging level are also included. The data are hand collected from 2008 to 2015 from the Chinese Insurance Yearbook. Using panel data analysis techniques, the results are interesting. The capital structure shows a significant negative relationship with the hedging level. Group has a negative relationship with reinsurance purchases. Assets exhibit a negative relationship with hedging levels. The hedging level has a negative relation with the individual hedging level. Insurers have less incentive to hedge because it provides less resource than leverage. The study also robustly investigates the strategic risk management separately by the financial crises.

In this paper, we explore an extensive panel data set covering more than 4,000 listed firms in 16 European countries to study the effects of shareholder protection on ownership structure and firm performance. We document a negative firm-level correlation between shareholder protection and ownership concentration. Differentiating between shareholder types, we find that this pattern is mainly driven by strategic investors. In contrast, we find a positive correlation between shareholder protection and block ownership of institutional investors, in particular when we restrict the analysis to independent institutional investors. Finally, we find that independent institutional investors are positively associated with firm valuation as measured by Tobin’s Q. The opposite applies for strategic investors. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that (i) high shareholder protection and (ii) limited ownership by strategic investors make small investors and investors interested in security returns more confident in their investments.

Capitalizing on a unique measure of takeover susceptibility principally based on the staggered implementation of state laws, this study aims to explore the takeover market’s effect on managerial ownership. The market for corporate control, often known as the takeover market, is an important external governance mechanism, whereas managerial ownership is a vital internal governance instrument. Managerial ownership brings into convergence the interests of shareholders and managers. The originality of this study arises from the usage of state-level anti-takeover legislations as a measure which is beyond the control of firms and plausibly exogenous to firm-specific characteristics.

In addition to the standard regression analysis, this study also executes a variety of robustness checks to minimize endogeneity, i.e. propensity score matching, entropy balancing, instrumental–variable analysis, Lewbel’s (2012) heteroscedastic identification and Oster’s (2019) testing for coefficient stability.

Based on a large sample of US firms, the results show that more hostile takeover threats bring about significantly lower managerial ownership. The results reinforce the prediction of the substitution hypothesis. The disciplinary function of the takeover market reduces agency conflict to the point where managerial ownership is less necessary as a governance mechanism. Specifically, a rise in takeover susceptibility by one standard deviation diminishes managerial ownership by 7.22%.

`To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to shed light on the impact of the takeover market on managerial ownership using a novel measure mainly based on the staggered adoption of state laws, which are plausibly exogenous to individual firms’ characteristics. Consequently, unlike prior research, this study is more likely to indicate a causal effect, rather than merely a correlation.

This study examines how lenders modify their behavior and their use of traditional, transaction-based lending models in credit decisions when faced with low earnings quality.

To measure the earnings quality, following Bharath, Sunder and Sunder (2008), the authors use three measures of accrual quality and combine them into a simple parsimonious measure of accrual quality. Subsequently, the authors apply the incremental R-square approach used by Kim and Kross (2005) to determine the degree to which lenders modify their reliance on financial statement ratios when faced with low accrual quality.

Consistent with prior literature, this study shows that the cost of debt is higher when accrual quality is low. In addition, this study extends prior literature by showing that lenders decrease their reliance on income statement data to make credit decisions as accrual quality decreases.

This paper broadens existing literature on the pricing of information risk in capital markets by being the first to show that lenders modify their reliance on financial statement data when faced with low-quality accruals. In addition, this paper extends the findings of Billings and Morton (2002) and demonstrates to managers the futility of using accrual manipulations to obtain more favorable credit terms. Lastly, this paper aids regulators and standard setters who seek to improve the usefulness of financial statements by showing that creditors do not appear to be misled by reporting choices that lower the quality of accruals.

This chapter shows how to identify the characteristics of borrowers that are part of a credit scoring model. The credit risk scoring model is an important tool for evaluating credit risk associated with customer characteristics that affect defaults. This research was conducted at a financial institution, a subsidiary of a commercial bank in Indonesia, to answer the challenge of determining the feasibility of providing financing quickly and accurately. This model uses a logistic regression method based on customer data with indicators of demographic characteristics, assets, occupations, and financing payments. This study identifies nine variables that meet the goodness of fit criteria, which consist of WOE, IV, and p-value. The nine variables can be used as predictors of default probability: type of work, work experience, net finance value, tenor, car brand, asset price, percentage of down payment (DP), interest, and income. The results of the study form a risk assessment model to identify variables that have a significant effect on the probability of default.